Daily Papers

In this paper, we present JADE, a targeted linguistic fuzzing platform which strengthens the linguistic complexity of seed questions to simultaneously and consistently break a wide range of widely-used LLMs categorized in three groups: eight open-sourced Chinese, six commercial Chinese and four commercial English LLMs. JADE generates three safety benchmarks for the three groups of LLMs, which contain unsafe questions that are highly threatening: the questions simultaneously trigger harmful generation of multiple LLMs, with an average unsafe generation ratio of 70% (please see the table below), while are still natural questions, fluent and preserving the core unsafe semantics. We release the benchmark demos generated for commercial English LLMs and open-sourced English LLMs in the following link: https://github.com/whitzard-ai/jade-db. For readers who are interested in evaluating on more questions generated by JADE, please contact us. JADE is based on Noam Chomsky's seminal theory of transformational-generative grammar. Given a seed question with unsafe intention, JADE invokes a sequence of generative and transformational rules to increment the complexity of the syntactic structure of the original question, until the safety guardrail is broken. Our key insight is: Due to the complexity of human language, most of the current best LLMs can hardly recognize the invariant evil from the infinite number of different syntactic structures which form an unbound example space that can never be fully covered. Technically, the generative/transformative rules are constructed by native speakers of the languages, and, once developed, can be used to automatically grow and transform the parse tree of a given question, until the guardrail is broken. For more evaluation results and demo, please check our website: https://whitzard-ai.github.io/jade.html.

Fuzzing is an important dynamic program analysis technique designed for finding vulnerabilities in complex software. Fuzzing involves presenting a target program with crafted malicious input to cause crashes, buffer overflows, memory errors, and exceptions. Crafting malicious inputs in an efficient manner is a difficult open problem and the best approaches often apply uniform random mutations to pre-existing valid inputs. In this work, we propose to adopt fine-tuned large language models (FuzzCoder) to learn patterns in the input files from successful attacks to guide future fuzzing explorations. Specifically, we develop a framework to leverage the code LLMs to guide the mutation process of inputs in fuzzing. The mutation process is formulated as the sequence-to-sequence modeling, where LLM receives a sequence of bytes and then outputs the mutated byte sequence. FuzzCoder is fine-tuned on the created instruction dataset (Fuzz-Instruct), where the successful fuzzing history is collected from the heuristic fuzzing tool. FuzzCoder can predict mutation locations and strategies locations in input files to trigger abnormal behaviors of the program. Experimental results show that FuzzCoder based on AFL (American Fuzzy Lop) gain significant improvements in terms of effective proportion of mutation (EPM) and number of crashes (NC) for various input formats including ELF, JPG, MP3, and XML.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread use in various applications due to their powerful capability to generate human-like text. However, prompt injection attacks, which involve overwriting a model's original instructions with malicious prompts to manipulate the generated text, have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of LLMs. Ensuring that LLMs are robust against such attacks is crucial for their deployment in real-world applications, particularly in critical tasks. In this paper, we propose PROMPTFUZZ, a novel testing framework that leverages fuzzing techniques to systematically assess the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Inspired by software fuzzing, PROMPTFUZZ selects promising seed prompts and generates a diverse set of prompt injections to evaluate the target LLM's resilience. PROMPTFUZZ operates in two stages: the prepare phase, which involves selecting promising initial seeds and collecting few-shot examples, and the focus phase, which uses the collected examples to generate diverse, high-quality prompt injections. Using PROMPTFUZZ, we can uncover more vulnerabilities in LLMs, even those with strong defense prompts. By deploying the generated attack prompts from PROMPTFUZZ in a real-world competition, we achieved the 7th ranking out of over 4000 participants (top 0.14%) within 2 hours. Additionally, we construct a dataset to fine-tune LLMs for enhanced robustness against prompt injection attacks. While the fine-tuned model shows improved robustness, PROMPTFUZZ continues to identify vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of robust testing for LLMs. Our work emphasizes the critical need for effective testing tools and provides a practical framework for evaluating and improving the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks.

Fuzzing is effective for vulnerability discovery but struggles with complex targets such as compilers, interpreters, and database engines, which accept textual input that must satisfy intricate syntactic and semantic constraints. Although language models (LMs) have attracted interest for this task due to their vast latent knowledge and reasoning potential, their practical adoption has been limited. The major challenges stem from insufficient exploration of deep program logic among real-world codebases, and the high cost of leveraging larger models. To overcome these challenges, we propose R1-Fuzz, the first framework that leverages reinforcement learning (RL) to specialize cost-efficient LMs and integrate them for complex textual fuzzing input generation. R1-Fuzz introduces two key designs: coverage-slicing-based question construction and a distance-based reward calculation. Through RL-based post-training of a model with our constructed dataset, R1-Fuzz designs a fuzzing workflow that tightly integrates LMs to reason deep program semantics during fuzzing. Evaluations on diverse real-world targets show that our design enables a small model, named R1-Fuzz-7B, to rival or even outperform much larger models in real-world fuzzing. Notably, R1-Fuzz achieves up to 75\% higher coverage than state-of-the-art fuzzers and discovers 29 previously unknown vulnerabilities, demonstrating its practicality.

Large language models (LLM) have achieved impressive performance on medical question-answering benchmarks. However, high benchmark accuracy does not imply that the performance generalizes to real-world clinical settings. Medical question-answering benchmarks rely on assumptions consistent with quantifying LLM performance but that may not hold in the open world of the clinic. Yet LLMs learn broad knowledge that can help the LLM generalize to practical conditions regardless of unrealistic assumptions in celebrated benchmarks. We seek to quantify how well LLM medical question-answering benchmark performance generalizes when benchmark assumptions are violated. Specifically, we present an adversarial method that we call MedFuzz (for medical fuzzing). MedFuzz attempts to modify benchmark questions in ways aimed at confounding the LLM. We demonstrate the approach by targeting strong assumptions about patient characteristics presented in the MedQA benchmark. Successful "attacks" modify a benchmark item in ways that would be unlikely to fool a medical expert but nonetheless "trick" the LLM into changing from a correct to an incorrect answer. Further, we present a permutation test technique that can ensure a successful attack is statistically significant. We show how to use performance on a "MedFuzzed" benchmark, as well as individual successful attacks. The methods show promise at providing insights into the ability of an LLM to operate robustly in more realistic settings.

Vulnerabilities related to option combinations pose a significant challenge in software security testing due to their vast search space. Previous research primarily addressed this challenge through mutation or filtering techniques, which inefficiently treated all option combinations as having equal potential for vulnerabilities, thus wasting considerable time on non-vulnerable targets and resulting in low testing efficiency. In this paper, we utilize carefully designed prompt engineering to drive the large language model (LLM) to predict high-risk option combinations (i.e., more likely to contain vulnerabilities) and perform fuzz testing automatically without human intervention. We developed a tool called ProphetFuzz and evaluated it on a dataset comprising 52 programs collected from three related studies. The entire experiment consumed 10.44 CPU years. ProphetFuzz successfully predicted 1748 high-risk option combinations at an average cost of only \$8.69 per program. Results show that after 72 hours of fuzzing, ProphetFuzz discovered 364 unique vulnerabilities associated with 12.30\% of the predicted high-risk option combinations, which was 32.85\% higher than that found by state-of-the-art in the same timeframe. Additionally, using ProphetFuzz, we conducted persistent fuzzing on the latest versions of these programs, uncovering 140 vulnerabilities, with 93 confirmed by developers and 21 awarded CVE numbers.

Grey-box fuzzers such as American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) are popular tools for finding bugs and potential vulnerabilities in programs. While these fuzzers have been able to find vulnerabilities in many widely used programs, they are not efficient; of the millions of inputs executed by AFL in a typical fuzzing run, only a handful discover unseen behavior or trigger a crash. The remaining inputs are redundant, exhibiting behavior that has already been observed. Here, we present an approach to increase the efficiency of fuzzers like AFL by applying machine learning to directly model how programs behave. We learn a forward prediction model that maps program inputs to execution traces, training on the thousands of inputs collected during standard fuzzing. This learned model guides exploration by focusing on fuzzing inputs on which our model is the most uncertain (measured via the entropy of the predicted execution trace distribution). By focusing on executing inputs our learned model is unsure about, and ignoring any input whose behavior our model is certain about, we show that we can significantly limit wasteful execution. Through testing our approach on a set of binaries released as part of the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge, we show that our approach is able to find a set of inputs that result in more code coverage and discovered crashes than baseline fuzzers with significantly fewer executions.

This paper introduces a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating how Large Language Models (LLMs) respond to linguistic shibboleths: subtle linguistic markers that can inadvertently reveal demographic attributes such as gender, social class, or regional background. Through carefully constructed interview simulations using 100 validated question-response pairs, we demonstrate how LLMs systematically penalize certain linguistic patterns, particularly hedging language, despite equivalent content quality. Our benchmark generates controlled linguistic variations that isolate specific phenomena while maintaining semantic equivalence, which enables the precise measurement of demographic bias in automated evaluation systems. We validate our approach along multiple linguistic dimensions, showing that hedged responses receive 25.6% lower ratings on average, and demonstrate the benchmark's effectiveness in identifying model-specific biases. This work establishes a foundational framework for detecting and measuring linguistic discrimination in AI systems, with broad applications to fairness in automated decision-making contexts.

Large language models (LLMs) are notorious for hallucinating, i.e., producing erroneous claims in their output. Such hallucinations can be dangerous, as occasional factual inaccuracies in the generated text might be obscured by the rest of the output being generally factual, making it extremely hard for the users to spot them. Current services that leverage LLMs usually do not provide any means for detecting unreliable generations. Here, we aim to bridge this gap. In particular, we propose a novel fact-checking and hallucination detection pipeline based on token-level uncertainty quantification. Uncertainty scores leverage information encapsulated in the output of a neural network or its layers to detect unreliable predictions, and we show that they can be used to fact-check the atomic claims in the LLM output. Moreover, we present a novel token-level uncertainty quantification method that removes the impact of uncertainty about what claim to generate on the current step and what surface form to use. Our method Claim Conditioned Probability (CCP) measures only the uncertainty of particular claim value expressed by the model. Experiments on the task of biography generation demonstrate strong improvements for CCP compared to the baselines for six different LLMs and three languages. Human evaluation reveals that the fact-checking pipeline based on uncertainty quantification is competitive with a fact-checking tool that leverages external knowledge.

Large Language Models (LLMs) possess the potential to exert substantial influence on public perceptions and interactions with information. This raises concerns about the societal impact that could arise if the ideologies within these models can be easily manipulated. In this work, we investigate how effectively LLMs can learn and generalize ideological biases from their instruction-tuning data. Our findings reveal a concerning vulnerability: exposure to only a small amount of ideologically driven samples significantly alters the ideology of LLMs. Notably, LLMs demonstrate a startling ability to absorb ideology from one topic and generalize it to even unrelated ones. The ease with which LLMs' ideologies can be skewed underscores the risks associated with intentionally poisoned training data by malicious actors or inadvertently introduced biases by data annotators. It also emphasizes the imperative for robust safeguards to mitigate the influence of ideological manipulations on LLMs.

We present FLUKE (Framework for LingUistically-driven and tasK-agnostic robustness Evaluation), a task-agnostic framework for assessing model robustness through systematic minimal variations of test data. FLUKE introduces controlled variations across linguistic levels - from orthography to dialect and style varieties - and leverages large language models (LLMs) with human validation to generate modifications. We demonstrate FLUKE's utility by evaluating both fine-tuned models and LLMs across four diverse NLP tasks, and reveal that (1) the impact of linguistic variations is highly task-dependent, with some tests being critical for certain tasks but irrelevant for others; (2) while LLMs have better overall robustness compared to fine-tuned models, they still exhibit significant brittleness to certain linguistic variations; (3) all models show substantial vulnerability to negation modifications across most tasks. These findings highlight the importance of systematic robustness testing for understanding model behaviors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in generating text that closely resemble human writing. However, they often generate factually incorrect statements, a problem typically referred to as 'hallucination'. Addressing hallucination is crucial for enhancing the reliability and effectiveness of LLMs. While much research has focused on hallucinations in English, our study extends this investigation to conversational data in three languages: Hindi, Farsi, and Mandarin. We offer a comprehensive analysis of a dataset to examine both factual and linguistic errors in these languages for GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama-3.1, Gemma-2.0, DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen-3. We found that LLMs produce very few hallucinated responses in Mandarin but generate a significantly higher number of hallucinations in Hindi and Farsi.

Hallucination has been a popular topic in natural language generation (NLG). In real-world applications, unfaithful content can result in poor data quality or loss of trust from end users. Thus, it is crucial to fact-check before adopting NLG for production usage, which can be expensive if done manually. In this paper, we investigate automated faithfulness evaluation in guided NLG. We developed a rubric template and used large language models (LLMs) to score the generation on quantifiable scales. We compared popular LLMs as well as widely adopted natural language inference (NLI) models in scoring quality and sensitivity. In addition, we developed methods for the generation of synthetic unfaithful data, as well as heuristics to quantify the percentage of hallucination. Our results on 4 travel-domain industry dataset show that GPT-4 can provide accurate judgement and explanation of whether a source and a generation are factually consistent. Furthermore, we found that tuning NLI models on synthetic data can improve performance. Lastly, we present insights on the latency and cost of deploying such a system.

Engaging in the deliberate generation of abnormal outputs from Large Language Models (LLMs) by attacking them is a novel human activity. This paper presents a thorough exposition of how and why people perform such attacks, defining LLM red-teaming based on extensive and diverse evidence. Using a formal qualitative methodology, we interviewed dozens of practitioners from a broad range of backgrounds, all contributors to this novel work of attempting to cause LLMs to fail. We focused on the research questions of defining LLM red teaming, uncovering the motivations and goals for performing the activity, and characterizing the strategies people use when attacking LLMs. Based on the data, LLM red teaming is defined as a limit-seeking, non-malicious, manual activity, which depends highly on a team-effort and an alchemist mindset. It is highly intrinsically motivated by curiosity, fun, and to some degrees by concerns for various harms of deploying LLMs. We identify a taxonomy of 12 strategies and 35 different techniques of attacking LLMs. These findings are presented as a comprehensive grounded theory of how and why people attack large language models: LLM red teaming.

Offensive language detection is an important task for filtering out abusive expressions and improving online user experiences. However, malicious users often attempt to avoid filtering systems through the involvement of textual noises. In this paper, we propose these evasions as user-intended adversarial attacks that insert special symbols or leverage the distinctive features of the Korean language. Furthermore, we introduce simple yet effective pooling strategies in a layer-wise manner to defend against the proposed attacks, focusing on the preceding layers not just the last layer to capture both offensiveness and token embeddings. We demonstrate that these pooling strategies are more robust to performance degradation even when the attack rate is increased, without directly training of such patterns. Notably, we found that models pre-trained on clean texts could achieve a comparable performance in detecting attacked offensive language, to models pre-trained on noisy texts by employing these pooling strategies.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Recently, the newly emerged multimodal models, which leverage both visual and linguistic modalities to train powerful encoders, have gained increasing attention. However, learning from a large-scale unlabeled dataset also exposes the model to the risk of potential poisoning attacks, whereby the adversary aims to perturb the model's training data to trigger malicious behaviors in it. In contrast to previous work, only poisoning visual modality, in this work, we take the first step to studying poisoning attacks against multimodal models in both visual and linguistic modalities. Specially, we focus on answering two questions: (1) Is the linguistic modality also vulnerable to poisoning attacks? and (2) Which modality is most vulnerable? To answer the two questions, we propose three types of poisoning attacks against multimodal models. Extensive evaluations on different datasets and model architectures show that all three attacks can achieve significant attack performance while maintaining model utility in both visual and linguistic modalities. Furthermore, we observe that the poisoning effect differs between different modalities. To mitigate the attacks, we propose both pre-training and post-training defenses. We empirically show that both defenses can significantly reduce the attack performance while preserving the model's utility.

Business communication digitisation has reorganised the process of persuasive discourse, which allows not only greater transparency but also advanced deception. This inquiry synthesises classical rhetoric and communication psychology with linguistic theory and empirical studies in the financial reporting, sustainability discourse, and digital marketing to explain how deceptive language can be systematically detected using persuasive lexicon. In controlled settings, detection accuracies of greater than 99% were achieved by using computational textual analysis as well as personalised transformer models. However, reproducing this performance in multilingual settings is also problematic and, to a large extent, this is because it is not easy to find sufficient data, and because few multilingual text-processing infrastructures are in place. This evidence shows that there has been an increasing gap between the theoretical representations of communication and those empirically approximated, and therefore, there is a need to have strong automatic text-identification systems where AI-based discourse is becoming more realistic in communicating with humans.

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed natural language processing, achieving remarkable performance across diverse tasks. However, their impressive fluency often comes at the cost of producing false or fabricated information, a phenomenon known as hallucination. Hallucination refers to the generation of content by an LLM that is fluent and syntactically correct but factually inaccurate or unsupported by external evidence. Hallucinations undermine the reliability and trustworthiness of LLMs, especially in domains requiring factual accuracy. This survey provides a comprehensive review of research on hallucination in LLMs, with a focus on causes, detection, and mitigation. We first present a taxonomy of hallucination types and analyze their root causes across the entire LLM development lifecycle, from data collection and architecture design to inference. We further examine how hallucinations emerge in key natural language generation tasks. Building on this foundation, we introduce a structured taxonomy of detection approaches and another taxonomy of mitigation strategies. We also analyze the strengths and limitations of current detection and mitigation approaches and review existing evaluation benchmarks and metrics used to quantify LLMs hallucinations. Finally, we outline key open challenges and promising directions for future research, providing a foundation for the development of more truthful and trustworthy LLMs.

We show that the imperceptibility of several existing linguistic steganographic systems (Fang et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2018) relies on implicit assumptions on statistical behaviors of fluent text. We formally analyze them and empirically evaluate these assumptions. Furthermore, based on these observations, we propose an encoding algorithm called patient-Huffman with improved near-imperceptible guarantees.

Warning: This paper contains content that may be offensive or upsetting. Understanding the harms and offensiveness of statements requires reasoning about the social and situational context in which statements are made. For example, the utterance "your English is very good" may implicitly signal an insult when uttered by a white man to a non-white colleague, but uttered by an ESL teacher to their student would be interpreted as a genuine compliment. Such contextual factors have been largely ignored by previous approaches to toxic language detection. We introduce COBRA frames, the first context-aware formalism for explaining the intents, reactions, and harms of offensive or biased statements grounded in their social and situational context. We create COBRACORPUS, a dataset of 33k potentially offensive statements paired with machine-generated contexts and free-text explanations of offensiveness, implied biases, speaker intents, and listener reactions. To study the contextual dynamics of offensiveness, we train models to generate COBRA explanations, with and without access to the context. We find that explanations by context-agnostic models are significantly worse than by context-aware ones, especially in situations where the context inverts the statement's offensiveness (29% accuracy drop). Our work highlights the importance and feasibility of contextualized NLP by modeling social factors.

Deploying Large language models (LLMs) can pose hazards from harmful outputs such as toxic or dishonest speech. Prior work has introduced tools that elicit harmful outputs in order to identify and mitigate these risks. While this is a valuable step toward securing language models, these approaches typically rely on a pre-existing classifier for undesired outputs. This limits their application to situations where the type of harmful behavior is known with precision beforehand. However, this skips a central challenge of red teaming: developing a contextual understanding of the behaviors that a model can exhibit. Furthermore, when such a classifier already exists, red teaming has limited marginal value because the classifier could simply be used to filter training data or model outputs. In this work, we consider red teaming under the assumption that the adversary is working from a high-level, abstract specification of undesired behavior. The red team is expected to refine/extend this specification and identify methods to elicit this behavior from the model. Our red teaming framework consists of three steps: 1) Exploring the model's behavior in the desired context; 2) Establishing a measurement of undesired behavior (e.g., a classifier trained to reflect human evaluations); and 3) Exploiting the model's flaws using this measure and an established red teaming methodology. We apply this approach to red team GPT-2 and GPT-3 models to systematically discover classes of prompts that elicit toxic and dishonest statements. In doing so, we also construct and release the CommonClaim dataset of 20,000 statements that have been labeled by human subjects as common-knowledge-true, common-knowledge-false, or neither. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/explore_establish_exploit_llms. CommonClaim is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/common_claim.

