Daily Papers

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in multimodal understanding, reasoning, and interaction. Given the extensive applications of MLLMs, the associated safety issues have become increasingly critical. Due to the effectiveness of preference optimization in aligning MLLMs with human preferences, there is an urgent need for safety-related preference data for MLLMs. To address this, we construct the MMSafe-PO preference dataset towards harmless multimodal assistants, featuring multimodal instructions, the conversational format, and ranked paired responses from human feedback. We also identify two insightful observations: modality co-defense and modality cheating, which illustrate that MLLMs possess a certain level of inherent defense while still presenting unique safety challenges. Based on these observations, we propose the Blind Preference Optimization (BPO) approach. Comprehensive experiments on three benchmarks show that BPO effectively enhances the safety capabilities of MLLMs. Notably, BPO significantly improves the safety rate of the base MLLM by 45.0%, outperforming the DPO approach. Additionally, applying BPO to the MMSafe-PO dataset greatly reduces the base MLLM's unsafe rate on other safety benchmarks (14.5% on MM-SafetyBench and 82.9% on HarmEval, demonstrating the effectiveness and robustness of both the dataset and the approach. We release code and data at https://lu-yang666.github.io/MMsafe-PO-Web/.

As AI systems become more capable, we would like to enlist their help to supervise other AIs. We experiment with methods for training a harmless AI assistant through self-improvement, without any human labels identifying harmful outputs. The only human oversight is provided through a list of rules or principles, and so we refer to the method as 'Constitutional AI'. The process involves both a supervised learning and a reinforcement learning phase. In the supervised phase we sample from an initial model, then generate self-critiques and revisions, and then finetune the original model on revised responses. In the RL phase, we sample from the finetuned model, use a model to evaluate which of the two samples is better, and then train a preference model from this dataset of AI preferences. We then train with RL using the preference model as the reward signal, i.e. we use 'RL from AI Feedback' (RLAIF). As a result we are able to train a harmless but non-evasive AI assistant that engages with harmful queries by explaining its objections to them. Both the SL and RL methods can leverage chain-of-thought style reasoning to improve the human-judged performance and transparency of AI decision making. These methods make it possible to control AI behavior more precisely and with far fewer human labels.

We apply preference modeling and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) to finetune language models to act as helpful and harmless assistants. We find this alignment training improves performance on almost all NLP evaluations, and is fully compatible with training for specialized skills such as python coding and summarization. We explore an iterated online mode of training, where preference models and RL policies are updated on a weekly cadence with fresh human feedback data, efficiently improving our datasets and models. Finally, we investigate the robustness of RLHF training, and identify a roughly linear relation between the RL reward and the square root of the KL divergence between the policy and its initialization. Alongside our main results, we perform peripheral analyses on calibration, competing objectives, and the use of OOD detection, compare our models with human writers, and provide samples from our models using prompts appearing in recent related work.

Ensuring that large language models (LLMs) are both helpful and harmless is a critical challenge, as overly strict constraints can lead to excessive refusals, while permissive models risk generating harmful content. Existing approaches, such as reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and direct preference optimization (DPO), attempt to balance these trade-offs but suffer from performance conflicts, limited controllability, and poor extendability. To address these issues, we propose Preference Vector, a novel framework inspired by task arithmetic. Instead of optimizing multiple preferences within a single objective, we train separate models on individual preferences, extract behavior shifts as preference vectors, and dynamically merge them at test time. This modular approach enables fine-grained, user-controllable preference adjustments and facilitates seamless integration of new preferences without retraining. Experiments show that our proposed Preference Vector framework improves helpfulness without excessive conservatism, allows smooth control over preference trade-offs, and supports scalable multi-preference alignment.

As the integration of large language models into daily life is on the rise, there is a clear gap in benchmarks for advising on subjective and personal dilemmas. To address this, we introduce AdvisorQA, the first benchmark developed to assess LLMs' capability in offering advice for deeply personalized concerns, utilizing the LifeProTips subreddit forum. This forum features a dynamic interaction where users post advice-seeking questions, receiving an average of 8.9 advice per query, with 164.2 upvotes from hundreds of users, embodying a collective intelligence framework. Therefore, we've completed a benchmark encompassing daily life questions, diverse corresponding responses, and majority vote ranking to train our helpfulness metric. Baseline experiments validate the efficacy of AdvisorQA through our helpfulness metric, GPT-4, and human evaluation, analyzing phenomena beyond the trade-off between helpfulness and harmlessness. AdvisorQA marks a significant leap in enhancing QA systems for providing personalized, empathetic advice, showcasing LLMs' improved understanding of human subjectivity.