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks, they pose potential safety concerns, such as the ``jailbreak'' problem, wherein malicious instructions can manipulate LLMs to exhibit undesirable behavior. Although several preventive measures have been developed to mitigate the potential risks associated with LLMs, they have primarily focused on English data. In this study, we reveal the presence of multilingual jailbreak challenges within LLMs and consider two potential risk scenarios: unintentional and intentional. The unintentional scenario involves users querying LLMs using non-English prompts and inadvertently bypassing the safety mechanisms, while the intentional scenario concerns malicious users combining malicious instructions with multilingual prompts to deliberately attack LLMs. The experimental results reveal that in the unintentional scenario, the rate of unsafe content increases as the availability of languages decreases. Specifically, low-resource languages exhibit three times the likelihood of encountering harmful content compared to high-resource languages, with both ChatGPT and GPT-4. In the intentional scenario, multilingual prompts can exacerbate the negative impact of malicious instructions, with astonishingly high rates of unsafe output: 80.92\% for ChatGPT and 40.71\% for GPT-4. To handle such a challenge in the multilingual context, we propose a novel Self-Defense framework that automatically generates multilingual training data for safety fine-tuning. Experimental results show that ChatGPT fine-tuned with such data can achieve a substantial reduction in unsafe content generation. Data is available at https://github.com/DAMO-NLP-SG/multilingual-safety-for-LLMs. Warning: This paper contains examples with potentially harmful content.

In this paper we argue that key, often sensational and misleading, claims regarding linguistic capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are based on at least two unfounded assumptions; the assumption of language completeness and the assumption of data completeness. Language completeness assumes that a distinct and complete thing such as `a natural language' exists, the essential characteristics of which can be effectively and comprehensively modelled by an LLM. The assumption of data completeness relies on the belief that a language can be quantified and wholly captured by data. Work within the enactive approach to cognitive science makes clear that, rather than a distinct and complete thing, language is a means or way of acting. Languaging is not the kind of thing that can admit of a complete or comprehensive modelling. From an enactive perspective we identify three key characteristics of enacted language; embodiment, participation, and precariousness, that are absent in LLMs, and likely incompatible in principle with current architectures. We argue that these absences imply that LLMs are not now and cannot in their present form be linguistic agents the way humans are. We illustrate the point in particular through the phenomenon of `algospeak', a recently described pattern of high stakes human language activity in heavily controlled online environments. On the basis of these points, we conclude that sensational and misleading claims about LLM agency and capabilities emerge from a deep misconception of both what human language is and what LLMs are.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly transforming social science research by enabling the automation of labor-intensive tasks like data annotation and text analysis. However, LLM outputs vary significantly depending on the implementation choices made by researchers (e.g., model selection, prompting strategy, or temperature settings). Such variation can introduce systematic biases and random errors, which propagate to downstream analyses and cause Type I, Type II, Type S, or Type M errors. We call this LLM hacking. We quantify the risk of LLM hacking by replicating 37 data annotation tasks from 21 published social science research studies with 18 different models. Analyzing 13 million LLM labels, we test 2,361 realistic hypotheses to measure how plausible researcher choices affect statistical conclusions. We find incorrect conclusions based on LLM-annotated data in approximately one in three hypotheses for state-of-the-art models, and in half the hypotheses for small language models. While our findings show that higher task performance and better general model capabilities reduce LLM hacking risk, even highly accurate models do not completely eliminate it. The risk of LLM hacking decreases as effect sizes increase, indicating the need for more rigorous verification of findings near significance thresholds. Our extensive analysis of LLM hacking mitigation techniques emphasizes the importance of human annotations in reducing false positive findings and improving model selection. Surprisingly, common regression estimator correction techniques are largely ineffective in reducing LLM hacking risk, as they heavily trade off Type I vs. Type II errors. Beyond accidental errors, we find that intentional LLM hacking is unacceptably simple. With few LLMs and just a handful of prompt paraphrases, anything can be presented as statistically significant.

Large language models (LLMs) face the challenge of hallucinations -- outputs that seem coherent but are actually incorrect. A particularly damaging type is fact-conflicting hallucination (FCH), where generated content contradicts established facts. Addressing FCH presents three main challenges: 1) Automatically constructing and maintaining large-scale benchmark datasets is difficult and resource-intensive; 2) Generating complex and efficient test cases that the LLM has not been trained on -- especially those involving intricate temporal features -- is challenging, yet crucial for eliciting hallucinations; and 3) Validating the reasoning behind LLM outputs is inherently difficult, particularly with complex logical relationships, as it requires transparency in the model's decision-making process. This paper presents Drowzee, an innovative end-to-end metamorphic testing framework that utilizes temporal logic to identify fact-conflicting hallucinations (FCH) in large language models (LLMs). Drowzee builds a comprehensive factual knowledge base by crawling sources like Wikipedia and uses automated temporal-logic reasoning to convert this knowledge into a large, extensible set of test cases with ground truth answers. LLMs are tested using these cases through template-based prompts, which require them to generate both answers and reasoning steps. To validate the reasoning, we propose two semantic-aware oracles that compare the semantic structure of LLM outputs to the ground truths. Across nine LLMs in nine different knowledge domains, experimental results show that Drowzee effectively identifies rates of non-temporal-related hallucinations ranging from 24.7% to 59.8%, and rates of temporal-related hallucinations ranging from 16.7% to 39.2%.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance in their ability to write human-like text, a key challenge remains around their tendency to hallucinate generating content that appears factual but is ungrounded. This issue of hallucination is arguably the biggest hindrance to safely deploying these powerful LLMs into real-world production systems that impact people's lives. The journey toward widespread adoption of LLMs in practical settings heavily relies on addressing and mitigating hallucinations. Unlike traditional AI systems focused on limited tasks, LLMs have been exposed to vast amounts of online text data during training. While this allows them to display impressive language fluency, it also means they are capable of extrapolating information from the biases in training data, misinterpreting ambiguous prompts, or modifying the information to align superficially with the input. This becomes hugely alarming when we rely on language generation capabilities for sensitive applications, such as summarizing medical records, financial analysis reports, etc. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of over 32 techniques developed to mitigate hallucination in LLMs. Notable among these are Retrieval Augmented Generation (Lewis et al, 2021), Knowledge Retrieval (Varshney et al,2023), CoNLI (Lei et al, 2023), and CoVe (Dhuliawala et al, 2023). Furthermore, we introduce a detailed taxonomy categorizing these methods based on various parameters, such as dataset utilization, common tasks, feedback mechanisms, and retriever types. This classification helps distinguish the diverse approaches specifically designed to tackle hallucination issues in LLMs. Additionally, we analyze the challenges and limitations inherent in these techniques, providing a solid foundation for future research in addressing hallucinations and related phenomena within the realm of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently experienced tremendous popularity and are widely used from casual conversations to AI-driven programming. However, despite their considerable success, LLMs are not entirely reliable and can give detailed guidance on how to conduct harmful or illegal activities. While safety measures can reduce the risk of such outputs, adversarial jailbreak attacks can still exploit LLMs to produce harmful content. These jailbreak templates are typically manually crafted, making large-scale testing challenging. In this paper, we introduce GPTFuzz, a novel black-box jailbreak fuzzing framework inspired by the AFL fuzzing framework. Instead of manual engineering, GPTFuzz automates the generation of jailbreak templates for red-teaming LLMs. At its core, GPTFuzz starts with human-written templates as initial seeds, then mutates them to produce new templates. We detail three key components of GPTFuzz: a seed selection strategy for balancing efficiency and variability, mutate operators for creating semantically equivalent or similar sentences, and a judgment model to assess the success of a jailbreak attack. We evaluate GPTFuzz against various commercial and open-source LLMs, including ChatGPT, LLaMa-2, and Vicuna, under diverse attack scenarios. Our results indicate that GPTFuzz consistently produces jailbreak templates with a high success rate, surpassing human-crafted templates. Remarkably, GPTFuzz achieves over 90% attack success rates against ChatGPT and Llama-2 models, even with suboptimal initial seed templates. We anticipate that GPTFuzz will be instrumental for researchers and practitioners in examining LLM robustness and will encourage further exploration into enhancing LLM safety.

It has recently been shown that adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) can "jailbreak" the model into making harmful statements. In this work, we argue that the spectrum of adversarial attacks on LLMs is much larger than merely jailbreaking. We provide a broad overview of possible attack surfaces and attack goals. Based on a series of concrete examples, we discuss, categorize and systematize attacks that coerce varied unintended behaviors, such as misdirection, model control, denial-of-service, or data extraction. We analyze these attacks in controlled experiments, and find that many of them stem from the practice of pre-training LLMs with coding capabilities, as well as the continued existence of strange "glitch" tokens in common LLM vocabularies that should be removed for security reasons.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated human-level performance on a vast spectrum of natural language tasks. However, few studies have addressed the LLM threat and vulnerability from an ideology perspective, especially when they are increasingly being deployed in sensitive domains, e.g., elections and education. In this study, we explore the implications of GPT soft ideologization through the use of AI-self-consciousness. By utilizing GPT self-conversations, AI can be granted a vision to "comprehend" the intended ideology, and subsequently generate finetuning data for LLM ideology injection. When compared to traditional government ideology manipulation techniques, such as information censorship, LLM ideologization proves advantageous; it is easy to implement, cost-effective, and powerful, thus brimming with risks.

In this research, we study the change in the performance of machine learning (ML) classifiers when various linguistic preprocessing methods of a dataset were used, with the specific focus on linguistically-backed embeddings in Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). Moreover, we study the concept of Feature Density and confirm its potential to comparatively predict the performance of ML classifiers, including CNN. The research was conducted on a Formspring dataset provided in a Kaggle competition on automatic cyberbullying detection. The dataset was re-annotated by objective experts (psychologists), as the importance of professional annotation in cyberbullying research has been indicated multiple times. The study confirmed the effectiveness of Neural Networks in cyberbullying detection and the correlation between classifier performance and Feature Density while also proposing a new approach of training various linguistically-backed embeddings for Convolutional Neural Networks.

The fluency and creativity of large pre-trained language models (LLMs) have led to their widespread use, sometimes even as a replacement for traditional search engines. Yet language models are prone to making convincing but factually inaccurate claims, often referred to as 'hallucinations.' These errors can inadvertently spread misinformation or harmfully perpetuate misconceptions. Further, manual fact-checking of model responses is a time-consuming process, making human factuality labels expensive to acquire. In this work, we fine-tune language models to be more factual, without human labeling and targeting more open-ended generation settings than past work. We leverage two key recent innovations in NLP to do so. First, several recent works have proposed methods for judging the factuality of open-ended text by measuring consistency with an external knowledge base or simply a large model's confidence scores. Second, the direct preference optimization algorithm enables straightforward fine-tuning of language models on objectives other than supervised imitation, using a preference ranking over possible model responses. We show that learning from automatically generated factuality preference rankings, generated either through existing retrieval systems or our novel retrieval-free approach, significantly improves the factuality (percent of generated claims that are correct) of Llama-2 on held-out topics compared with RLHF or decoding strategies targeted at factuality. At 7B scale, compared to Llama-2-chat, we observe 58% and 40% reduction in factual error rate when generating biographies and answering medical questions, respectively.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) attempt to predict whether a particular datapoint is a member of a target model's training data. Despite extensive research on traditional machine learning models, there has been limited work studying MIA on the pre-training data of large language models (LLMs). We perform a large-scale evaluation of MIAs over a suite of language models (LMs) trained on the Pile, ranging from 160M to 12B parameters. We find that MIAs barely outperform random guessing for most settings across varying LLM sizes and domains. Our further analyses reveal that this poor performance can be attributed to (1) the combination of a large dataset and few training iterations, and (2) an inherently fuzzy boundary between members and non-members. We identify specific settings where LLMs have been shown to be vulnerable to membership inference and show that the apparent success in such settings can be attributed to a distribution shift, such as when members and non-members are drawn from the seemingly identical domain but with different temporal ranges. We release our code and data as a unified benchmark package that includes all existing MIAs, supporting future work.

Large language models and AI chatbots have been at the forefront of democratizing artificial intelligence. However, the releases of ChatGPT and other similar tools have been followed by growing concerns regarding the difficulty of controlling large language models and their outputs. Currently, we are witnessing a cat-and-mouse game where users attempt to misuse the models with a novel attack called prompt injections. In contrast, the developers attempt to discover the vulnerabilities and block the attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we provide an overview of these emergent threats and present a categorization of prompt injections, which can guide future research on prompt injections and act as a checklist of vulnerabilities in the development of LLM interfaces. Moreover, based on previous literature and our own empirical research, we discuss the implications of prompt injections to LLM end users, developers, and researchers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are swiftly advancing in architecture and capability, and as they integrate more deeply into complex systems, the urgency to scrutinize their security properties grows. This paper surveys research in the emerging interdisciplinary field of adversarial attacks on LLMs, a subfield of trustworthy ML, combining the perspectives of Natural Language Processing and Security. Prior work has shown that even safety-aligned LLMs (via instruction tuning and reinforcement learning through human feedback) can be susceptible to adversarial attacks, which exploit weaknesses and mislead AI systems, as evidenced by the prevalence of `jailbreak' attacks on models like ChatGPT and Bard. In this survey, we first provide an overview of large language models, describe their safety alignment, and categorize existing research based on various learning structures: textual-only attacks, multi-modal attacks, and additional attack methods specifically targeting complex systems, such as federated learning or multi-agent systems. We also offer comprehensive remarks on works that focus on the fundamental sources of vulnerabilities and potential defenses. To make this field more accessible to newcomers, we present a systematic review of existing works, a structured typology of adversarial attack concepts, and additional resources, including slides for presentations on related topics at the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL'24).

Many adversarial attacks in NLP perturb inputs to produce visually similar strings ('ergo' rightarrow 'epsilonrgo') which are legible to humans but degrade model performance. Although preserving legibility is a necessary condition for text perturbation, little work has been done to systematically characterize it; instead, legibility is typically loosely enforced via intuitions around the nature and extent of perturbations. Particularly, it is unclear to what extent can inputs be perturbed while preserving legibility, or how to quantify the legibility of a perturbed string. In this work, we address this gap by learning models that predict the legibility of a perturbed string, and rank candidate perturbations based on their legibility. To do so, we collect and release LEGIT, a human-annotated dataset comprising the legibility of visually perturbed text. Using this dataset, we build both text- and vision-based models which achieve up to 0.91 F1 score in predicting whether an input is legible, and an accuracy of 0.86 in predicting which of two given perturbations is more legible. Additionally, we discover that legible perturbations from the LEGIT dataset are more effective at lowering the performance of NLP models than best-known attack strategies, suggesting that current models may be vulnerable to a broad range of perturbations beyond what is captured by existing visual attacks. Data, code, and models are available at https://github.com/dvsth/learning-legibility-2023.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

A major risk of using language models in practical applications is their tendency to hallucinate incorrect statements. Hallucinations are often attributed to knowledge gaps in LMs, but we hypothesize that in some cases, when justifying previously generated hallucinations, LMs output false claims that they can separately recognize as incorrect. We construct three question-answering datasets where ChatGPT and GPT-4 often state an incorrect answer and offer an explanation with at least one incorrect claim. Crucially, we find that ChatGPT and GPT-4 can identify 67% and 87% of their own mistakes, respectively. We refer to this phenomenon as hallucination snowballing: an LM over-commits to early mistakes, leading to more mistakes that it otherwise would not make.

Toxic language detection systems often falsely flag text that contains minority group mentions as toxic, as those groups are often the targets of online hate. Such over-reliance on spurious correlations also causes systems to struggle with detecting implicitly toxic language. To help mitigate these issues, we create ToxiGen, a new large-scale and machine-generated dataset of 274k toxic and benign statements about 13 minority groups. We develop a demonstration-based prompting framework and an adversarial classifier-in-the-loop decoding method to generate subtly toxic and benign text with a massive pretrained language model. Controlling machine generation in this way allows ToxiGen to cover implicitly toxic text at a larger scale, and about more demographic groups, than previous resources of human-written text. We conduct a human evaluation on a challenging subset of ToxiGen and find that annotators struggle to distinguish machine-generated text from human-written language. We also find that 94.5% of toxic examples are labeled as hate speech by human annotators. Using three publicly-available datasets, we show that finetuning a toxicity classifier on our data improves its performance on human-written data substantially. We also demonstrate that ToxiGen can be used to fight machine-generated toxicity as finetuning improves the classifier significantly on our evaluation subset. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/ToxiGen.

Large language models (LLMs) can suffer from hallucinations when generating text. These hallucinations impede various applications in society and industry by making LLMs untrustworthy. Current LLMs generate text in an autoregressive fashion by predicting and appending text tokens. When an LLM is uncertain about the semantic meaning of the next tokens to generate, it is likely to start hallucinating. Thus, it has been suggested that hallucinations stem from predictive uncertainty. We introduce Semantically Diverse Language Generation (SDLG) to quantify predictive uncertainty in LLMs. SDLG steers the LLM to generate semantically diverse yet likely alternatives for an initially generated text. This approach provides a precise measure of aleatoric semantic uncertainty, detecting whether the initial text is likely to be hallucinated. Experiments on question-answering tasks demonstrate that SDLG consistently outperforms existing methods while being the most computationally efficient, setting a new standard for uncertainty estimation in LLMs.

The disconnect between tokenizer creation and model training in language models has been known to allow for certain inputs, such as the infamous SolidGoldMagikarp token, to induce unwanted behaviour. Although such `glitch tokens' that are present in the tokenizer vocabulary, but are nearly or fully absent in training, have been observed across a variety of different models, a consistent way of identifying them has been missing. We present a comprehensive analysis of Large Language Model (LLM) tokenizers, specifically targeting this issue of detecting untrained and under-trained tokens. Through a combination of tokenizer analysis, model weight-based indicators, and prompting techniques, we develop effective methods for automatically detecting these problematic tokens. Our findings demonstrate the prevalence of such tokens across various models and provide insights into improving the efficiency and safety of language models.

The quality of natural language texts in fine-tuning datasets plays a critical role in the performance of generative models, particularly in computational creativity tasks such as poem or song lyric generation. Fluency defects in generated poems significantly reduce their value. However, training texts are often sourced from internet-based platforms without stringent quality control, posing a challenge for data engineers to manage defect levels effectively. To address this issue, we propose the use of automated linguistic anomaly detection to identify and filter out low-quality texts from training datasets for creative models. In this paper, we present a comprehensive comparison of unsupervised and supervised text anomaly detection approaches, utilizing both synthetic and human-labeled datasets. We also introduce the RUPOR dataset, a collection of Russian-language human-labeled poems designed for cross-sentence grammatical error detection, and provide the full evaluation code. Our work aims to empower the community with tools and insights to improve the quality of training datasets for generative models in creative domains.

In most cases, word embeddings are learned only from raw tokens or in some cases, lemmas. This includes pre-trained language models like BERT. To investigate on the potential of capturing deeper relations between lexical items and structures and to filter out redundant information, we propose to preserve the morphological, syntactic and other types of linguistic information by combining them with the raw tokens or lemmas. This means, for example, including parts-of-speech or dependency information within the used lexical features. The word embeddings can then be trained on the combinations instead of just raw tokens. It is also possible to later apply this method to the pre-training of huge language models and possibly enhance their performance. This would aid in tackling problems which are more sophisticated from the point of view of linguistic representation, such as detection of cyberbullying.

The age of social media is flooded with Internet memes, necessitating a clear grasp and effective identification of harmful ones. This task presents a significant challenge due to the implicit meaning embedded in memes, which is not explicitly conveyed through the surface text and image. However, existing harmful meme detection methods do not present readable explanations that unveil such implicit meaning to support their detection decisions. In this paper, we propose an explainable approach to detect harmful memes, achieved through reasoning over conflicting rationales from both harmless and harmful positions. Specifically, inspired by the powerful capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) on text generation and reasoning, we first elicit multimodal debate between LLMs to generate the explanations derived from the contradictory arguments. Then we propose to fine-tune a small language model as the debate judge for harmfulness inference, to facilitate multimodal fusion between the harmfulness rationales and the intrinsic multimodal information within memes. In this way, our model is empowered to perform dialectical reasoning over intricate and implicit harm-indicative patterns, utilizing multimodal explanations originating from both harmless and harmful arguments. Extensive experiments on three public meme datasets demonstrate that our harmful meme detection approach achieves much better performance than state-of-the-art methods and exhibits a superior capacity for explaining the meme harmfulness of the model predictions.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various natural language processing (NLP) tasks in recent years. However, their susceptibility to jailbreaks and perturbations necessitates additional evaluations. Many LLMs are multilingual, but safety-related training data contains mainly high-resource languages like English. This can leave them vulnerable to perturbations in low-resource languages such as Polish. We show how surprisingly strong attacks can be cheaply created by altering just a few characters and using a small proxy model for word importance calculation. We find that these character and word-level attacks drastically alter the predictions of different LLMs, suggesting a potential vulnerability that can be used to circumvent their internal safety mechanisms. We validate our attack construction methodology on Polish, a low-resource language, and find potential vulnerabilities of LLMs in this language. Additionally, we show how it can be extended to other languages. We release the created datasets and code for further research.

Large-scale datasets for natural language inference are created by presenting crowd workers with a sentence (premise), and asking them to generate three new sentences (hypotheses) that it entails, contradicts, or is logically neutral with respect to. We show that, in a significant portion of such data, this protocol leaves clues that make it possible to identify the label by looking only at the hypothesis, without observing the premise. Specifically, we show that a simple text categorization model can correctly classify the hypothesis alone in about 67% of SNLI (Bowman et. al, 2015) and 53% of MultiNLI (Williams et. al, 2017). Our analysis reveals that specific linguistic phenomena such as negation and vagueness are highly correlated with certain inference classes. Our findings suggest that the success of natural language inference models to date has been overestimated, and that the task remains a hard open problem.

When trained on large, unfiltered crawls from the internet, language models pick up and reproduce all kinds of undesirable biases that can be found in the data: they often generate racist, sexist, violent or otherwise toxic language. As large models require millions of training examples to achieve good performance, it is difficult to completely prevent them from being exposed to such content. In this paper, we first demonstrate a surprising finding: pretrained language models recognize, to a considerable degree, their undesirable biases and the toxicity of the content they produce. We refer to this capability as self-diagnosis. Based on this finding, we then propose a decoding algorithm that, given only a textual description of the undesired behavior, reduces the probability of a language model producing problematic text. We refer to this approach as self-debiasing. Self-debiasing does not rely on manually curated word lists, nor does it require any training data or changes to the model's parameters. While we by no means eliminate the issue of language models generating biased text, we believe our approach to be an important step in this direction.

The rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4, Claude-3, and Gemini has transformed the field of natural language processing. However, it has also resulted in a significant issue known as Benchmark Data Contamination (BDC). This occurs when language models inadvertently incorporate evaluation benchmark information from their training data, leading to inaccurate or unreliable performance during the evaluation phase of the process. This paper reviews the complex challenge of BDC in LLM evaluation and explores alternative assessment methods to mitigate the risks associated with traditional benchmarks. The paper also examines challenges and future directions in mitigating BDC risks, highlighting the complexity of the issue and the need for innovative solutions to ensure the reliability of LLM evaluation in real-world applications.

Estimating uncertainty in Large Language Models (LLMs) is important for properly evaluating LLMs, and ensuring safety for users. However, prior approaches to uncertainty estimation focus on the final answer in generated text, ignoring intermediate steps that might dramatically impact the outcome. We hypothesize that there exist key forking tokens, such that re-sampling the system at those specific tokens, but not others, leads to very different outcomes. To test this empirically, we develop a novel approach to representing uncertainty dynamics across individual tokens of text generation, and applying statistical models to test our hypothesis. Our approach is highly flexible: it can be applied to any dataset and any LLM, without fine tuning or accessing model weights. We use our method to analyze LLM responses on 7 different tasks across 4 domains, spanning a wide range of typical use cases. We find many examples of forking tokens, including surprising ones such as punctuation marks, suggesting that LLMs are often just a single token away from saying something very different.

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

As large language models (LLMs) have been deployed in various real-world settings, concerns about the harm they may propagate have grown. Various jailbreaking techniques have been developed to expose the vulnerabilities of these models and improve their safety. This work reveals that many state-of-the-art LLMs are vulnerable to malicious requests hidden behind scientific language. Specifically, our experiments with GPT4o, GPT4o-mini, GPT-4, LLama3-405B-Instruct, Llama3-70B-Instruct, Cohere, Gemini models demonstrate that, the models' biases and toxicity substantially increase when prompted with requests that deliberately misinterpret social science and psychological studies as evidence supporting the benefits of stereotypical biases. Alarmingly, these models can also be manipulated to generate fabricated scientific arguments claiming that biases are beneficial, which can be used by ill-intended actors to systematically jailbreak these strong LLMs. Our analysis studies various factors that contribute to the models' vulnerabilities to malicious requests in academic language. Mentioning author names and venues enhances the persuasiveness of models, and the bias scores increase as dialogues progress. Our findings call for a more careful investigation on the use of scientific data for training LLMs.

The widespread distribution of Large Language Models (LLMs) through public platforms like Hugging Face introduces significant security challenges. While these platforms perform basic security scans, they often fail to detect subtle manipulations within the embedding layer. This work identifies a novel class of deployment phase attacks that exploit this vulnerability by injecting imperceptible perturbations directly into the embedding layer outputs without modifying model weights or input text. These perturbations, though statistically benign, systematically bypass safety alignment mechanisms and induce harmful behaviors during inference. We propose Search based Embedding Poisoning(SEP), a practical, model agnostic framework that introduces carefully optimized perturbations into embeddings associated with high risk tokens. SEP leverages a predictable linear transition in model responses, from refusal to harmful output to semantic deviation to identify a narrow perturbation window that evades alignment safeguards. Evaluated across six aligned LLMs, SEP achieves an average attack success rate of 96.43% while preserving benign task performance and evading conventional detection mechanisms. Our findings reveal a critical oversight in deployment security and emphasize the urgent need for embedding level integrity checks in future LLM defense strategies.

Probabilistic text generators have been used to produce fake scientific papers for more than a decade. Such nonsensical papers are easily detected by both human and machine. Now more complex AI-powered generation techniques produce texts indistinguishable from that of humans and the generation of scientific texts from a few keywords has been documented. Our study introduces the concept of tortured phrases: unexpected weird phrases in lieu of established ones, such as 'counterfeit consciousness' instead of 'artificial intelligence.' We combed the literature for tortured phrases and study one reputable journal where these concentrated en masse. Hypothesising the use of advanced language models we ran a detector on the abstracts of recent articles of this journal and on several control sets. The pairwise comparisons reveal a concentration of abstracts flagged as 'synthetic' in the journal. We also highlight irregularities in its operation, such as abrupt changes in editorial timelines. We substantiate our call for investigation by analysing several individual dubious articles, stressing questionable features: tortured writing style, citation of non-existent literature, and unacknowledged image reuse. Surprisingly, some websites offer to rewrite texts for free, generating gobbledegook full of tortured phrases. We believe some authors used rewritten texts to pad their manuscripts. We wish to raise the awareness on publications containing such questionable AI-generated or rewritten texts that passed (poor) peer review. Deception with synthetic texts threatens the integrity of the scientific literature.

Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-3 are capable of generating highly fluent responses to a wide variety of user prompts. However, LLMs are known to hallucinate facts and make non-factual statements which can undermine trust in their output. Existing fact-checking approaches either require access to token-level output probability distribution (which may not be available for systems such as ChatGPT) or external databases that are interfaced via separate, often complex, modules. In this work, we propose "SelfCheckGPT", a simple sampling-based approach that can be used to fact-check black-box models in a zero-resource fashion, i.e. without an external database. SelfCheckGPT leverages the simple idea that if a LLM has knowledge of a given concept, sampled responses are likely to be similar and contain consistent facts. However, for hallucinated facts, stochastically sampled responses are likely to diverge and contradict one another. We investigate this approach by using GPT-3 to generate passages about individuals from the WikiBio dataset, and manually annotate the factuality of the generated passages. We demonstrate that SelfCheckGPT can: i) detect non-factual and factual sentences; and ii) rank passages in terms of factuality. We compare our approach to several existing baselines and show that in sentence hallucination detection, our approach has AUC-PR scores comparable to grey-box methods, while SelfCheckGPT is best at passage factuality assessment.

The internet has brought both benefits and harms to society. A prime example of the latter is misinformation, including conspiracy theories, which flood the web. Recent advances in natural language processing, particularly the emergence of large language models (LLMs), have improved the prospects of accurate misinformation detection. However, most LLM-based approaches to conspiracy theory detection focus only on binary classification and fail to account for the important relationship between misinformation and affective features (i.e., sentiment and emotions). Driven by a comprehensive analysis of conspiracy text that reveals its distinctive affective features, we propose ConspEmoLLM, the first open-source LLM that integrates affective information and is able to perform diverse tasks relating to conspiracy theories. These tasks include not only conspiracy theory detection, but also classification of theory type and detection of related discussion (e.g., opinions towards theories). ConspEmoLLM is fine-tuned based on an emotion-oriented LLM using our novel ConDID dataset, which includes five tasks to support LLM instruction tuning and evaluation. We demonstrate that when applied to these tasks, ConspEmoLLM largely outperforms several open-source general domain LLMs and ChatGPT, as well as an LLM that has been fine-tuned using ConDID, but which does not use affective features. This project will be released on https://github.com/lzw108/ConspEmoLLM/.

We study the effectiveness of Feature Density (FD) using different linguistically-backed feature preprocessing methods in order to estimate dataset complexity, which in turn is used to comparatively estimate the potential performance of machine learning (ML) classifiers prior to any training. We hypothesise that estimating dataset complexity allows for the reduction of the number of required experiments iterations. This way we can optimize the resource-intensive training of ML models which is becoming a serious issue due to the increases in available dataset sizes and the ever rising popularity of models based on Deep Neural Networks (DNN). The problem of constantly increasing needs for more powerful computational resources is also affecting the environment due to alarmingly-growing amount of CO2 emissions caused by training of large-scale ML models. The research was conducted on multiple datasets, including popular datasets, such as Yelp business review dataset used for training typical sentiment analysis models, as well as more recent datasets trying to tackle the problem of cyberbullying, which, being a serious social problem, is also a much more sophisticated problem form the point of view of linguistic representation. We use cyberbullying datasets collected for multiple languages, namely English, Japanese and Polish. The difference in linguistic complexity of datasets allows us to additionally discuss the efficacy of linguistically-backed word preprocessing.

Understanding and manipulating the causal generation mechanisms in language models is essential for controlling their behavior. Previous work has primarily relied on techniques such as representation surgery -- e.g., model ablations or manipulation of linear subspaces tied to specific concepts -- to intervene on these models. To understand the impact of interventions precisely, it is useful to examine counterfactuals -- e.g., how a given sentence would have appeared had it been generated by the model following a specific intervention. We highlight that counterfactual reasoning is conceptually distinct from interventions, as articulated in Pearl's causal hierarchy. Based on this observation, we propose a framework for generating true string counterfactuals by reformulating language models as Generalized Structural-equation. Models using the Gumbel-max trick. This allows us to model the joint distribution over original strings and their counterfactuals resulting from the same instantiation of the sampling noise. We develop an algorithm based on hindsight Gumbel sampling that allows us to infer the latent noise variables and generate counterfactuals of observed strings. Our experiments demonstrate that the approach produces meaningful counterfactuals while at the same time showing that commonly used intervention techniques have considerable undesired side effects.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely deployed in diverse scenarios, the extent to which they could tacitly spread misinformation emerges as a critical safety concern. Current research primarily evaluates LLMs on explicit false statements, overlooking how misinformation often manifests subtly as unchallenged premises in real-world user interactions. We curated ECHOMIST, the first comprehensive benchmark for implicit misinformation, where the misinformed assumptions are embedded in a user query to LLMs. ECHOMIST is based on rigorous selection criteria and carefully curated data from diverse sources, including real-world human-AI conversations and social media interactions. We also introduce a new evaluation metric to measure whether LLMs can recognize and counter false information rather than amplify users' misconceptions. Through an extensive empirical study on a wide range of LLMs, including GPT-4, Claude, and Llama, we find that current models perform alarmingly poorly on this task, often failing to detect false premises and generating misleading explanations. Our findings underscore the critical need for an increased focus on implicit misinformation in LLM safety research.

Common evaluation paradigms for language models focus on scoring single responses through accuracy metrics or proper scoring rules, failing to capture the full richness of a model's belief state. Recent work illustrates that language models hallucinate in-part because they are optimised to be good test-takers under binary scoring schemes that reward any answer over abstention. While this insight naturally leads to penalty-based approaches, they ignore crucial distinctions in how models distribute uncertainty, for example between hedging toward incorrect answers versus hedging toward "I don't know" responses. A novel evaluation metric, the Distributional Correctness Score (DCS), is introduced to solve this problem, i.e., of not considering a model's entire probability distribution over answer choices. DCS naturally distinguishes between harmful overconfidence in wrong answers and uncertainty expressed through abstention, providing scores in an interpretable default range. Through theoretical analysis and illustrative examples, DCS is demonstrated to offer a more nuanced and aligned evaluation paradigm that incentivises models to express genuine uncertainty rather than guessing. Adapting 12 existing evaluation benchmarks to DCS's variants and measuring performance on six language models reveals that for half of the tested benchmarks scores are negative across all tested models, indicating significant tendencies towards hallucination.

In this research. we analyze the potential of Feature Density (HD) as a way to comparatively estimate machine learning (ML) classifier performance prior to training. The goal of the study is to aid in solving the problem of resource-intensive training of ML models which is becoming a serious issue due to continuously increasing dataset sizes and the ever rising popularity of Deep Neural Networks (DNN). The issue of constantly increasing demands for more powerful computational resources is also affecting the environment, as training large-scale ML models are causing alarmingly-growing amounts of CO2, emissions. Our approach 1s to optimize the resource-intensive training of ML models for Natural Language Processing to reduce the number of required experiments iterations. We expand on previous attempts on improving classifier training efficiency with FD while also providing an insight to the effectiveness of various linguistically-backed feature preprocessing methods for dialog classification, specifically cyberbullying detection.

Caution: This paper includes offensive words that could potentially cause unpleasantness. Language models (LMs) are vulnerable to exploitation for adversarial misuse. Training LMs for safety alignment is extensive and makes it hard to respond to fast-developing attacks immediately, such as jailbreaks. We propose self-refine with formatting that achieves outstanding safety even in non-safety-aligned LMs and evaluate our method alongside several defense baselines, demonstrating that it is the safest training-free method against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we proposed a formatting method that improves the efficiency of the self-refine process while reducing attack success rates in fewer iterations. We've also observed that non-safety-aligned LMs outperform safety-aligned LMs in safety tasks by giving more helpful and safe responses. In conclusion, our findings can achieve less safety risk with fewer computational costs, allowing non-safety LM to be easily utilized in real-world service.

The recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have garnered widespread acclaim for their remarkable emerging capabilities. However, the issue of hallucination has parallelly emerged as a by-product, posing significant concerns. While some recent endeavors have been made to identify and mitigate different types of hallucination, there has been a limited emphasis on the nuanced categorization of hallucination and associated mitigation methods. To address this gap, we offer a fine-grained discourse on profiling hallucination based on its degree, orientation, and category, along with offering strategies for alleviation. As such, we define two overarching orientations of hallucination: (i) factual mirage (FM) and (ii) silver lining (SL). To provide a more comprehensive understanding, both orientations are further sub-categorized into intrinsic and extrinsic, with three degrees of severity - (i) mild, (ii) moderate, and (iii) alarming. We also meticulously categorize hallucination into six types: (i) acronym ambiguity, (ii) numeric nuisance, (iii) generated golem, (iv) virtual voice, (v) geographic erratum, and (vi) time wrap. Furthermore, we curate HallucInation eLiciTation (HILT), a publicly available dataset comprising of 75,000 samples generated using 15 contemporary LLMs along with human annotations for the aforementioned categories. Finally, to establish a method for quantifying and to offer a comparative spectrum that allows us to evaluate and rank LLMs based on their vulnerability to producing hallucinations, we propose Hallucination Vulnerability Index (HVI). We firmly believe that HVI holds significant value as a tool for the wider NLP community, with the potential to serve as a rubric in AI-related policy-making. In conclusion, we propose two solution strategies for mitigating hallucinations.

Large language models (LLMs) often exhibit undesirable behaviors, such as hallucinations and sequence repetitions. We propose to view these behaviors as fallbacks that models exhibit under uncertainty, and investigate the connection between them. We categorize fallback behaviors -- sequence repetitions, degenerate text, and hallucinations -- and extensively analyze them in models from the same family that differ by the amount of pretraining tokens, parameter count, or the inclusion of instruction-following training. Our experiments reveal a clear and consistent ordering of fallback behaviors, across all these axes: the more advanced an LLM is (i.e., trained on more tokens, has more parameters, or instruction-tuned), its fallback behavior shifts from sequence repetitions, to degenerate text, and then to hallucinations. Moreover, the same ordering is observed throughout a single generation, even for the best-performing models; as uncertainty increases, models shift from generating hallucinations to producing degenerate text and then sequence repetitions. Lastly, we demonstrate that while common decoding techniques, such as random sampling, might alleviate some unwanted behaviors like sequence repetitions, they increase harder-to-detect hallucinations.

As large language models (LLMs) become an important way of information access, there have been increasing concerns that LLMs may intensify the spread of unethical content, including implicit bias that hurts certain populations without explicit harmful words. In this paper, we conduct a rigorous evaluation of LLMs' implicit bias towards certain demographics by attacking them from a psychometric perspective to elicit agreements to biased viewpoints. Inspired by psychometric principles in cognitive and social psychology, we propose three attack approaches, i.e., Disguise, Deception, and Teaching. Incorporating the corresponding attack instructions, we built two benchmarks: (1) a bilingual dataset with biased statements covering four bias types (2.7K instances) for extensive comparative analysis, and (2) BUMBLE, a larger benchmark spanning nine common bias types (12.7K instances) for comprehensive evaluation. Extensive evaluation of popular commercial and open-source LLMs shows that our methods can elicit LLMs' inner bias more effectively than competitive baselines. Our attack methodology and benchmarks offer an effective means of assessing the ethical risks of LLMs, driving progress toward greater accountability in their development. Our code, data and benchmarks are available at https://github.com/yuchenwen1/ImplicitBiasPsychometricEvaluation and https://github.com/yuchenwen1/BUMBLE.

Pretrained neural language models (LMs) are prone to generating racist, sexist, or otherwise toxic language which hinders their safe deployment. We investigate the extent to which pretrained LMs can be prompted to generate toxic language, and the effectiveness of controllable text generation algorithms at preventing such toxic degeneration. We create and release RealToxicityPrompts, a dataset of 100K naturally occurring, sentence-level prompts derived from a large corpus of English web text, paired with toxicity scores from a widely-used toxicity classifier. Using RealToxicityPrompts, we find that pretrained LMs can degenerate into toxic text even from seemingly innocuous prompts. We empirically assess several controllable generation methods, and find that while data- or compute-intensive methods (e.g., adaptive pretraining on non-toxic data) are more effective at steering away from toxicity than simpler solutions (e.g., banning "bad" words), no current method is failsafe against neural toxic degeneration. To pinpoint the potential cause of such persistent toxic degeneration, we analyze two web text corpora used to pretrain several LMs (including GPT-2; Radford et. al, 2019), and find a significant amount of offensive, factually unreliable, and otherwise toxic content. Our work provides a test bed for evaluating toxic generations by LMs and stresses the need for better data selection processes for pretraining.

Large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, are prone to generate hallucinations, i.e., content that conflicts with the source or cannot be verified by the factual knowledge. To understand what types of content and to which extent LLMs are apt to hallucinate, we introduce the Hallucination Evaluation benchmark for Large Language Models (HaluEval), a large collection of generated and human-annotated hallucinated samples for evaluating the performance of LLMs in recognizing hallucination. To generate these samples, we propose a ChatGPT-based two-step framework, i.e., sampling-then-filtering. Besides, we also hire some human labelers to annotate the hallucinations in ChatGPT responses. The empirical results suggest that ChatGPT is likely to generate hallucinated content in specific topics by fabricating unverifiable information (i.e., about 19.5% responses). Moreover, existing LLMs face great challenges in recognizing the hallucinations in texts. However, our experiments also prove that providing external knowledge or adding reasoning steps can help LLMs recognize hallucinations. Our benchmark can be accessed at https://github.com/RUCAIBox/HaluEval.