In recent advancements in Conversational Large Language Models (LLMs), a concerning trend has emerged, showing that many new base LLMs experience a knowledge reduction in their foundational capabilities following Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). This process often leads to issues such as forgetting or a decrease in the base model's abilities. Moreover, fine-tuned models struggle to align with user preferences, inadvertently increasing the generation of toxic outputs when specifically prompted. To overcome these challenges, we adopted an innovative approach by completely bypassing SFT and directly implementing Harmless Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). Our method not only preserves the base model's general capabilities but also significantly enhances its conversational abilities, while notably reducing the generation of toxic outputs. Our approach holds significant implications for fields that demand a nuanced understanding and generation of responses, such as customer service. We applied this methodology to Mistral, the most popular base model, thereby creating Mistral-Plus. Our validation across 11 general tasks demonstrates that Mistral-Plus outperforms similarly sized open-source base models and their corresponding instruct versions. Importantly, the conversational abilities of Mistral-Plus were significantly improved, indicating a substantial advancement over traditional SFT models in both safety and user preference alignment.

Existing works have extensively studied adversarial examples, which are minimal perturbations that can mislead the output of deep neural networks (DNNs) while remaining imperceptible to humans. However, in this work, we reveal the existence of a harmless perturbation space, in which perturbations drawn from this space, regardless of their magnitudes, leave the network output unchanged when applied to inputs. Essentially, the harmless perturbation space emerges from the usage of non-injective functions (linear or non-linear layers) within DNNs, enabling multiple distinct inputs to be mapped to the same output. For linear layers with input dimensions exceeding output dimensions, any linear combination of the orthogonal bases of the nullspace of the parameter consistently yields no change in their output. For non-linear layers, the harmless perturbation space may expand, depending on the properties of the layers and input samples. Inspired by this property of DNNs, we solve for a family of general perturbation spaces that are redundant for the DNN's decision, and can be used to hide sensitive data and serve as a means of model identification. Our work highlights the distinctive robustness of DNNs (i.e., consistency under large magnitude perturbations) in contrast to adversarial examples (vulnerability for small imperceptible noises).

With the rapid development of large language models (LLMs), they are not only used as general-purpose AI assistants but are also customized through further fine-tuning to meet the requirements of different applications. A pivotal factor in the success of current LLMs is the alignment process. Current alignment methods, such as supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), focus on training-time alignment and are often complex and cumbersome to implement. Therefore, we develop InferAligner, a novel inference-time alignment method that utilizes cross-model guidance for harmlessness alignment. InferAligner utilizes safety steering vectors extracted from safety-aligned model to modify the activations of the target model when responding to harmful inputs, thereby guiding the target model to provide harmless responses. Experimental results show that our method can be very effectively applied to domain-specific models in finance, medicine, and mathematics, as well as to multimodal large language models (MLLMs) such as LLaVA. It significantly diminishes the Attack Success Rate (ASR) of both harmful instructions and jailbreak attacks, while maintaining almost unchanged performance in downstream tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities in various language tasks but are susceptible to jailbreak attacks that circumvent their safety alignments. This paper introduces Latent Fusion Jailbreak (LFJ), a representation-based attack that interpolates hidden states from harmful and benign query pairs to elicit prohibited responses. LFJ begins by selecting query pairs with high thematic and syntactic similarity, then performs gradient-guided interpolation at influential layers and tokens, followed by optimization to balance attack success, output fluency, and computational efficiency. Evaluations on models such as Vicuna and LLaMA-2 across benchmarks like AdvBench and MaliciousInstruct yield an average attack success rate (ASR) of 94.01%, outperforming existing methods. To mitigate LFJ, we propose an adversarial training defense that fine-tunes models on interpolated examples, reducing ASR by over 80% without degrading performance on benign inputs. Ablation studies validate the importance of query pair selection, hidden state interpolation components, and optimization strategies in LFJ's effectiveness.

Dataset ownership verification, the process of determining if a dataset is used in a model's training data, is necessary for detecting unauthorized data usage and data contamination. Existing approaches, such as backdoor watermarking, rely on inducing a detectable behavior into the trained model on a part of the data distribution. However, these approaches have limitations, as they can be harmful to the model's performances or require unpractical access to the model's internals. Most importantly, previous approaches lack guarantee against false positives. This paper introduces data taggants, a novel non-backdoor dataset ownership verification technique. Our method uses pairs of out-of-distribution samples and random labels as secret keys, and leverages clean-label targeted data poisoning to subtly alter a dataset, so that models trained on it respond to the key samples with the corresponding key labels. The keys are built as to allow for statistical certificates with black-box access only to the model. We validate our approach through comprehensive and realistic experiments on ImageNet1k using ViT and ResNet models with state-of-the-art training recipes. Our findings demonstrate that data taggants can reliably make models trained on the protected dataset detectable with high confidence, without compromising validation accuracy, and demonstrates superiority over backdoor watermarking. Moreover, our method shows to be stealthy and robust against various defense mechanisms.