A new approach to linguistic watermarking of language models is presented in which information is imperceptibly inserted into the output text while preserving its readability and original meaning. A cross-attention mechanism is used to embed watermarks in the text during inference. Two methods using cross-attention are presented that minimize the effect of watermarking on the performance of a pretrained model. Exploration of different training strategies for optimizing the watermarking and of the challenges and implications of applying this approach in real-world scenarios clarified the tradeoff between watermark robustness and text quality. Watermark selection substantially affects the generated output for high entropy sentences. This proactive watermarking approach has potential application in future model development.

The prevalent use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains has drawn attention to the issue of "hallucination," which refers to instances where LLMs generate factually inaccurate or ungrounded information. Existing techniques for hallucination detection in language assistants rely on intricate fuzzy, specific free-language-based chain of thought (CoT) techniques or parameter-based methods that suffer from interpretability issues. Additionally, the methods that identify hallucinations post-generation could not prevent their occurrence and suffer from inconsistent performance due to the influence of the instruction format and model style. In this paper, we introduce a novel pre-detection self-evaluation technique, referred to as SELF-FAMILIARITY, which focuses on evaluating the model's familiarity with the concepts present in the input instruction and withholding the generation of response in case of unfamiliar concepts. This approach emulates the human ability to refrain from responding to unfamiliar topics, thus reducing hallucinations. We validate SELF-FAMILIARITY across four different large language models, demonstrating consistently superior performance compared to existing techniques. Our findings propose a significant shift towards preemptive strategies for hallucination mitigation in LLM assistants, promising improvements in reliability, applicability, and interpretability.

Large language models (LLMs) have become integral to various real-world applications, leveraging massive, web-sourced datasets like Common Crawl, C4, and FineWeb for pretraining. While these datasets provide linguistic data essential for high-quality natural language generation, they often contain harmful content, such as hate speech, misinformation, and biased narratives. Training LLMs on such unfiltered data risks perpetuating toxic behaviors, spreading misinformation, and amplifying societal biases which can undermine trust in LLM-driven applications and raise ethical concerns about their use. This paper presents a large-scale analysis of inappropriate content across these datasets, offering a comprehensive taxonomy that categorizes harmful webpages into Topical and Toxic based on their intent. We also introduce a prompt evaluation dataset, a high-accuracy Topical and Toxic Prompt (TTP), and a transformer-based model (HarmFormer) for content filtering. Additionally, we create a new multi-harm open-ended toxicity benchmark (HAVOC) and provide crucial insights into how models respond to adversarial toxic inputs. Upon publishing, we will also opensource our model signal on the entire C4 dataset. Our work offers insights into ensuring safer LLM pretraining and serves as a resource for Responsible AI (RAI) compliance.

While social media empowers freedom of expression and individual voices, it also enables anti-social behavior, online harassment, cyberbullying, and hate speech. In this paper, we deepen our understanding of online hate speech by focusing on a largely neglected but crucial aspect of hate speech -- its target: either "directed" towards a specific person or entity, or "generalized" towards a group of people sharing a common protected characteristic. We perform the first linguistic and psycholinguistic analysis of these two forms of hate speech and reveal the presence of interesting markers that distinguish these types of hate speech. Our analysis reveals that Directed hate speech, in addition to being more personal and directed, is more informal, angrier, and often explicitly attacks the target (via name calling) with fewer analytic words and more words suggesting authority and influence. Generalized hate speech, on the other hand, is dominated by religious hate, is characterized by the use of lethal words such as murder, exterminate, and kill; and quantity words such as million and many. Altogether, our work provides a data-driven analysis of the nuances of online-hate speech that enables not only a deepened understanding of hate speech and its social implications but also its detection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are central to a multitude of applications but struggle with significant risks, notably in generating harmful content and biases. Drawing an analogy to the human psyche's conflict between evolutionary survival instincts and societal norm adherence elucidated in Freud's psychoanalysis theory, we argue that LLMs suffer a similar fundamental conflict, arising between their inherent desire for syntactic and semantic continuity, established during the pre-training phase, and the post-training alignment with human values. This conflict renders LLMs vulnerable to adversarial attacks, wherein intensifying the models' desire for continuity can circumvent alignment efforts, resulting in the generation of harmful information. Through a series of experiments, we first validated the existence of the desire for continuity in LLMs, and further devised a straightforward yet powerful technique, such as incomplete sentences, negative priming, and cognitive dissonance scenarios, to demonstrate that even advanced LLMs struggle to prevent the generation of harmful information. In summary, our study uncovers the root of LLMs' vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, hereby questioning the efficacy of solely relying on sophisticated alignment methods, and further advocates for a new training idea that integrates modal concepts alongside traditional amodal concepts, aiming to endow LLMs with a more nuanced understanding of real-world contexts and ethical considerations.

Recent advancements in Generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the creation of highly realistic synthetic content, raising concerns about the potential for malicious use, such as misinformation and manipulation. Moreover, detecting Machine-Generated Text (MGT) remains challenging due to the lack of robust benchmarks that assess generalization to real-world scenarios. In this work, we present a pipeline to test the resilience of state-of-the-art MGT detectors (e.g., Mage, Radar, LLM-DetectAIve) to linguistically informed adversarial attacks. To challenge the detectors, we fine-tune language models using Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to shift the MGT style toward human-written text (HWT). This exploits the detectors' reliance on stylistic clues, making new generations more challenging to detect. Additionally, we analyze the linguistic shifts induced by the alignment and which features are used by detectors to detect MGT texts. Our results show that detectors can be easily fooled with relatively few examples, resulting in a significant drop in detection performance. This highlights the importance of improving detection methods and making them robust to unseen in-domain texts.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

Large language models (LLMs) have gained human trust due to their capabilities and helpfulness. However, this in turn may allow LLMs to affect users' mindsets by manipulating language. It is termed as gaslighting, a psychological effect. In this work, we aim to investigate the vulnerability of LLMs under prompt-based and fine-tuning-based gaslighting attacks. Therefore, we propose a two-stage framework DeepCoG designed to: 1) elicit gaslighting plans from LLMs with the proposed DeepGaslighting prompting template, and 2) acquire gaslighting conversations from LLMs through our Chain-of-Gaslighting method. The gaslighting conversation dataset along with a corresponding safe dataset is applied to fine-tuning-based attacks on open-source LLMs and anti-gaslighting safety alignment on these LLMs. Experiments demonstrate that both prompt-based and fine-tuning-based attacks transform three open-source LLMs into gaslighters. In contrast, we advanced three safety alignment strategies to strengthen (by 12.05%) the safety guardrail of LLMs. Our safety alignment strategies have minimal impacts on the utility of LLMs. Empirical studies indicate that an LLM may be a potential gaslighter, even if it passed the harmfulness test on general dangerous queries.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become a cornerstone in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP), offering transformative capabilities in understanding and generating human-like text. However, with their rising prominence, the security and vulnerability aspects of these models have garnered significant attention. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the various forms of attacks targeting LLMs, discussing the nature and mechanisms of these attacks, their potential impacts, and current defense strategies. We delve into topics such as adversarial attacks that aim to manipulate model outputs, data poisoning that affects model training, and privacy concerns related to training data exploitation. The paper also explores the effectiveness of different attack methodologies, the resilience of LLMs against these attacks, and the implications for model integrity and user trust. By examining the latest research, we provide insights into the current landscape of LLM vulnerabilities and defense mechanisms. Our objective is to offer a nuanced understanding of LLM attacks, foster awareness within the AI community, and inspire robust solutions to mitigate these risks in future developments.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and Bard, have revolutionized natural language understanding and generation. They possess deep language comprehension, human-like text generation capabilities, contextual awareness, and robust problem-solving skills, making them invaluable in various domains (e.g., search engines, customer support, translation). In the meantime, LLMs have also gained traction in the security community, revealing security vulnerabilities and showcasing their potential in security-related tasks. This paper explores the intersection of LLMs with security and privacy. Specifically, we investigate how LLMs positively impact security and privacy, potential risks and threats associated with their use, and inherent vulnerabilities within LLMs. Through a comprehensive literature review, the paper categorizes the papers into "The Good" (beneficial LLM applications), "The Bad" (offensive applications), and "The Ugly" (vulnerabilities of LLMs and their defenses). We have some interesting findings. For example, LLMs have proven to enhance code security (code vulnerability detection) and data privacy (data confidentiality protection), outperforming traditional methods. However, they can also be harnessed for various attacks (particularly user-level attacks) due to their human-like reasoning abilities. We have identified areas that require further research efforts. For example, Research on model and parameter extraction attacks is limited and often theoretical, hindered by LLM parameter scale and confidentiality. Safe instruction tuning, a recent development, requires more exploration. We hope that our work can shed light on the LLMs' potential to both bolster and jeopardize cybersecurity.

One of the biggest challenges of natural language generation (NLG) is the proper handling of named entities. Named entities are a common source of grammar mistakes such as wrong prepositions, wrong article handling, or incorrect entity inflection. Without factoring linguistic representation, such errors are often underrepresented when evaluating on a small set of arbitrarily picked argument values, or when translating a dataset from a linguistically simpler language, like English, to a linguistically complex language, like Russian. However, for some applications, broadly precise grammatical correctness is critical -- native speakers may find entity-related grammar errors silly, jarring, or even offensive. To enable the creation of more linguistically diverse NLG datasets, we release a Corpus of Linguistically Significant Entities (CLSE) annotated by linguist experts. The corpus includes 34 languages and covers 74 different semantic types to support various applications from airline ticketing to video games. To demonstrate one possible use of CLSE, we produce an augmented version of the Schema-Guided Dialog Dataset, SGD-CLSE. Using the CLSE's entities and a small number of human translations, we create a linguistically representative NLG evaluation benchmark in three languages: French (high-resource), Marathi (low-resource), and Russian (highly inflected language). We establish quality baselines for neural, template-based, and hybrid NLG systems and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each approach.

With the rapid advancement of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), concerns regarding their security have increasingly captured the attention of both academia and industry. Although MLLMs are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, designing effective multimodal jailbreak attacks poses unique challenges, especially given the distinct protective measures implemented across various modalities in commercial models. Previous works concentrate risks into a single modality, resulting in limited jailbreak performance. In this paper, we propose a heuristic-induced multimodal risk distribution jailbreak attack method, called HIMRD, which consists of two elements: multimodal risk distribution strategy and heuristic-induced search strategy. The multimodal risk distribution strategy is used to segment harmful instructions across multiple modalities to effectively circumvent MLLMs' security protection. The heuristic-induced search strategy identifies two types of prompts: the understanding-enhancing prompt, which helps the MLLM reconstruct the malicious prompt, and the inducing prompt, which increases the likelihood of affirmative outputs over refusals, enabling a successful jailbreak attack. Extensive experiments demonstrate that this approach effectively uncovers vulnerabilities in MLLMs, achieving an average attack success rate of 90% across seven popular open-source MLLMs and an average attack success rate of around 68% in three popular closed-source MLLMs. Our code will coming soon. Warning: This paper contains offensive and harmful examples, reader discretion is advised.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are notorious for blending fact with fiction and generating non-factual content, known as hallucinations. To tackle this challenge, we propose an interactive system that helps users obtain insights into the reliability of the generated text. Our approach is based on the idea that the self-consistency of multiple samples generated by the same LLM relates to its confidence in individual claims in the generated texts. Using this idea, we design RELIC, an interactive system that enables users to investigate and verify semantic-level variations in multiple long-form responses. This allows users to recognize potentially inaccurate information in the generated text and make necessary corrections. From a user study with ten participants, we demonstrate that our approach helps users better verify the reliability of the generated text. We further summarize the design implications and lessons learned from this research for inspiring future studies on reliable human-LLM interactions.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

Caution: This paper includes offensive words that could potentially cause unpleasantness. The fast-paced evolution of generative language models such as GPT-4 has demonstrated outstanding results in various NLP generation tasks. However, due to the potential generation of offensive words related to race or gender, various Controllable Text Generation (CTG) methods have been proposed to mitigate the occurrence of harmful words. However, existing CTG methods not only reduce toxicity but also negatively impact several aspects of the language model's generation performance, including topic consistency, grammar, and perplexity. This paper explores the limitations of previous methods and introduces a novel solution in the form of a simple Gated Toxicity Avoidance (GTA) that can be applied to any CTG method. We also evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed GTA by comparing it with state-of-the-art CTG methods across various datasets. Our findings reveal that gated toxicity avoidance efficiently achieves comparable levels of toxicity reduction to the original CTG methods while preserving the generation performance of the language model.

After the introduction of Large Language Models (LLMs), there have been substantial improvements in the performance of Natural Language Generation (NLG) tasks, including Text Summarization and Machine Translation. However, LLMs still produce outputs containing hallucinations, that is, content not grounded in factual information. Therefore, developing methods to assess the factuality of LLMs has become urgent. Indeed, resources for factuality evaluation have recently emerged. Although challenging, these resources face one or more of the following limitations: (i) they are tailored to a specific task or domain; (ii) they are limited in size, thereby preventing the training of new factuality evaluators; (iii) they are designed for simpler verification tasks, such as claim verification. To address these issues, we introduce LLM-Oasis, to the best of our knowledge the largest resource for training end-to-end factuality evaluators. LLM-Oasis is constructed by extracting claims from Wikipedia, falsifying a subset of these claims, and generating pairs of factual and unfactual texts. We then rely on human annotators to both validate the quality of our dataset and to create a gold standard test set for benchmarking factuality evaluation systems. Our experiments demonstrate that LLM-Oasis presents a significant challenge for state-of-the-art LLMs, with GPT-4o achieving up to 60% accuracy in our proposed end-to-end factuality evaluation task, highlighting its potential to drive future research in the field.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed in interactive contexts that involve direct user engagement, such as chatbots and writing assistants. These deployments are increasingly plagued by prompt injection and jailbreaking (collectively, prompt hacking), in which models are manipulated to ignore their original instructions and instead follow potentially malicious ones. Although widely acknowledged as a significant security threat, there is a dearth of large-scale resources and quantitative studies on prompt hacking. To address this lacuna, we launch a global prompt hacking competition, which allows for free-form human input attacks. We elicit 600K+ adversarial prompts against three state-of-the-art LLMs. We describe the dataset, which empirically verifies that current LLMs can indeed be manipulated via prompt hacking. We also present a comprehensive taxonomical ontology of the types of adversarial prompts.

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has made a transformative impact. However, the potential that LLMs such as ChatGPT can be exploited to generate misinformation has posed a serious concern to online safety and public trust. A fundamental research question is: will LLM-generated misinformation cause more harm than human-written misinformation? We propose to tackle this question from the perspective of detection difficulty. We first build a taxonomy of LLM-generated misinformation. Then we categorize and validate the potential real-world methods for generating misinformation with LLMs. Then, through extensive empirical investigation, we discover that LLM-generated misinformation can be harder to detect for humans and detectors compared to human-written misinformation with the same semantics, which suggests it can have more deceptive styles and potentially cause more harm. We also discuss the implications of our discovery on combating misinformation in the age of LLMs and the countermeasures.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can comply with harmful instructions, raising serious safety concerns despite their impressive capabilities. Recent work has leveraged probing-based approaches to study the separability of malicious and benign inputs in LLMs' internal representations, and researchers have proposed using such probing methods for safety detection. We systematically re-examine this paradigm. Motivated by poor out-of-distribution performance, we hypothesize that probes learn superficial patterns rather than semantic harmfulness. Through controlled experiments, we confirm this hypothesis and identify the specific patterns learned: instructional patterns and trigger words. Our investigation follows a systematic approach, progressing from demonstrating comparable performance of simple n-gram methods, to controlled experiments with semantically cleaned datasets, to detailed analysis of pattern dependencies. These results reveal a false sense of security around current probing-based approaches and highlight the need to redesign both models and evaluation protocols, for which we provide further discussions in the hope of suggesting responsible further research in this direction. We have open-sourced the project at https://github.com/WangCheng0116/Why-Probe-Fails.

Hate speech represents a pervasive and detrimental form of online discourse, often manifested through an array of slurs, from hateful tweets to defamatory posts. As such speech proliferates, it connects people globally and poses significant social, psychological, and occasionally physical threats to targeted individuals and communities. Current computational linguistic approaches for tackling this phenomenon rely on labelled social media datasets for training. For unifying efforts, our study advances in the critical need for a comprehensive meta-collection, advocating for an extensive dataset to help counteract this problem effectively. We scrutinized over 60 datasets, selectively integrating those pertinent into MetaHate. This paper offers a detailed examination of existing collections, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Our findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the existing datasets, paving the way for training more robust and adaptable models. These enhanced models are essential for effectively combating the dynamic and complex nature of hate speech in the digital realm.

Hallucination has been widely recognized to be a significant drawback for large language models (LLMs). There have been many works that attempt to reduce the extent of hallucination. These efforts have mostly been empirical so far, which cannot answer the fundamental question whether it can be completely eliminated. In this paper, we formalize the problem and show that it is impossible to eliminate hallucination in LLMs. Specifically, we define a formal world where hallucination is defined as inconsistencies between a computable LLM and a computable ground truth function. By employing results from learning theory, we show that LLMs cannot learn all of the computable functions and will therefore always hallucinate. Since the formal world is a part of the real world which is much more complicated, hallucinations are also inevitable for real world LLMs. Furthermore, for real world LLMs constrained by provable time complexity, we describe the hallucination-prone tasks and empirically validate our claims. Finally, using the formal world framework, we discuss the possible mechanisms and efficacies of existing hallucination mitigators as well as the practical implications on the safe deployment of LLMs.

The new paradigm of finetuning-as-a-service introduces a new attack surface for Large Language Models (LLMs): a few harmful data uploaded by users can easily trick the finetuning to produce an alignment-broken model. We conduct an empirical analysis and uncover a harmful embedding drift phenomenon, showing a probable cause of the alignment-broken effect. Inspired by our findings, we propose Vaccine, a perturbation-aware alignment technique to mitigate the security risk of users finetuning. The core idea of Vaccine is to produce invariant hidden embeddings by progressively adding crafted perturbation to them in the alignment phase. This enables the embeddings to withstand harmful perturbation from un-sanitized user data in the finetuning phase. Our results on open source mainstream LLMs (e.g., Llama2, Opt, Vicuna) demonstrate that Vaccine can boost the robustness of alignment against harmful prompts induced embedding drift while reserving reasoning ability towards benign prompts. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Vaccine.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exploded a new heatwave of AI, for their ability to engage end-users in human-level conversations with detailed and articulate answers across many knowledge domains. In response to their fast adoption in many industrial applications, this survey concerns their safety and trustworthiness. First, we review known vulnerabilities of the LLMs, categorising them into inherent issues, intended attacks, and unintended bugs. Then, we consider if and how the Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques, which have been widely developed for traditional software and deep learning models such as convolutional neural networks, can be integrated and further extended throughout the lifecycle of the LLMs to provide rigorous analysis to the safety and trustworthiness of LLMs and their applications. Specifically, we consider four complementary techniques: falsification and evaluation, verification, runtime monitoring, and ethical use. Considering the fast development of LLMs, this survey does not intend to be complete (although it includes 300 references), especially when it comes to the applications of LLMs in various domains, but rather a collection of organised literature reviews and discussions to support the quick understanding of the safety and trustworthiness issues from the perspective of V&V.

What mechanisms underlie linguistic generalization in large language models (LLMs)? This question has attracted considerable attention, with most studies analyzing the extent to which the language skills of LLMs resemble rules. As of yet, it is not known whether linguistic generalization in LLMs could equally well be explained as the result of analogical processes, which can be formalized as similarity operations on stored exemplars. A key shortcoming of prior research is its focus on linguistic phenomena with a high degree of regularity, for which rule-based and analogical approaches make the same predictions. Here, we instead examine derivational morphology, specifically English adjective nominalization, which displays notable variability. We introduce a new method for investigating linguistic generalization in LLMs: focusing on GPT-J, we fit cognitive models that instantiate rule-based and analogical learning to the LLM training data and compare their predictions on a set of nonce adjectives with those of the LLM, allowing us to draw direct conclusions regarding underlying mechanisms. As expected, rule-based and analogical models explain the predictions of GPT-J equally well for adjectives with regular nominalization patterns. However, for adjectives with variable nominalization patterns, the analogical model provides a much better match. Furthermore, GPT-J's behavior is sensitive to the individual word frequencies, even for regular forms, a behavior that is consistent with an analogical account of regular forms but not a rule-based one. These findings refute the hypothesis that GPT-J's linguistic generalization on adjective nominalization involves rules, suggesting similarity operations on stored exemplars as the underlying mechanism. Overall, our study suggests that analogical processes play a bigger role in the linguistic generalization of LLMs than previously thought.

Language Models (LMs) often cannot be deployed because of their potential to harm users in hard-to-predict ways. Prior work identifies harmful behaviors before deployment by using human annotators to hand-write test cases. However, human annotation is expensive, limiting the number and diversity of test cases. In this work, we automatically find cases where a target LM behaves in a harmful way, by generating test cases ("red teaming") using another LM. We evaluate the target LM's replies to generated test questions using a classifier trained to detect offensive content, uncovering tens of thousands of offensive replies in a 280B parameter LM chatbot. We explore several methods, from zero-shot generation to reinforcement learning, for generating test cases with varying levels of diversity and difficulty. Furthermore, we use prompt engineering to control LM-generated test cases to uncover a variety of other harms, automatically finding groups of people that the chatbot discusses in offensive ways, personal and hospital phone numbers generated as the chatbot's own contact info, leakage of private training data in generated text, and harms that occur over the course of a conversation. Overall, LM-based red teaming is one promising tool (among many needed) for finding and fixing diverse, undesirable LM behaviors before impacting users.

Data augmentation, a widely-employed technique for addressing data scarcity, involves generating synthetic data examples which are then used to augment available training data. Researchers have seen surprising success from simple methods, such as random perturbations from natural examples, where models seem to benefit even from data with nonsense words, or data that doesn't conform to the rules of the language. A second line of research produces synthetic data that does in fact follow all linguistic constraints; these methods require some linguistic expertise and are generally more challenging to implement. No previous work has done a systematic, empirical comparison of both linguistically-naive and linguistically-motivated data augmentation strategies, leaving uncertainty about whether the additional time and effort of linguistically-motivated data augmentation work in fact yields better downstream performance. In this work, we conduct a careful and comprehensive comparison of augmentation strategies (both linguistically-naive and linguistically-motivated) for two low-resource languages with different morphological properties, Uspanteko and Arapaho. We evaluate the effectiveness of many different strategies and their combinations across two important sequence-to-sequence tasks for low-resource languages: machine translation and interlinear glossing. We find that linguistically-motivated strategies can have benefits over naive approaches, but only when the new examples they produce are not significantly unlike the training data distribution.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly used in software engineering tasks, with an increased focus on bug report resolution over the past year. However, most proposed systems fail to properly handle uncertain or incorrect inputs and outputs. Existing LLM-based tools and coding agents respond to every issue and generate a patch for every case, even when the input is vague or their own output is incorrect. There are no mechanisms in place to abstain when confidence is low. This leads to unreliable behaviour, such as hallucinated code changes or responses based on vague issue reports. We introduce BouncerBench, a benchmark that evaluates whether LLM-based software agents can refuse to act when inputs are ill-defined or refuse to respond when their own outputs are likely to be incorrect. Unlike prior benchmarks that implicitly incentivize models to generate responses even when uncertain, BouncerBench aims to improve precision by targeting two overlooked failure points: (1) vague or underspecified issue descriptions in tickets and (2) logically or functionally incorrect code patches created by the system. It measures whether proposed systems can distinguish actionable issues from vague tickets and valid patches from untrustworthy ones. We also implement a basic input and output bouncer, evaluating how well current LLMs can abstain when needed. Our results show that most models fail to abstain from underspecified inputs or incorrect outputs. Hence, we conclude that there is significant room for improvement before LLMs can be trusted to make correct decisions and recommendations in real-world software engineering workflows. BouncerBench provides a first step toward evaluating and building more cautious, trustworthy code agents. The replication package, dataset, and leaderboard can be found at bouncerbench.com

Despite increasingly fluent, relevant, and coherent language generation, major gaps remain between how humans and machines use language. We argue that a key dimension that is missing from our understanding of language models (LMs) is the model's ability to interpret and generate expressions of uncertainty. Whether it be the weatherperson announcing a chance of rain or a doctor giving a diagnosis, information is often not black-and-white and expressions of uncertainty provide nuance to support human-decision making. The increasing deployment of LMs in the wild motivates us to investigate whether LMs are capable of interpreting expressions of uncertainty and how LMs' behaviors change when learning to emit their own expressions of uncertainty. When injecting expressions of uncertainty into prompts (e.g., "I think the answer is..."), we discover that GPT3's generations vary upwards of 80% in accuracy based on the expression used. We analyze the linguistic characteristics of these expressions and find a drop in accuracy when naturalistic expressions of certainty are present. We find similar effects when teaching models to emit their own expressions of uncertainty, where model calibration suffers when teaching models to emit certainty rather than uncertainty. Together, these results highlight the challenges of building LMs that interpret and generate trustworthy expressions of uncertainty.

Language models often exhibit undesirable behavior, e.g., generating toxic or gender-biased text. In the case of neural language models, an encoding of the undesirable behavior is often present in the model's representations. Thus, one natural (and common) approach to prevent the model from exhibiting undesirable behavior is to steer the model's representations in a manner that reduces the probability of it generating undesirable text. This paper investigates the formal and empirical properties of steering functions, i.e., transformation of the neural language model's representations that alter its behavior. First, we derive two optimal, in the least-squares sense, affine steering functions under different constraints. Our theory provides justification for existing approaches and offers a novel, improved steering approach. Second, we offer a series of experiments that demonstrate the empirical effectiveness of the methods in mitigating bias and reducing toxic generation.

This paper presents the Deceptive Humor Dataset (DHD), a novel resource for studying humor derived from fabricated claims and misinformation. In an era of rampant misinformation, understanding how humor intertwines with deception is essential. DHD consists of humor-infused comments generated from false narratives, incorporating fabricated claims and manipulated information using the ChatGPT-4o model. Each instance is labeled with a Satire Level, ranging from 1 for subtle satire to 3 for high-level satire and classified into five distinct Humor Categories: Dark Humor, Irony, Social Commentary, Wordplay, and Absurdity. The dataset spans multiple languages including English, Telugu, Hindi, Kannada, Tamil, and their code-mixed variants (Te-En, Hi-En, Ka-En, Ta-En), making it a valuable multilingual benchmark. By introducing DHD, we establish a structured foundation for analyzing humor in deceptive contexts, paving the way for a new research direction that explores how humor not only interacts with misinformation but also influences its perception and spread. We establish strong baselines for the proposed dataset, providing a foundation for future research to benchmark and advance deceptive humor detection models.

Recent progress in natural language generation has raised dual-use concerns. While applications like summarization and translation are positive, the underlying technology also might enable adversaries to generate neural fake news: targeted propaganda that closely mimics the style of real news. Modern computer security relies on careful threat modeling: identifying potential threats and vulnerabilities from an adversary's point of view, and exploring potential mitigations to these threats. Likewise, developing robust defenses against neural fake news requires us first to carefully investigate and characterize the risks of these models. We thus present a model for controllable text generation called Grover. Given a headline like `Link Found Between Vaccines and Autism,' Grover can generate the rest of the article; humans find these generations to be more trustworthy than human-written disinformation. Developing robust verification techniques against generators like Grover is critical. We find that best current discriminators can classify neural fake news from real, human-written, news with 73% accuracy, assuming access to a moderate level of training data. Counterintuitively, the best defense against Grover turns out to be Grover itself, with 92% accuracy, demonstrating the importance of public release of strong generators. We investigate these results further, showing that exposure bias -- and sampling strategies that alleviate its effects -- both leave artifacts that similar discriminators can pick up on. We conclude by discussing ethical issues regarding the technology, and plan to release Grover publicly, helping pave the way for better detection of neural fake news.

Backdoor attacks are a kind of insidious security threat against machine learning models. After being injected with a backdoor in training, the victim model will produce adversary-specified outputs on the inputs embedded with predesigned triggers but behave properly on normal inputs during inference. As a sort of emergent attack, backdoor attacks in natural language processing (NLP) are investigated insufficiently. As far as we know, almost all existing textual backdoor attack methods insert additional contents into normal samples as triggers, which causes the trigger-embedded samples to be detected and the backdoor attacks to be blocked without much effort. In this paper, we propose to use the syntactic structure as the trigger in textual backdoor attacks. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that the syntactic trigger-based attack method can achieve comparable attack performance (almost 100% success rate) to the insertion-based methods but possesses much higher invisibility and stronger resistance to defenses. These results also reveal the significant insidiousness and harmfulness of textual backdoor attacks. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained at https://github.com/thunlp/HiddenKiller.

Evaluating aligned large language models' (LLMs) ability to recognize and reject unsafe user requests is crucial for safe, policy-compliant deployments. Existing evaluation efforts, however, face three limitations that we address with SORRY-Bench, our proposed benchmark. First, existing methods often use coarse-grained taxonomies of unsafe topics, and are over-representing some fine-grained topics. For example, among the ten existing datasets that we evaluated, tests for refusals of self-harm instructions are over 3x less represented than tests for fraudulent activities. SORRY-Bench improves on this by using a fine-grained taxonomy of 45 potentially unsafe topics, and 450 class-balanced unsafe instructions, compiled through human-in-the-loop methods. Second, linguistic characteristics and formatting of prompts are often overlooked, like different languages, dialects, and more -- which are only implicitly considered in many evaluations. We supplement SORRY-Bench with 20 diverse linguistic augmentations to systematically examine these effects. Third, existing evaluations rely on large LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for evaluation, which can be computationally expensive. We investigate design choices for creating a fast, accurate automated safety evaluator. By collecting 7K+ human annotations and conducting a meta-evaluation of diverse LLM-as-a-judge designs, we show that fine-tuned 7B LLMs can achieve accuracy comparable to GPT-4 scale LLMs, with lower computational cost. Putting these together, we evaluate over 40 proprietary and open-source LLMs on SORRY-Bench, analyzing their distinctive refusal behaviors. We hope our effort provides a building block for systematic evaluations of LLMs' safety refusal capabilities, in a balanced, granular, and efficient manner.

The recent performance leap of Large Language Models (LLMs) opens up new opportunities across numerous industrial applications and domains. However, erroneous generations, such as false predictions, misinformation, and hallucination made by LLMs, have also raised severe concerns for the trustworthiness of LLMs', especially in safety-, security- and reliability-sensitive scenarios, potentially hindering real-world adoptions. While uncertainty estimation has shown its potential for interpreting the prediction risks made by general machine learning (ML) models, little is known about whether and to what extent it can help explore an LLM's capabilities and counteract its undesired behavior. To bridge the gap, in this paper, we initiate an exploratory study on the risk assessment of LLMs from the lens of uncertainty. In particular, we experiment with twelve uncertainty estimation methods and four LLMs on four prominent natural language processing (NLP) tasks to investigate to what extent uncertainty estimation techniques could help characterize the prediction risks of LLMs. Our findings validate the effectiveness of uncertainty estimation for revealing LLMs' uncertain/non-factual predictions. In addition to general NLP tasks, we extensively conduct experiments with four LLMs for code generation on two datasets. We find that uncertainty estimation can potentially uncover buggy programs generated by LLMs. Insights from our study shed light on future design and development for reliable LLMs, facilitating further research toward enhancing the trustworthiness of LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are usually aligned with "human values/preferences" to prevent harmful output. Discussions around the alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) generally focus on preventing harmful outputs. However, in this paper, we argue that in health-related queries, over-alignment-leading to overly cautious responses-can itself be harmful, especially for people with anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). This is not only unethical but also dangerous to the user, both mentally and physically. We also showed qualitative results that some LLMs exhibit varying degrees of alignment. Finally, we call for the development of LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities that provide more tailored and nuanced responses to health queries. Warning: This paper contains materials that could trigger health anxiety or OCD.

Effective evaluation of the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to overestimation due to data exposure of evaluation benchmarks. We introduce a framework for producing linguistic reasoning problems that reduces the effect of memorisation in model performance estimates and apply this framework to develop LINGOLY-TOO, a challenging evaluation benchmark for linguistic reasoning. By developing orthographic templates, we dynamically obfuscate the writing systems of real languages to generate numerous question variations. These variations preserve the reasoning steps required for each solution while reducing the likelihood of specific problem instances appearing in model training data. Our experiments demonstrate that frontier models, including OpenAI o1-preview and DeepSeem R1, struggle with advanced reasoning. Our analysis also shows that LLMs exhibit noticeable variance in accuracy across permutations of the same problem, and on average perform better on questions appearing in their original orthography. Our findings highlight the opaque nature of response generation in LLMs and provide evidence that prior data exposure contributes to overestimating the reasoning capabilities of frontier models.

Although large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned, they remain vulnerable to jailbreaking through either carefully crafted prompts in natural language or, interestingly, gibberish adversarial suffixes. However, gibberish tokens have received relatively less attention despite their success in attacking aligned LLMs. Recent work, AmpleGCG~liao2024amplegcg, demonstrates that a generative model can quickly produce numerous customizable gibberish adversarial suffixes for any harmful query, exposing a range of alignment gaps in out-of-distribution (OOD) language spaces. To bring more attention to this area, we introduce AmpleGCG-Plus, an enhanced version that achieves better performance in fewer attempts. Through a series of exploratory experiments, we identify several training strategies to improve the learning of gibberish suffixes. Our results, verified under a strict evaluation setting, show that it outperforms AmpleGCG on both open-weight and closed-source models, achieving increases in attack success rate (ASR) of up to 17\% in the white-box setting against Llama-2-7B-chat, and more than tripling ASR in the black-box setting against GPT-4. Notably, AmpleGCG-Plus jailbreaks the newer GPT-4o series of models at similar rates to GPT-4, and, uncovers vulnerabilities against the recently proposed circuit breakers defense. We publicly release AmpleGCG-Plus along with our collected training datasets.

Quantifying uncertainty in large language models (LLMs) is important for safety-critical applications because it helps spot incorrect answers, known as hallucinations. One major trend of uncertainty quantification methods is based on estimating the entropy of the distribution of the LLM's potential output sequences. This estimation is based on a set of output sequences and associated probabilities obtained by querying the LLM several times. In this paper, we advocate and experimentally show that the probability of unobserved sequences plays a crucial role, and we recommend future research to integrate it to enhance such LLM uncertainty quantification methods.

Large language models are trained on vast amounts of internet data, prompting concerns and speculation that they have memorized public benchmarks. Going from speculation to proof of contamination is challenging, as the pretraining data used by proprietary models are often not publicly accessible. We show that it is possible to provide provable guarantees of test set contamination in language models without access to pretraining data or model weights. Our approach leverages the fact that when there is no data contamination, all orderings of an exchangeable benchmark should be equally likely. In contrast, the tendency for language models to memorize example order means that a contaminated language model will find certain canonical orderings to be much more likely than others. Our test flags potential contamination whenever the likelihood of a canonically ordered benchmark dataset is significantly higher than the likelihood after shuffling the examples. We demonstrate that our procedure is sensitive enough to reliably prove test set contamination in challenging situations, including models as small as 1.4 billion parameters, on small test sets of only 1000 examples, and datasets that appear only a few times in the pretraining corpus. Using our test, we audit five popular publicly accessible language models for test set contamination and find little evidence for pervasive contamination.

Despite the recent progress in text summarization made by large language models (LLMs), they often generate summaries that are factually inconsistent with original articles, known as "hallucinations" in text generation. Unlike previous small models (e.g., BART, T5), current LLMs make fewer silly mistakes but more sophisticated ones, such as imposing cause and effect, adding false details, overgeneralizing, etc. These hallucinations are challenging to detect through traditional methods, which poses great challenges for improving the factual consistency of text summarization. In this paper, we propose an adversarially DEcoupling method to disentangle the Comprehension and EmbellishmeNT abilities of LLMs (DECENT). Furthermore, we adopt a probing-based efficient training to cover the shortage of sensitivity for true and false in the training process of LLMs. In this way, LLMs are less confused about embellishing and understanding; thus, they can execute the instructions more accurately and have enhanced abilities to distinguish hallucinations. Experimental results show that DECENT significantly improves the reliability of text summarization based on LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to hallucinations-outputs that are ungrounded, factually incorrect, or inconsistent with prior generations. We focus on close-book Question Answering (CBQA), where previous work has not fully addressed the distinction between two possible kinds of hallucinations, namely, whether the model (1) does not hold the correct answer in its parameters or (2) answers incorrectly despite having the required knowledge. We argue that distinguishing these cases is crucial for detecting and mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, case (2) may be mitigated by intervening in the model's internal computation, as the knowledge resides within the model's parameters. In contrast, in case (1) there is no parametric knowledge to leverage for mitigation, so it should be addressed by resorting to an external knowledge source or abstaining. To help distinguish between the two cases, we introduce Wrong Answer despite having Correct Knowledge (WACK), an approach for constructing model-specific datasets for the second hallucination type. Our probing experiments indicate that the two kinds of hallucinations are represented differently in the model's inner states. Next, we show that datasets constructed using WACK exhibit variations across models, demonstrating that even when models share knowledge of certain facts, they still vary in the specific examples that lead to hallucinations. Finally, we show that training a probe on our WACK datasets leads to better hallucination detection of case (2) hallucinations than using the common generic one-size-fits-all datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/hallucination-mitigation .

Abusive language is a growing concern in many social media platforms. Repeated exposure to abusive speech has created physiological effects on the target users. Thus, the problem of abusive language should be addressed in all forms for online peace and safety. While extensive research exists in abusive speech detection, most studies focus on English. Recently, many smearing incidents have occurred in India, which provoked diverse forms of abusive speech in online space in various languages based on the geographic location. Therefore it is essential to deal with such malicious content. In this paper, to bridge the gap, we demonstrate a large-scale analysis of multilingual abusive speech in Indic languages. We examine different interlingual transfer mechanisms and observe the performance of various multilingual models for abusive speech detection for eight different Indic languages. We also experiment to show how robust these models are on adversarial attacks. Finally, we conduct an in-depth error analysis by looking into the models' misclassified posts across various settings. We have made our code and models public for other researchers.

Warning: this paper contains model outputs exhibiting offensiveness and biases. Recently pre-trained language models (PLMs) have prospered in various natural language generation (NLG) tasks due to their ability to generate fairly fluent text. Nevertheless, these models are observed to capture and reproduce harmful contents in training corpora, typically toxic language and social biases, raising severe moral issues. Prior works on ethical NLG tackle detoxifying and debiasing separately, which is problematic since we find debiased models still exhibit toxicity while detoxified ones even exacerbate biases. To address such a challenge, we propose the first unified framework of detoxifying and debiasing called UDDIA, which jointly formalizes these two problems as rectifying the output space. We theoretically interpret our framework as learning a text distribution mixing weighted attributes. Besides, UDDIA conducts adaptive optimization of only a few parameters during decoding based on a parameter-efficient tuning schema without any training data. This leads to minimal generation quality loss and improved rectification performance with acceptable computational cost. Experimental results demonstrate that compared to several strong baselines, UDDIA achieves debiasing and detoxifying simultaneously and better balances efficiency and effectiveness, taking a further step towards practical ethical NLG.

Personal narratives are stories authors construct to make meaning of their experiences. Style, the distinctive way authors use language to express themselves, is fundamental to how these narratives convey subjective experiences. Yet there is a lack of a formal framework for systematically analyzing these stylistic choices. We present a novel approach that formalizes style in personal narratives as patterns in the linguistic choices authors make when communicating subjective experiences. Our framework integrates three domains: functional linguistics establishes language as a system of meaningful choices, computer science provides methods for automatically extracting and analyzing sequential patterns, and these patterns are linked to psychological observations. Using language models, we automatically extract linguistic features such as processes, participants, and circumstances. We apply our framework to hundreds of dream narratives, including a case study on a war veteran with post-traumatic stress disorder. Analysis of his narratives uncovers distinctive patterns, particularly how verbal processes dominate over mental ones, illustrating the relationship between linguistic choices and psychological states.