Optimization-based jailbreaks typically adopt the Toxic-Continuation setting in large vision-language models (LVLMs), following the standard next-token prediction objective. In this setting, an adversarial image is optimized to make the model predict the next token of a toxic prompt. However, we find that the Toxic-Continuation paradigm is effective at continuing already-toxic inputs, but struggles to induce safety misalignment when explicit toxic signals are absent. We propose a new paradigm: Benign-to-Toxic (B2T) jailbreak. Unlike prior work, we optimize adversarial images to induce toxic outputs from benign conditioning. Since benign conditioning contains no safety violations, the image alone must break the model's safety mechanisms. Our method outperforms prior approaches, transfers in black-box settings, and complements text-based jailbreaks. These results reveal an underexplored vulnerability in multimodal alignment and introduce a fundamentally new direction for jailbreak approaches.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Language models have shown promise in various tasks but can be affected by undesired data during training, fine-tuning, or alignment. For example, if some unsafe conversations are wrongly annotated as safe ones, the model fine-tuned on these samples may be harmful. Therefore, the correctness of annotations, i.e., the credibility of the dataset, is important. This study focuses on the credibility of real-world datasets, including the popular benchmarks Jigsaw Civil Comments, Anthropic Harmless & Red Team, PKU BeaverTails & SafeRLHF, that can be used for training a harmless language model. Given the cost and difficulty of cleaning these datasets by humans, we introduce a systematic framework for evaluating the credibility of datasets, identifying label errors, and evaluating the influence of noisy labels in the curated language data, specifically focusing on unsafe comments and conversation classification. With the framework, we find and fix an average of 6.16% label errors in 11 datasets constructed from the above benchmarks. The data credibility and downstream learning performance can be remarkably improved by directly fixing label errors, indicating the significance of cleaning existing real-world datasets. We provide an open-source tool, Docta, for data cleaning at https://github.com/Docta-ai/docta.

Typical neural network trainings have substantial variance in test-set performance between repeated runs, impeding hyperparameter comparison and training reproducibility. We present the following results towards understanding this variation. (1) Despite having significant variance on their test-sets, we demonstrate that standard CIFAR-10 and ImageNet trainings have very little variance in their performance on the test-distributions from which those test-sets are sampled, suggesting that variance is less of a practical issue than previously thought. (2) We present a simplifying statistical assumption which closely approximates the structure of the test-set accuracy distribution. (3) We argue that test-set variance is inevitable in the following two senses. First, we show that variance is largely caused by high sensitivity of the training process to initial conditions, rather than by specific sources of randomness like the data order and augmentations. Second, we prove that variance is unavoidable given the observation that ensembles of trained networks are well-calibrated. (4) We conduct preliminary studies of distribution-shift, fine-tuning, data augmentation and learning rate through the lens of variance between runs.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

Achieving balanced alignment of large language models (LLMs) in terms of Helpfulness, Honesty, and Harmlessness (3H optimization) constitutes a cornerstone of responsible AI, with existing methods like data mixture strategies facing limitations including reliance on expert knowledge and conflicting optimization signals. While model merging offers a promising alternative by integrating specialized models, its potential for 3H optimization remains underexplored. This paper establishes the first comprehensive benchmark for model merging in 3H-aligned LLMs, systematically evaluating 15 methods (12 training-free merging and 3 data mixture techniques) across 10 datasets associated with 5 annotation dimensions, 2 LLM families, and 2 training paradigms. Our analysis reveals three pivotal insights: (i) previously overlooked collaborative/conflicting relationships among 3H dimensions, (ii) the consistent superiority of model merging over data mixture approaches in balancing alignment trade-offs, and (iii) the critical role of parameter-level conflict resolution through redundant component pruning and outlier mitigation. Building on these findings, we propose R-TSVM, a Reweighting-enhanced Task Singular Vector Merging method that incorporates outlier-aware parameter weighting and sparsity-adaptive rank selection strategies adapted to the heavy-tailed parameter distribution and sparsity for LLMs, further improving LLM alignment across multiple evaluations. We release our trained models for further exploration.