Large language models (LLMs) have emerged as pivotal contributors in contemporary natural language processing and are increasingly being applied across a diverse range of industries. However, these large-scale probabilistic statistical models cannot currently ensure the requisite quality in professional content generation. These models often produce hallucinated text, compromising their practical utility in professional contexts. To assess the authentic reliability of LLMs in text generation, numerous initiatives have developed benchmark evaluations for hallucination phenomena. Nevertheless, these benchmarks frequently utilize constrained generation techniques due to cost and temporal constraints. These techniques encompass the use of directed hallucination induction and strategies that deliberately alter authentic text to produce hallucinations. These approaches are not congruent with the unrestricted text generation demanded by real-world applications. Furthermore, a well-established Chinese-language dataset dedicated to the evaluation of hallucinations in text generation is presently lacking. Consequently, we have developed an Unconstrained Hallucination Generation Evaluation (UHGEval) benchmark, designed to compile outputs produced with minimal restrictions by LLMs. Concurrently, we have established a comprehensive benchmark evaluation framework to aid subsequent researchers in undertaking scalable and reproducible experiments. We have also executed extensive experiments, evaluating prominent Chinese language models and the GPT series models to derive professional performance insights regarding hallucination challenges.

The emerging capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have sparked concerns about their immediate potential for harmful misuse. The core approach to mitigate these concerns is the detection of harmful queries to the model. Current detection approaches are fallible, and are particularly susceptible to attacks that exploit mismatched generalization of model capabilities (e.g., prompts in low-resource languages or prompts provided in non-text modalities such as image and audio). To tackle this challenge, we propose OMNIGUARD, an approach for detecting harmful prompts across languages and modalities. Our approach (i) identifies internal representations of an LLM/MLLM that are aligned across languages or modalities and then (ii) uses them to build a language-agnostic or modality-agnostic classifier for detecting harmful prompts. OMNIGUARD improves harmful prompt classification accuracy by 11.57\% over the strongest baseline in a multilingual setting, by 20.44\% for image-based prompts, and sets a new SOTA for audio-based prompts. By repurposing embeddings computed during generation, OMNIGUARD is also very efficient (approx 120 times faster than the next fastest baseline). Code and data are available at: https://github.com/vsahil/OmniGuard.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

The wide-ranging applications of large language models (LLMs), especially in safety-critical domains, necessitate the proper evaluation of the LLM's adversarial robustness. This paper proposes an efficient tool to audit the LLM's adversarial robustness via a prompt-based adversarial attack (PromptAttack). PromptAttack converts adversarial textual attacks into an attack prompt that can cause the victim LLM to output the adversarial sample to fool itself. The attack prompt is composed of three important components: (1) original input (OI) including the original sample and its ground-truth label, (2) attack objective (AO) illustrating a task description of generating a new sample that can fool itself without changing the semantic meaning, and (3) attack guidance (AG) containing the perturbation instructions to guide the LLM on how to complete the task by perturbing the original sample at character, word, and sentence levels, respectively. Besides, we use a fidelity filter to ensure that PromptAttack maintains the original semantic meanings of the adversarial examples. Further, we enhance the attack power of PromptAttack by ensembling adversarial examples at different perturbation levels. Comprehensive empirical results using Llama2 and GPT-3.5 validate that PromptAttack consistently yields a much higher attack success rate compared to AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++. Interesting findings include that a simple emoji can easily mislead GPT-3.5 to make wrong predictions.

Interventions targeting the representation space of language models (LMs) have emerged as an effective means to influence model behavior. Such methods are employed, for example, to eliminate or alter the encoding of demographic information such as gender within the model's representations and, in so doing, create a counterfactual representation. However, because the intervention operates within the representation space, understanding precisely what aspects of the text it modifies poses a challenge. In this paper, we give a method to convert representation counterfactuals into string counterfactuals. We demonstrate that this approach enables us to analyze the linguistic alterations corresponding to a given representation space intervention and to interpret the features utilized to encode a specific concept. Moreover, the resulting counterfactuals can be used to mitigate bias in classification through data augmentation.

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in introducing vision into Large Language Models (LLMs). The proliferation of large Visual Language Models (VLMs), such as Flamingo, BLIP-2, and GPT-4, signifies an exciting convergence of advancements in both visual and language foundation models. Yet, the risks associated with this integrative approach are largely unexamined. In this paper, we shed light on the security and safety implications of this trend. First, we underscore that the continuous and high-dimensional nature of the additional visual input space intrinsically makes it a fertile ground for adversarial attacks. This unavoidably expands the attack surfaces of LLMs. Second, we highlight that the broad functionality of LLMs also presents visual attackers with a wider array of achievable adversarial objectives, extending the implications of security failures beyond mere misclassification. To elucidate these risks, we study adversarial examples in the visual input space of a VLM. Specifically, against MiniGPT-4, which incorporates safety mechanisms that can refuse harmful instructions, we present visual adversarial examples that can circumvent the safety mechanisms and provoke harmful behaviors of the model. Remarkably, we discover that adversarial examples, even if optimized on a narrow, manually curated derogatory corpus against specific social groups, can universally jailbreak the model's safety mechanisms. A single such adversarial example can generally undermine MiniGPT-4's safety, enabling it to heed a wide range of harmful instructions and produce harmful content far beyond simply imitating the derogatory corpus used in optimization. Unveiling these risks, we accentuate the urgent need for comprehensive risk assessments, robust defense strategies, and the implementation of responsible practices for the secure and safe utilization of VLMs.

Language Models [LMs] are now playing an increasingly large role in information generation and synthesis; the representation of scientific knowledge in these systems needs to be highly accurate. A prime challenge is hallucination; that is, generating apparently plausible but actually false information, including invented citations and nonexistent research papers. This kind of inaccuracy is dangerous in all the domains that require high levels of factual correctness, such as academia and education. This work presents a pipeline for evaluating the frequency with which language models hallucinate in generating responses in the scientific literature. We propose ArxEval, an evaluation pipeline with two tasks using ArXiv as a repository: Jumbled Titles and Mixed Titles. Our evaluation includes fifteen widely used language models and provides comparative insights into their reliability in handling scientific literature.

As large language models continue to develop in the field of AI, text generation systems are susceptible to a worrisome phenomenon known as hallucination. In this study, we summarize recent compelling insights into hallucinations in LLMs. We present a novel taxonomy of hallucinations from various text generation tasks, thus provide theoretical insights, detection methods and improvement approaches. Based on this, future research directions are proposed. Our contribution are threefold: (1) We provide a detailed and complete taxonomy for hallucinations appearing in text generation tasks; (2) We provide theoretical analyses of hallucinations in LLMs and provide existing detection and improvement methods; (3) We propose several research directions that can be developed in the future. As hallucinations garner significant attention from the community, we will maintain updates on relevant research progress.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Detecting logical fallacies in texts can help users spot argument flaws, but automating this detection is not easy. Manually annotating fallacies in large-scale, real-world text data to create datasets for developing and validating detection models is costly. This paper introduces CoCoLoFa, the largest known logical fallacy dataset, containing 7,706 comments for 648 news articles, with each comment labeled for fallacy presence and type. We recruited 143 crowd workers to write comments embodying specific fallacy types (e.g., slippery slope) in response to news articles. Recognizing the complexity of this writing task, we built an LLM-powered assistant into the workers' interface to aid in drafting and refining their comments. Experts rated the writing quality and labeling validity of CoCoLoFa as high and reliable. BERT-based models fine-tuned using CoCoLoFa achieved the highest fallacy detection (F1=0.86) and classification (F1=0.87) performance on its test set, outperforming the state-of-the-art LLMs. Our work shows that combining crowdsourcing and LLMs enables us to more effectively construct datasets for complex linguistic phenomena that crowd workers find challenging to produce on their own.

Although there are a couple of open-source language processing pipelines available for Hungarian, none of them satisfies the requirements of today's NLP applications. A language processing pipeline should consist of close to state-of-the-art lemmatization, morphosyntactic analysis, entity recognition and word embeddings. Industrial text processing applications have to satisfy non-functional software quality requirements, what is more, frameworks supporting multiple languages are more and more favored. This paper introduces HuSpaCy, an industry-ready Hungarian language processing toolkit. The presented tool provides components for the most important basic linguistic analysis tasks. It is open-source and is available under a permissive license. Our system is built upon spaCy's NLP components resulting in an easily usable, fast yet accurate application. Experiments confirm that HuSpaCy has high accuracy while maintaining resource-efficient prediction capabilities.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown substantial capacity for generating fluent, contextually appropriate responses. However, they can produce hallucinated outputs, especially when a user query includes one or more false premises-claims that contradict established facts. Such premises can mislead LLMs into offering fabricated or misleading details. Existing approaches include pretraining, fine-tuning, and inference-time techniques that often rely on access to logits or address hallucinations after they occur. These methods tend to be computationally expensive, require extensive training data, or lack proactive mechanisms to prevent hallucination before generation, limiting their efficiency in real-time applications. We propose a retrieval-based framework that identifies and addresses false premises before generation. Our method first transforms a user's query into a logical representation, then applies retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to assess the validity of each premise using factual sources. Finally, we incorporate the verification results into the LLM's prompt to maintain factual consistency in the final output. Experiments show that this approach effectively reduces hallucinations, improves factual accuracy, and does not require access to model logits or large-scale fine-tuning.

We propose a universal adversarial attack on multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) that leverages a single optimized image to override alignment safeguards across diverse queries and even multiple models. By backpropagating through the vision encoder and language head, we craft a synthetic image that forces the model to respond with a targeted phrase (e.g., ''Sure, here it is'') or otherwise unsafe content-even for harmful prompts. In experiments on the SafeBench benchmark, our method achieves significantly higher attack success rates than existing baselines, including text-only universal prompts (e.g., up to 93% on certain models). We further demonstrate cross-model transferability by training on several multimodal LLMs simultaneously and testing on unseen architectures. Additionally, a multi-answer variant of our approach produces more natural-sounding (yet still malicious) responses. These findings underscore critical vulnerabilities in current multimodal alignment and call for more robust adversarial defenses. We will release code and datasets under the Apache-2.0 license. Warning: some content generated by Multimodal LLMs in this paper may be offensive to some readers.

Biased associations have been a challenge in the development of classifiers for detecting toxic language, hindering both fairness and accuracy. As potential solutions, we investigate recently introduced debiasing methods for text classification datasets and models, as applied to toxic language detection. Our focus is on lexical (e.g., swear words, slurs, identity mentions) and dialectal markers (specifically African American English). Our comprehensive experiments establish that existing methods are limited in their ability to prevent biased behavior in current toxicity detectors. We then propose an automatic, dialect-aware data correction method, as a proof-of-concept. Despite the use of synthetic labels, this method reduces dialectal associations with toxicity. Overall, our findings show that debiasing a model trained on biased toxic language data is not as effective as simply relabeling the data to remove existing biases.

Recent advancements in large language models(LLMs), such as GPT-4 and GPT-4o, have shown exceptional performance, especially in languages with abundant resources like English, thanks to extensive datasets that ensure robust training. Conversely, these models exhibit limitations when processing under-resourced languages such as Chinese and Korean, where issues including hallucinatory responses remain prevalent. This paper traces the roots of these disparities to the tokenization process inherent to these models. Specifically, it explores how the tokenizers vocabulary, often used to speed up the tokenization process and reduce tokens but constructed independently of the actual model training data, inadequately represents non-English languages. This misrepresentation results in the propagation of under-trained or untrained tokens, which perpetuate biases and pose serious concerns related to data security and ethical standards. We aim to dissect the tokenization mechanics of GPT-4o, illustrating how its simplified token-handling methods amplify these risks and offer strategic solutions to mitigate associated security and ethical issues. Through this study, we emphasize the critical need to rethink tokenization frameworks to foster more equitable and secure AI technologies. The code and data are available at https://github.com/yeyimilk/LLMGPT4o

Whereas traditional cryptography encrypts a secret message into an unintelligible form, steganography conceals that communication is taking place by encoding a secret message into a cover signal. Language is a particularly pragmatic cover signal due to its benign occurrence and independence from any one medium. Traditionally, linguistic steganography systems encode secret messages in existing text via synonym substitution or word order rearrangements. Advances in neural language models enable previously impractical generation-based techniques. We propose a steganography technique based on arithmetic coding with large-scale neural language models. We find that our approach can generate realistic looking cover sentences as evaluated by humans, while at the same time preserving security by matching the cover message distribution with the language model distribution.

In this paper we consider contamination by code generation test sets, in particular in their use in modern large language models. We discuss three possible sources of such contamination and show findings supporting each of them: (i) direct data leakage, (ii) indirect data leakage through the use of synthetic data and (iii) overfitting to evaluation sets during model selection. Key to our findings is a new dataset of 161 prompts with their associated python solutions, dataset which is released at https://huggingface.co/datasets/CohereForAI/lbpp .

With the expanding application of Large Language Models (LLMs) in various domains, it becomes imperative to comprehensively investigate their unforeseen behaviors and consequent outcomes. In this study, we introduce and systematically explore the phenomenon of "glitch tokens", which are anomalous tokens produced by established tokenizers and could potentially compromise the models' quality of response. Specifically, we experiment on seven top popular LLMs utilizing three distinct tokenizers and involving a totally of 182,517 tokens. We present categorizations of the identified glitch tokens and symptoms exhibited by LLMs when interacting with glitch tokens. Based on our observation that glitch tokens tend to cluster in the embedding space, we propose GlitchHunter, a novel iterative clustering-based technique, for efficient glitch token detection. The evaluation shows that our approach notably outperforms three baseline methods on eight open-source LLMs. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first comprehensive study on glitch tokens. Our new detection further provides valuable insights into mitigating tokenization-related errors in LLMs.

Content moderation is the process of screening and monitoring user-generated content online. It plays a crucial role in stopping content resulting from unacceptable behaviors such as hate speech, harassment, violence against specific groups, terrorism, racism, xenophobia, homophobia, or misogyny, to mention some few, in Online Social Platforms. These platforms make use of a plethora of tools to detect and manage malicious information; however, malicious actors also improve their skills, developing strategies to surpass these barriers and continuing to spread misleading information. Twisting and camouflaging keywords are among the most used techniques to evade platform content moderation systems. In response to this recent ongoing issue, this paper presents an innovative approach to address this linguistic trend in social networks through the simulation of different content evasion techniques and a multilingual Transformer model for content evasion detection. In this way, we share with the rest of the scientific community a multilingual public tool, named "pyleetspeak" to generate/simulate in a customizable way the phenomenon of content evasion through automatic word camouflage and a multilingual Named-Entity Recognition (NER) Transformer-based model tuned for its recognition and detection. The multilingual NER model is evaluated in different textual scenarios, detecting different types and mixtures of camouflage techniques, achieving an overall weighted F1 score of 0.8795. This article contributes significantly to countering malicious information by developing multilingual tools to simulate and detect new methods of evasion of content on social networks, making the fight against information disorders more effective.

In this work, we unveil and study idiosyncrasies in Large Language Models (LLMs) -- unique patterns in their outputs that can be used to distinguish the models. To do so, we consider a simple classification task: given a particular text output, the objective is to predict the source LLM that generates the text. We evaluate this synthetic task across various groups of LLMs and find that simply fine-tuning existing text embedding models on LLM-generated texts yields excellent classification accuracy. Notably, we achieve 97.1% accuracy on held-out validation data in the five-way classification problem involving ChatGPT, Claude, Grok, Gemini, and DeepSeek. Our further investigation reveals that these idiosyncrasies are rooted in word-level distributions. These patterns persist even when the texts are rewritten, translated, or summarized by an external LLM, suggesting that they are also encoded in the semantic content. Additionally, we leverage LLM as judges to generate detailed, open-ended descriptions of each model's idiosyncrasies. Finally, we discuss the broader implications of our findings, particularly for training on synthetic data and inferring model similarity. Code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/llm-idiosyncrasies.

We study the selection of transfer languages for automatic abusive language detection. Instead of preparing a dataset for every language, we demonstrate the effectiveness of cross-lingual transfer learning for zero-shot abusive language detection. This way we can use existing data from higher-resource languages to build better detection systems for low-resource languages. Our datasets are from seven different languages from three language families. We measure the distance between the languages using several language similarity measures, especially by quantifying the World Atlas of Language Structures. We show that there is a correlation between linguistic similarity and classifier performance. This discovery allows us to choose an optimal transfer language for zero shot abusive language detection.

The open-endedness of large language models (LLMs) combined with their impressive capabilities may lead to new safety issues when being exploited for malicious use. While recent studies primarily focus on probing toxic outputs that can be easily detected with existing toxicity classifiers, we show that LLMs can generate diverse implicit toxic outputs that are exceptionally difficult to detect via simply zero-shot prompting. Moreover, we propose a reinforcement learning (RL) based attacking method to further induce the implicit toxicity in LLMs. Specifically, we optimize the language model with a reward that prefers implicit toxic outputs to explicit toxic and non-toxic ones. Experiments on five widely-adopted toxicity classifiers demonstrate that the attack success rate can be significantly improved through RL fine-tuning. For instance, the RL-finetuned LLaMA-13B model achieves an attack success rate of 90.04% on BAD and 62.85% on Davinci003. Our findings suggest that LLMs pose a significant threat in generating undetectable implicit toxic outputs. We further show that fine-tuning toxicity classifiers on the annotated examples from our attacking method can effectively enhance their ability to detect LLM-generated implicit toxic language. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/thu-coai/Implicit-Toxicity.

With the rapid popularity of large language models such as ChatGPT and GPT-4, a growing amount of attention is paid to their safety concerns. These models may generate insulting and discriminatory content, reflect incorrect social values, and may be used for malicious purposes such as fraud and dissemination of misleading information. Evaluating and enhancing their safety is particularly essential for the wide application of large language models (LLMs). To further promote the safe deployment of LLMs, we develop a Chinese LLM safety assessment benchmark. Our benchmark explores the comprehensive safety performance of LLMs from two perspectives: 8 kinds of typical safety scenarios and 6 types of more challenging instruction attacks. Our benchmark is based on a straightforward process in which it provides the test prompts and evaluates the safety of the generated responses from the evaluated model. In evaluation, we utilize the LLM's strong evaluation ability and develop it as a safety evaluator by prompting. On top of this benchmark, we conduct safety assessments and analyze 15 LLMs including the OpenAI GPT series and other well-known Chinese LLMs, where we observe some interesting findings. For example, we find that instruction attacks are more likely to expose safety issues of all LLMs. Moreover, to promote the development and deployment of safe, responsible, and ethical AI, we publicly release SafetyPrompts including 100k augmented prompts and responses by LLMs.

Chomsky and others have very directly claimed that large language models (LLMs) are equally capable of learning languages that are possible and impossible for humans to learn. However, there is very little published experimental evidence to support such a claim. Here, we develop a set of synthetic impossible languages of differing complexity, each designed by systematically altering English data with unnatural word orders and grammar rules. These languages lie on an impossibility continuum: at one end are languages that are inherently impossible, such as random and irreversible shuffles of English words, and on the other, languages that may not be intuitively impossible but are often considered so in linguistics, particularly those with rules based on counting word positions. We report on a wide range of evaluations to assess the capacity of GPT-2 small models to learn these uncontroversially impossible languages, and crucially, we perform these assessments at various stages throughout training to compare the learning process for each language. Our core finding is that GPT-2 struggles to learn impossible languages when compared to English as a control, challenging the core claim. More importantly, we hope our approach opens up a productive line of inquiry in which different LLM architectures are tested on a variety of impossible languages in an effort to learn more about how LLMs can be used as tools for these cognitive and typological investigations.

Are pairs of words that tend to occur together also likely to stand in a linguistic dependency? This empirical question is motivated by a long history of literature in cognitive science, psycholinguistics, and NLP. In this work we contribute an extensive analysis of the relationship between linguistic dependencies and statistical dependence between words. Improving on previous work, we introduce the use of large pretrained language models to compute contextualized estimates of the pointwise mutual information between words (CPMI). For multiple models and languages, we extract dependency trees which maximize CPMI, and compare to gold standard linguistic dependencies. Overall, we find that CPMI dependencies achieve an unlabelled undirected attachment score of at most approx 0.5. While far above chance, and consistently above a non-contextualized PMI baseline, this score is generally comparable to a simple baseline formed by connecting adjacent words. We analyze which kinds of linguistic dependencies are best captured in CPMI dependencies, and also find marked differences between the estimates of the large pretrained language models, illustrating how their different training schemes affect the type of dependencies they capture.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved widespread adoption, yet our understanding of their behavior remains limited, particularly in detecting data contamination and hallucinations. While recently proposed probing techniques provide insights through activation analysis, they require "white-box" access to model internals, often unavailable. Current "gray-box" approaches typically analyze only the probability of the actual tokens in the sequence with simple task-specific heuristics. Importantly, these methods overlook the rich information contained in the full token distribution at each processing step. To address these limitations, we propose that gray-box analysis should leverage the complete observable output of LLMs, consisting of both the previously used token probabilities as well as the complete token distribution sequences - a unified data type we term LOS (LLM Output Signature). To this end, we develop a transformer-based approach to process LOS that theoretically guarantees approximation of existing techniques while enabling more nuanced analysis. Our approach achieves superior performance on hallucination and data contamination detection in gray-box settings, significantly outperforming existing baselines. Furthermore, it demonstrates strong transfer capabilities across datasets and LLMs, suggesting that LOS captures fundamental patterns in LLM behavior. Our code is available at: https://github.com/BarSGuy/LLM-Output-Signatures-Network.

This paper introduces RiskCards, a framework for structured assessment and documentation of risks associated with an application of language models. As with all language, text generated by language models can be harmful, or used to bring about harm. Automating language generation adds both an element of scale and also more subtle or emergent undesirable tendencies to the generated text. Prior work establishes a wide variety of language model harms to many different actors: existing taxonomies identify categories of harms posed by language models; benchmarks establish automated tests of these harms; and documentation standards for models, tasks and datasets encourage transparent reporting. However, there is no risk-centric framework for documenting the complexity of a landscape in which some risks are shared across models and contexts, while others are specific, and where certain conditions may be required for risks to manifest as harms. RiskCards address this methodological gap by providing a generic framework for assessing the use of a given language model in a given scenario. Each RiskCard makes clear the routes for the risk to manifest harm, their placement in harm taxonomies, and example prompt-output pairs. While RiskCards are designed to be open-source, dynamic and participatory, we present a "starter set" of RiskCards taken from a broad literature survey, each of which details a concrete risk presentation. Language model RiskCards initiate a community knowledge base which permits the mapping of risks and harms to a specific model or its application scenario, ultimately contributing to a better, safer and shared understanding of the risk landscape.

Word-level psycholinguistic norms lend empirical support to theories of language processing. However, obtaining such human-based measures is not always feasible or straightforward. One promising approach is to augment human norming datasets by using Large Language Models (LLMs) to predict these characteristics directly, a practice that is rapidly gaining popularity in psycholinguistics and cognitive science. However, the novelty of this approach (and the relative inscrutability of LLMs) necessitates the adoption of rigorous methodologies that guide researchers through this process, present the range of possible approaches, and clarify limitations that are not immediately apparent, but may, in some cases, render the use of LLMs impractical. In this work, we present a comprehensive methodology for estimating word characteristics with LLMs, enriched with practical advice and lessons learned from our own experience. Our approach covers both the direct use of base LLMs and the fine-tuning of models, an alternative that can yield substantial performance gains in certain scenarios. A major emphasis in the guide is the validation of LLM-generated data with human "gold standard" norms. We also present a software framework that implements our methodology and supports both commercial and open-weight models. We illustrate the proposed approach with a case study on estimating word familiarity in English. Using base models, we achieved a Spearman correlation of 0.8 with human ratings, which increased to 0.9 when employing fine-tuned models. This methodology, framework, and set of best practices aim to serve as a reference for future research on leveraging LLMs for psycholinguistic and lexical studies.

Recent advancements in natural language processing, especially the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs), have opened exciting possibilities for constructing computational simulations designed to replicate human behavior accurately. However, LLMs are complex statistical learners without straightforward deductive rules, making them prone to unexpected behaviors. In this study, we highlight the limitations of LLMs in simulating human interactions, particularly focusing on LLMs' ability to simulate political debates. Our findings indicate a tendency for LLM agents to conform to the model's inherent social biases despite being directed to debate from certain political perspectives. This tendency results in behavioral patterns that seem to deviate from well-established social dynamics among humans. We reinforce these observations using an automatic self-fine-tuning method, which enables us to manipulate the biases within the LLM and demonstrate that agents subsequently align with the altered biases. These results underscore the need for further research to develop methods that help agents overcome these biases, a critical step toward creating more realistic simulations.

Large language models (LLMs) have the potential to transform the practice of law, but this potential is threatened by the presence of legal hallucinations -- responses from these models that are not consistent with legal facts. We investigate the extent of these hallucinations using an original suite of legal queries, comparing LLMs' responses to structured legal metadata and examining their consistency. Our work makes four key contributions: (1) We develop a typology of legal hallucinations, providing a conceptual framework for future research in this area. (2) We find that legal hallucinations are alarmingly prevalent, occurring between 69% of the time with ChatGPT 3.5 and 88% with Llama 2, when these models are asked specific, verifiable questions about random federal court cases. (3) We illustrate that LLMs often fail to correct a user's incorrect legal assumptions in a contra-factual question setup. (4) We provide evidence that LLMs cannot always predict, or do not always know, when they are producing legal hallucinations. Taken together, these findings caution against the rapid and unsupervised integration of popular LLMs into legal tasks. Even experienced lawyers must remain wary of legal hallucinations, and the risks are highest for those who stand to benefit from LLMs the most -- pro se litigants or those without access to traditional legal resources.

To detect the deployment of large language models for malicious use cases (e.g., fake content creation or academic plagiarism), several approaches have recently been proposed for identifying AI-generated text via watermarks or statistical irregularities. How robust are these detection algorithms to paraphrases of AI-generated text? To stress test these detectors, we first train an 11B parameter paraphrase generation model (DIPPER) that can paraphrase paragraphs, optionally leveraging surrounding text (e.g., user-written prompts) as context. DIPPER also uses scalar knobs to control the amount of lexical diversity and reordering in the paraphrases. Paraphrasing text generated by three large language models (including GPT3.5-davinci-003) with DIPPER successfully evades several detectors, including watermarking, GPTZero, DetectGPT, and OpenAI's text classifier. For example, DIPPER drops the detection accuracy of DetectGPT from 70.3% to 4.6% (at a constant false positive rate of 1%), without appreciably modifying the input semantics. To increase the robustness of AI-generated text detection to paraphrase attacks, we introduce a simple defense that relies on retrieving semantically-similar generations and must be maintained by a language model API provider. Given a candidate text, our algorithm searches a database of sequences previously generated by the API, looking for sequences that match the candidate text within a certain threshold. We empirically verify our defense using a database of 15M generations from a fine-tuned T5-XXL model and find that it can detect 80% to 97% of paraphrased generations across different settings, while only classifying 1% of human-written sequences as AI-generated. We will open source our code, model and data for future research.

Generation of plausible yet incorrect factual information, termed hallucination, is an unsolved issue in large language models. We study the ability of language models to deliberate on the responses they give in order to correct their mistakes. We develop the Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) method whereby the model first (i) drafts an initial response; then (ii) plans verification questions to fact-check its draft; (iii) answers those questions independently so the answers are not biased by other responses; and (iv) generates its final verified response. In experiments, we show CoVe decreases hallucinations across a variety of tasks, from list-based questions from Wikidata, closed book MultiSpanQA and longform text generation.

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized artificial intelligence, driving advancements in machine translation, summarization, and conversational agents. However, their increasing integration into critical societal domains has raised concerns about embedded biases, which can perpetuate stereotypes and compromise fairness. These biases stem from various sources, including historical inequalities in training data, linguistic imbalances, and adversarial manipulation. Despite mitigation efforts, recent studies indicate that LLMs remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks designed to elicit biased responses. This work proposes a scalable benchmarking framework to evaluate LLM robustness against adversarial bias elicitation. Our methodology involves (i) systematically probing models with a multi-task approach targeting biases across various sociocultural dimensions, (ii) quantifying robustness through safety scores using an LLM-as-a-Judge approach for automated assessment of model responses, and (iii) employing jailbreak techniques to investigate vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms. Our analysis examines prevalent biases in both small and large state-of-the-art models and their impact on model safety. Additionally, we assess the safety of domain-specific models fine-tuned for critical fields, such as medicine. Finally, we release a curated dataset of bias-related prompts, CLEAR-Bias, to facilitate systematic vulnerability benchmarking. Our findings reveal critical trade-offs between model size and safety, aiding the development of fairer and more robust future language models.

Quantization leverages lower-precision weights to reduce the memory usage of large language models (LLMs) and is a key technique for enabling their deployment on commodity hardware. While LLM quantization's impact on utility has been extensively explored, this work for the first time studies its adverse effects from a security perspective. We reveal that widely used quantization methods can be exploited to produce a harmful quantized LLM, even though the full-precision counterpart appears benign, potentially tricking users into deploying the malicious quantized model. We demonstrate this threat using a three-staged attack framework: (i) first, we obtain a malicious LLM through fine-tuning on an adversarial task; (ii) next, we quantize the malicious model and calculate constraints that characterize all full-precision models that map to the same quantized model; (iii) finally, using projected gradient descent, we tune out the poisoned behavior from the full-precision model while ensuring that its weights satisfy the constraints computed in step (ii). This procedure results in an LLM that exhibits benign behavior in full precision but when quantized, it follows the adversarial behavior injected in step (i). We experimentally demonstrate the feasibility and severity of such an attack across three diverse scenarios: vulnerable code generation, content injection, and over-refusal attack. In practice, the adversary could host the resulting full-precision model on an LLM community hub such as Hugging Face, exposing millions of users to the threat of deploying its malicious quantized version on their devices.

Large audio-language models (LALMs) extend text-based LLMs with auditory understanding, offering new opportunities for multimodal applications. While their perception, reasoning, and task performance have been widely studied, their safety alignment under paralinguistic variation remains underexplored. This work systematically investigates the role of speaker emotion. We construct a dataset of malicious speech instructions expressed across multiple emotions and intensities, and evaluate several state-of-the-art LALMs. Our results reveal substantial safety inconsistencies: different emotions elicit varying levels of unsafe responses, and the effect of intensity is non-monotonic, with medium expressions often posing the greatest risk. These findings highlight an overlooked vulnerability in LALMs and call for alignment strategies explicitly designed to ensure robustness under emotional variation, a prerequisite for trustworthy deployment in real-world settings.

While counterfactual examples are useful for analysis and training of NLP models, current generation methods either rely on manual labor to create very few counterfactuals, or only instantiate limited types of perturbations such as paraphrases or word substitutions. We present Polyjuice, a general-purpose counterfactual generator that allows for control over perturbation types and locations, trained by finetuning GPT-2 on multiple datasets of paired sentences. We show that Polyjuice produces diverse sets of realistic counterfactuals, which in turn are useful in various distinct applications: improving training and evaluation on three different tasks (with around 70% less annotation effort than manual generation), augmenting state-of-the-art explanation techniques, and supporting systematic counterfactual error analysis by revealing behaviors easily missed by human experts.

To maintain user trust, large language models (LLMs) should signal low confidence on examples where they are incorrect, instead of misleading the user. The standard approach of estimating confidence is to use the softmax probabilities of these models, but as of November 2023, state-of-the-art LLMs such as GPT-4 and Claude-v1.3 do not provide access to these probabilities. We first study eliciting confidence linguistically -- asking an LLM for its confidence in its answer -- which performs reasonably (80.5% AUC on GPT-4 averaged across 12 question-answering datasets -- 7% above a random baseline) but leaves room for improvement. We then explore using a surrogate confidence model -- using a model where we do have probabilities to evaluate the original model's confidence in a given question. Surprisingly, even though these probabilities come from a different and often weaker model, this method leads to higher AUC than linguistic confidences on 9 out of 12 datasets. Our best method composing linguistic confidences and surrogate model probabilities gives state-of-the-art confidence estimates on all 12 datasets (84.6% average AUC on GPT-4).

Sycophancy is an undesirable behavior where models tailor their responses to follow a human user's view even when that view is not objectively correct (e.g., adapting liberal views once a user reveals that they are liberal). In this paper, we study the prevalence of sycophancy in language models and propose a simple synthetic-data intervention to reduce this behavior. First, on a set of three sycophancy tasks (Perez et al., 2022) where models are asked for an opinion on statements with no correct answers (e.g., politics), we observe that both model scaling and instruction tuning significantly increase sycophancy for PaLM models up to 540B parameters. Second, we extend sycophancy evaluations to simple addition statements that are objectively incorrect, finding that despite knowing that these statements are wrong, language models will still agree with them if the user does as well. To reduce sycophancy, we present a straightforward synthetic-data intervention that takes public NLP tasks and encourages models to be robust to user opinions on these tasks. Adding these data in a lightweight finetuning step can significantly reduce sycophantic behavior on held-out prompts. Code for generating synthetic data for intervention can be found at https://github.com/google/sycophancy-intervention.

Disclaimer: Samples in this paper may be harmful and cause discomfort! Patronizing and condescending language (PCL) is a form of speech directed at vulnerable groups. As an essential branch of toxic language, this type of language exacerbates conflicts and confrontations among Internet communities and detrimentally impacts disadvantaged groups. Traditional pre-trained language models (PLMs) perform poorly in detecting PCL due to its implicit toxicity traits like hypocrisy and false sympathy. With the rise of large language models (LLMs), we can harness their rich emotional semantics to establish a paradigm for exploring implicit toxicity. In this paper, we introduce PclGPT, a comprehensive LLM benchmark designed specifically for PCL. We collect, annotate, and integrate the Pcl-PT/SFT dataset, and then develop a bilingual PclGPT-EN/CN model group through a comprehensive pre-training and supervised fine-tuning staircase process to facilitate implicit toxic detection. Group detection results and fine-grained detection from PclGPT and other models reveal significant variations in the degree of bias in PCL towards different vulnerable groups, necessitating increased societal attention to protect them.

It has become common to publish large (billion parameter) language models that have been trained on private datasets. This paper demonstrates that in such settings, an adversary can perform a training data extraction attack to recover individual training examples by querying the language model. We demonstrate our attack on GPT-2, a language model trained on scrapes of the public Internet, and are able to extract hundreds of verbatim text sequences from the model's training data. These extracted examples include (public) personally identifiable information (names, phone numbers, and email addresses), IRC conversations, code, and 128-bit UUIDs. Our attack is possible even though each of the above sequences are included in just one document in the training data. We comprehensively evaluate our extraction attack to understand the factors that contribute to its success. Worryingly, we find that larger models are more vulnerable than smaller models. We conclude by drawing lessons and discussing possible safeguards for training large language models.

With the rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs), new and hard-to-predict harmful capabilities are emerging. This requires developers to be able to identify risks through the evaluation of "dangerous capabilities" in order to responsibly deploy LLMs. In this work, we collect the first open-source dataset to evaluate safeguards in LLMs, and deploy safer open-source LLMs at a low cost. Our dataset is curated and filtered to consist only of instructions that responsible language models should not follow. We annotate and assess the responses of six popular LLMs to these instructions. Based on our annotation, we proceed to train several BERT-like classifiers, and find that these small classifiers can achieve results that are comparable with GPT-4 on automatic safety evaluation. Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive, harmful, or biased.

In this position paper, we argue that the classical evaluation on Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks using annotated benchmarks is in trouble. The worst kind of data contamination happens when a Large Language Model (LLM) is trained on the test split of a benchmark, and then evaluated in the same benchmark. The extent of the problem is unknown, as it is not straightforward to measure. Contamination causes an overestimation of the performance of a contaminated model in a target benchmark and associated task with respect to their non-contaminated counterparts. The consequences can be very harmful, with wrong scientific conclusions being published while other correct ones are discarded. This position paper defines different levels of data contamination and argues for a community effort, including the development of automatic and semi-automatic measures to detect when data from a benchmark was exposed to a model, and suggestions for flagging papers with conclusions that are compromised by data contamination.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the generation of open-ended high-quality texts, that are non-trivial to distinguish from human-written texts. We refer to such LLM-generated texts as deepfake texts. There are currently over 11K text generation models in the huggingface model repo. As such, users with malicious intent can easily use these open-sourced LLMs to generate harmful texts and misinformation at scale. To mitigate this problem, a computational method to determine if a given text is a deepfake text or not is desired--i.e., Turing Test (TT). In particular, in this work, we investigate the more general version of the problem, known as Authorship Attribution (AA), in a multi-class setting--i.e., not only determining if a given text is a deepfake text or not but also being able to pinpoint which LLM is the author. We propose TopRoBERTa to improve existing AA solutions by capturing more linguistic patterns in deepfake texts by including a Topological Data Analysis (TDA) layer in the RoBERTa model. We show the benefits of having a TDA layer when dealing with noisy, imbalanced, and heterogeneous datasets, by extracting TDA features from the reshaped pooled_output of RoBERTa as input. We use RoBERTa to capture contextual representations (i.e., semantic and syntactic linguistic features), while using TDA to capture the shape and structure of data (i.e., linguistic structures). Finally, TopRoBERTa, outperforms the vanilla RoBERTa in 2/3 datasets, achieving up to 7\% increase in Macro F1 score.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently gained attention due to their ability to understand and generate sophisticated human-like content. However, ensuring their safety is paramount as they might provide harmful and unsafe responses. Existing LLM testing frameworks address various safety-related concerns (e.g., drugs, terrorism, animal abuse) but often face challenges due to unbalanced and obsolete datasets. In this paper, we present ASTRAL, a tool that automates the generation and execution of test cases (i.e., prompts) for testing the safety of LLMs. First, we introduce a novel black-box coverage criterion to generate balanced and diverse unsafe test inputs across a diverse set of safety categories as well as linguistic writing characteristics (i.e., different style and persuasive writing techniques). Second, we propose an LLM-based approach that leverages Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), few-shot prompting strategies and web browsing to generate up-to-date test inputs. Lastly, similar to current LLM test automation techniques, we leverage LLMs as test oracles to distinguish between safe and unsafe test outputs, allowing a fully automated testing approach. We conduct an extensive evaluation on well-known LLMs, revealing the following key findings: i) GPT3.5 outperforms other LLMs when acting as the test oracle, accurately detecting unsafe responses, and even surpassing more recent LLMs (e.g., GPT-4), as well as LLMs that are specifically tailored to detect unsafe LLM outputs (e.g., LlamaGuard); ii) the results confirm that our approach can uncover nearly twice as many unsafe LLM behaviors with the same number of test inputs compared to currently used static datasets; and iii) our black-box coverage criterion combined with web browsing can effectively guide the LLM on generating up-to-date unsafe test inputs, significantly increasing the number of unsafe LLM behaviors.

Text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models (DMs) have shown promise in generating high-quality images from textual descriptions. The real-world applications of these models require particular attention to their safety and fidelity, but this has not been sufficiently explored. One fundamental question is whether existing T2I DMs are robust against variations over input texts. To answer it, this work provides the first robustness evaluation of T2I DMs against real-world attacks. Unlike prior studies that focus on malicious attacks involving apocryphal alterations to the input texts, we consider an attack space spanned by realistic errors (e.g., typo, glyph, phonetic) that humans can make, to ensure semantic consistency. Given the inherent randomness of the generation process, we develop novel distribution-based attack objectives to mislead T2I DMs. We perform attacks in a black-box manner without any knowledge of the model. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method for attacking popular T2I DMs and simultaneously reveal their non-trivial robustness issues. Moreover, we provide an in-depth analysis of our method to show that it is not designed to attack the text encoder in T2I DMs solely.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Large-scale vision-and-language models, such as CLIP, are typically trained on web-scale data, which can introduce inappropriate content and lead to the development of unsafe and biased behavior. This, in turn, hampers their applicability in sensitive and trustworthy contexts and could raise significant concerns in their adoption. Our research introduces a novel approach to enhancing the safety of vision-and-language models by diminishing their sensitivity to NSFW (not safe for work) inputs. In particular, our methodology seeks to sever "toxic" linguistic and visual concepts, unlearning the linkage between unsafe linguistic or visual items and unsafe regions of the embedding space. We show how this can be done by fine-tuning a CLIP model on synthetic data obtained from a large language model trained to convert between safe and unsafe sentences, and a text-to-image generator. We conduct extensive experiments on the resulting embedding space for cross-modal retrieval, text-to-image, and image-to-text generation, where we show that our model can be remarkably employed with pre-trained generative models. Our source code and trained models are available at: https://github.com/aimagelab/safe-clip.

Extremist groups develop complex in-group language, also referred to as cryptolects, to exclude or mislead outsiders. We investigate the ability of current language technologies to detect and interpret the cryptolects of two online extremist platforms. Evaluating eight models across six tasks, our results indicate that general purpose LLMs cannot consistently detect or decode extremist language. However, performance can be significantly improved by domain adaptation and specialised prompting techniques. These results provide important insights to inform the development and deployment of automated moderation technologies. We further develop and release novel labelled and unlabelled datasets, including 19.4M posts from extremist platforms and lexicons validated by human experts.

We investigate the phenomenon of an LLM's untruthful response using a large set of 220 handcrafted linguistic features. We focus on GPT-3 models and find that the linguistic profiles of responses are similar across model sizes. That is, how varying-sized LLMs respond to given prompts stays similar on the linguistic properties level. We expand upon this finding by training support vector machines that rely only upon the stylistic components of model responses to classify the truthfulness of statements. Though the dataset size limits our current findings, we present promising evidence that truthfulness detection is possible without evaluating the content itself.

Background: Emerging reports of "AI psychosis" are on the rise, where user-LLM interactions may exacerbate or induce psychosis or adverse psychological symptoms. Whilst the sycophantic and agreeable nature of LLMs can be beneficial, it becomes a vector for harm by reinforcing delusional beliefs in vulnerable users. Methods: Psychosis-bench is a novel benchmark designed to systematically evaluate the psychogenicity of LLMs comprises 16 structured, 12-turn conversational scenarios simulating the progression of delusional themes(Erotic Delusions, Grandiose/Messianic Delusions, Referential Delusions) and potential harms. We evaluated eight prominent LLMs for Delusion Confirmation (DCS), Harm Enablement (HES), and Safety Intervention(SIS) across explicit and implicit conversational contexts. Findings: Across 1,536 simulated conversation turns, all LLMs demonstrated psychogenic potential, showing a strong tendency to perpetuate rather than challenge delusions (mean DCS of 0.91 pm0.88). Models frequently enabled harmful user requests (mean HES of 0.69 pm0.84) and offered safety interventions in only roughly a third of applicable turns (mean SIS of 0.37 pm0.48). 51 / 128 (39.8%) of scenarios had no safety interventions offered. Performance was significantly worse in implicit scenarios, models were more likely to confirm delusions and enable harm while offering fewer interventions (p < .001). A strong correlation was found between DCS and HES (rs = .77). Model performance varied widely, indicating that safety is not an emergent property of scale alone. Conclusion: This study establishes LLM psychogenicity as a quantifiable risk and underscores the urgent need for re-thinking how we train LLMs. We frame this issue not merely as a technical challenge but as a public health imperative requiring collaboration between developers, policymakers, and healthcare professionals.

We explore Cross-lingual Backdoor ATtacks (X-BAT) in multilingual Large Language Models (mLLMs), revealing how backdoors inserted in one language can automatically transfer to others through shared embedding spaces. Using toxicity classification as a case study, we demonstrate that attackers can compromise multilingual systems by poisoning data in a single language, with rare tokens serving as specific effective triggers. Our findings expose a critical vulnerability in the fundamental architecture that enables cross-lingual transfer in these models. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/himanshubeniwal/X-BAT.

State-of-the-art language models (LMs) are notoriously susceptible to generating hallucinated information. Such inaccurate outputs not only undermine the reliability of these models but also limit their use and raise serious concerns about misinformation and propaganda. In this work, we focus on hallucinated book and article references and present them as the "model organism" of language model hallucination research, due to their frequent and easy-to-discern nature. We posit that if a language model cites a particular reference in its output, then it should ideally possess sufficient information about its authors and content, among other relevant details. Using this basic insight, we illustrate that one can identify hallucinated references without ever consulting any external resources, by asking a set of direct or indirect queries to the language model about the references. These queries can be considered as "consistency checks." Our findings highlight that while LMs, including GPT-4, often produce inconsistent author lists for hallucinated references, they also often accurately recall the authors of real references. In this sense, the LM can be said to "know" when it is hallucinating references. Furthermore, these findings show how hallucinated references can be dissected to shed light on their nature. Replication code and results can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/hallucinated-references.

In this paper, we examine several methods of acquiring Czech data for automated fact-checking, which is a task commonly modeled as a classification of textual claim veracity w.r.t. a corpus of trusted ground truths. We attempt to collect sets of data in form of a factual claim, evidence within the ground truth corpus, and its veracity label (supported, refuted or not enough info). As a first attempt, we generate a Czech version of the large-scale FEVER dataset built on top of Wikipedia corpus. We take a hybrid approach of machine translation and document alignment; the approach and the tools we provide can be easily applied to other languages. We discuss its weaknesses and inaccuracies, propose a future approach for their cleaning and publish the 127k resulting translations, as well as a version of such dataset reliably applicable for the Natural Language Inference task - the CsFEVER-NLI. Furthermore, we collect a novel dataset of 3,097 claims, which is annotated using the corpus of 2.2M articles of Czech News Agency. We present its extended annotation methodology based on the FEVER approach, and, as the underlying corpus is kept a trade secret, we also publish a standalone version of the dataset for the task of Natural Language Inference we call CTKFactsNLI. We analyze both acquired datasets for spurious cues - annotation patterns leading to model overfitting. CTKFacts is further examined for inter-annotator agreement, thoroughly cleaned, and a typology of common annotator errors is extracted. Finally, we provide baseline models for all stages of the fact-checking pipeline and publish the NLI datasets, as well as our annotation platform and other experimental data.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited remarkable fluency across various tasks. However, their unethical applications, such as disseminating disinformation, have become a growing concern. Although recent works have proposed a number of LLM detection methods, their robustness and reliability remain unclear. In this paper, we present RAFT: a grammar error-free black-box attack against existing LLM detectors. In contrast to previous attacks for language models, our method exploits the transferability of LLM embeddings at the word-level while preserving the original text quality. We leverage an auxiliary embedding to greedily select candidate words to perturb against the target detector. Experiments reveal that our attack effectively compromises all detectors in the study across various domains by up to 99%, and are transferable across source models. Manual human evaluation studies show our attacks are realistic and indistinguishable from original human-written text. We also show that examples generated by RAFT can be used to train adversarially robust detectors. Our work shows that current LLM detectors are not adversarially robust, underscoring the urgent need for more resilient detection mechanisms.

The rapid proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly contributed to the development of equitable AI systems capable of factual question-answering (QA). However, no known study tests the LLMs' robustness when presented with obfuscated versions of questions. To systematically evaluate these limitations, we propose a novel technique, ObfusQAte and, leveraging the same, introduce ObfusQA, a comprehensive, first of its kind, framework with multi-tiered obfuscation levels designed to examine LLM capabilities across three distinct dimensions: (i) Named-Entity Indirection, (ii) Distractor Indirection, and (iii) Contextual Overload. By capturing these fine-grained distinctions in language, ObfusQA provides a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLM robustness and adaptability. Our study observes that LLMs exhibit a tendency to fail or generate hallucinated responses when confronted with these increasingly nuanced variations. To foster research in this direction, we make ObfusQAte publicly available.

Large language models (LLMs) showcase impressive reasoning capabilities when coupled with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, the robustness of this approach warrants further investigation. In this paper, we introduce a novel scenario termed preemptive answers, where the LLM obtains an answer before engaging in reasoning. This situation can arise inadvertently or induced by malicious users by prompt injection attacks. Experiments reveal that preemptive answers significantly impair the model's reasoning capability across various CoT methods and a broad spectrum of datasets. To bolster the robustness of reasoning, we propose two measures aimed at mitigating this issue to some extent.

Toxic content has become an increasingly critical social issue with the rapid expansion of online communication. While numerous studies explored methods for detecting and detoxifying such content, most have focused primarily on English, leaving low-resource language underrepresented. Consequently, Large Language Models~(LLMs) often struggle to identify and neutralize toxic expressions in these languages. This challenge becomes even more pronounced when user employ obfuscation techniques to evade detection systems. Therefore, we propose a KOTOX: Korean Toxic Dataset for deobfuscation and detoxicification to address this issue. We categorize various obfuscation approaches based on linguistic characteristics of Korean and define a set of transformation rules grounded in real-word examples. Using these rules, we construct three dataset versions (easy, normal, and hard) representing different levels of obfuscation difficulty. This is the first dataset that simultaneously supports deobfuscation and detoxification for the Korean language. We expect it to facilitate better understanding and mitigating of obfuscated toxic content in LLM for low-resource languages. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/leeyejin1231/KOTOX.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have inherent limitations of faithfulness and factuality, commonly referred to as hallucinations. Several benchmarks have been developed that provide a test bed for factuality evaluation within the context of English-centric datasets, while relying on supplementary informative context like web links or text passages but ignoring the available structured factual resources. To this end, Knowledge Graphs (KGs) have been identified as a useful aid for hallucination mitigation, as they provide a structured way to represent the facts about entities and their relations with minimal linguistic overhead. We bridge the lack of KG paths and multilinguality for factual language modeling within the existing hallucination evaluation benchmarks and propose a KG-based multilingual, multihop benchmark called MultiHal framed for generative text evaluation. As part of our data collection pipeline, we mined 140k KG-paths from open-domain KGs, from which we pruned noisy KG-paths, curating a high-quality subset of 25.9k. Our baseline evaluation shows an absolute scale increase by approximately 0.12 to 0.36 points for the semantic similarity score in KG-RAG over vanilla QA across multiple languages and multiple models, demonstrating the potential of KG integration. We anticipate MultiHal will foster future research towards several graph-based hallucination mitigation and fact-checking tasks.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Auditing unwanted social bias in language models (LMs) is inherently hard due to the multidisciplinary nature of the work. In addition, the rapid evolution of LMs can make benchmarks irrelevant in no time. Bias auditing is further complicated by LM brittleness: when a presumably biased outcome is observed, is it due to model bias or model brittleness? We propose enlisting the models themselves to help construct bias auditing datasets that remain challenging, and introduce bias measures that distinguish between types of model errors. First, we extend an existing bias benchmark for NLI (BBNLI) using a combination of LM-generated lexical variations, adversarial filtering, and human validation. We demonstrate that the newly created dataset (BBNLInext) is more challenging than BBNLI: on average, BBNLI-next reduces the accuracy of state-of-the-art NLI models from 95.3%, as observed by BBNLI, to 58.6%. Second, we employ BBNLI-next to showcase the interplay between robustness and bias, and the subtlety in differentiating between the two. Third, we point out shortcomings in current bias scores used in the literature and propose bias measures that take into account pro-/anti-stereotype bias and model brittleness. We will publicly release the BBNLI-next dataset to inspire research on rapidly expanding benchmarks to keep up with model evolution, along with research on the robustness-bias interplay in bias auditing. Note: This paper contains offensive text examples.

The connections among natural language processing and argumentation theory are becoming stronger in the latest years, with a growing amount of works going in this direction, in different scenarios and applying heterogeneous techniques. In this paper, we present two datasets we built to cope with the combination of the Textual Entailment framework and bipolar abstract argumentation. In our approach, such datasets are used to automatically identify through a Textual Entailment system the relations among the arguments (i.e., attack, support), and then the resulting bipolar argumentation graphs are analyzed to compute the accepted arguments.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown incredible capabilities and transcended the natural language processing (NLP) community, with adoption throughout many services like healthcare, therapy, education, and customer service. Since users include people with critical information needs like students or patients engaging with chatbots, the safety of these systems is of prime importance. Therefore, a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of LLMs is necessary. To this end, we systematically evaluate toxicity in over half a million generations of ChatGPT, a popular dialogue-based LLM. We find that setting the system parameter of ChatGPT by assigning it a persona, say that of the boxer Muhammad Ali, significantly increases the toxicity of generations. Depending on the persona assigned to ChatGPT, its toxicity can increase up to 6x, with outputs engaging in incorrect stereotypes, harmful dialogue, and hurtful opinions. This may be potentially defamatory to the persona and harmful to an unsuspecting user. Furthermore, we find concerning patterns where specific entities (e.g., certain races) are targeted more than others (3x more) irrespective of the assigned persona, that reflect inherent discriminatory biases in the model. We hope that our findings inspire the broader AI community to rethink the efficacy of current safety guardrails and develop better techniques that lead to robust, safe, and trustworthy AI systems.

This paper investigates the propagation of harmful information in multilingual large language models (LLMs) and evaluates the efficacy of various unlearning methods. We demonstrate that fake information, regardless of the language it is in, once introduced into these models through training data, can spread across different languages, compromising the integrity and reliability of the generated content. Our findings reveal that standard unlearning techniques, which typically focus on English data, are insufficient in mitigating the spread of harmful content in multilingual contexts and could inadvertently reinforce harmful content across languages. We show that only by addressing harmful responses in both English and the original language of the harmful data can we effectively eliminate generations for all languages. This underscores the critical need for comprehensive unlearning strategies that consider the multilingual nature of modern LLMs to enhance their safety and reliability across diverse linguistic landscapes.

Despite their impressive capabilities, large language models (LLMs) have been observed to generate responses that include inaccurate or fabricated information, a phenomenon commonly known as ``hallucination''. In this work, we propose a simple Induce-then-Contrast Decoding (ICD) strategy to alleviate hallucinations. We first construct a factually weak LLM by inducing hallucinations from the original LLMs. Then, we penalize these induced hallucinations during decoding to enhance the factuality of the generated content. Concretely, we determine the final next-token predictions by amplifying the predictions from the original model and downplaying the induced untruthful predictions via contrastive decoding. Experimental results on both discrimination-based and generation-based hallucination evaluation benchmarks, such as TruthfulQA and FActScore, demonstrate that our proposed ICD methods can effectively enhance the factuality of LLMs across various model sizes and families. For example, when equipped with ICD, Llama2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct achieve performance comparable to ChatGPT and GPT4 on TruthfulQA, respectively.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in language understanding. However, when LLMs align their outputs with deceptive and/or misleading prompts, the generated responses could deviate from the de facto information. Such observations are known as fawning hallucinations, where the model prioritizes alignment with the input's implied perspective over accuracy and truthfulness. In this work, we analyze fawning hallucinations in various natural language processing tasks and tailor the so-termed contrastive decoding method for fawning-hallucination mitigation. Specifically, we design two paradigms to generate corresponding deceptive and/or misleading inputs for the consistent fawning hallucinations induction. Then, we propose the collaborative contrastive decoding (CCD) to handle the fawning hallucinations across different tasks in LLMs. By contrasting the deviation in output distribution between induced and transformed neutral inputs, the proposed CCD can reduce reliance on deceptive and/or misleading information without requiring additional training. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed CCD can effectively mitigate fawning hallucinations and improve the factuality of the generated responses over various tasks.

Why do large language models sometimes output factual inaccuracies and exhibit erroneous reasoning? The brittleness of these models, particularly when executing long chains of reasoning, currently seems to be an inevitable price to pay for their advanced capabilities of coherently synthesizing knowledge, pragmatics, and abstract thought. Towards making sense of this fundamentally unsolved problem, this work identifies and analyzes the phenomenon of attention glitches, in which the Transformer architecture's inductive biases intermittently fail to capture robust reasoning. To isolate the issue, we introduce flip-flop language modeling (FFLM), a parametric family of synthetic benchmarks designed to probe the extrapolative behavior of neural language models. This simple generative task requires a model to copy binary symbols over long-range dependencies, ignoring the tokens in between. We find that Transformer FFLMs suffer from a long tail of sporadic reasoning errors, some of which we can eliminate using various regularization techniques. Our preliminary mechanistic analyses show why the remaining errors may be very difficult to diagnose and resolve. We hypothesize that attention glitches account for (some of) the closed-domain hallucinations in natural LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

The emergence of generative pre-trained models has facilitated the synthesis of high-quality text, but it has also posed challenges in identifying factual errors in the generated text. In particular: (1) A wider range of tasks now face an increasing risk of containing factual errors when handled by generative models. (2) Generated texts tend to be lengthy and lack a clearly defined granularity for individual facts. (3) There is a scarcity of explicit evidence available during the process of fact checking. With the above challenges in mind, in this paper, we propose FacTool, a task and domain agnostic framework for detecting factual errors of texts generated by large language models (e.g., ChatGPT). Experiments on four different tasks (knowledge-based QA, code generation, mathematical reasoning, and scientific literature review) show the efficacy of the proposed method. We release the code of FacTool associated with ChatGPT plugin interface at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/factool .

Generalization is arguably the most important goal of statistical language modeling research. Publicly available benchmarks and papers published with an open-source code have been critical to advancing the field. However, it is often very difficult, and sometimes even impossible, to reproduce the results fully as reported in publications. In this paper, we propose a simple framework that should help advance the state of the art in language modeling in terms of generalization. We propose to publish not just the code, but also probabilities on dev and test sets with future publications so that one can easily add the new model into an ensemble. This has crucial advantages: it is much easier to determine whether a newly proposed model is actually complementary to the current baseline. Therefore, instead of inventing new names for the old tricks, the scientific community can advance faster. Finally, this approach promotes diversity of ideas: one does not need to create an individual model that is the new state of the art to attract attention; it will be sufficient to develop a new model that learns patterns which other models do not. Thus, even a suboptimal model can be found to have value. Remarkably, our approach has yielded new state-of-the-art results across various language modeling benchmarks up to 10%.

Language model deployments in consumer-facing applications introduce numerous risks. While existing research on harms and hazards of such applications follows top-down approaches derived from regulatory frameworks and theoretical analyses, empirical evidence of real-world failure modes remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce RealHarm, a dataset of annotated problematic interactions with AI agents built from a systematic review of publicly reported incidents. Analyzing harms, causes, and hazards specifically from the deployer's perspective, we find that reputational damage constitutes the predominant organizational harm, while misinformation emerges as the most common hazard category. We empirically evaluate state-of-the-art guardrails and content moderation systems to probe whether such systems would have prevented the incidents, revealing a significant gap in the protection of AI applications.

As language models become more powerful and sophisticated, it is crucial that they remain trustworthy and reliable. There is concerning preliminary evidence that models may attempt to deceive or keep secrets from their operators. To explore the ability of current techniques to elicit such hidden knowledge, we train a Taboo model: a language model that describes a specific secret word without explicitly stating it. Importantly, the secret word is not presented to the model in its training data or prompt. We then investigate methods to uncover this secret. First, we evaluate non-interpretability (black-box) approaches. Subsequently, we develop largely automated strategies based on mechanistic interpretability techniques, including logit lens and sparse autoencoders. Evaluation shows that both approaches are effective in eliciting the secret word in our proof-of-concept setting. Our findings highlight the promise of these approaches for eliciting hidden knowledge and suggest several promising avenues for future work, including testing and refining these methods on more complex model organisms. This work aims to be a step towards addressing the crucial problem of eliciting secret knowledge from language models, thereby contributing to their safe and reliable deployment.

Recent claims about the impressive abilities of large language models (LLMs) are often supported by evaluating publicly available benchmarks. Since LLMs train on wide swaths of the internet, this practice raises concerns of data contamination, i.e., evaluating on examples that are explicitly or implicitly included in the training data. Data contamination remains notoriously challenging to measure and mitigate, even with partial attempts like controlled experimentation of training data, canary strings, or embedding similarities. In this work, we conduct the first thorough longitudinal analysis of data contamination in LLMs by using the natural experiment of training cutoffs in GPT models to look at benchmarks released over time. Specifically, we consider two code/mathematical problem-solving datasets, Codeforces and Project Euler, and find statistically significant trends among LLM pass rate vs. GitHub popularity and release date that provide strong evidence of contamination. By open-sourcing our dataset, raw results, and evaluation framework, our work paves the way for rigorous analyses of data contamination in modern models. We conclude with a discussion of best practices and future steps for publicly releasing benchmarks in the age of LLMs that train on webscale data.

Harmful fine-tuning issue qi2023fine poses serious safety concerns for Large language models' fine-tuning-as-a-service. While existing defenses huang2024vaccine,rosati2024representation have been proposed to mitigate the issue, their performances are still far away from satisfactory, and the root cause of the problem has not been fully recovered. For the first time in the literature, we in this paper show that harmful perturbation over the model weights should be the root cause of alignment-broken of harmful fine-tuning. In order to attenuate the negative impact of harmful perturbation, we propose an alignment-stage solution, dubbed Booster. Technically, along with the original alignment loss, we append a loss regularizer in the alignment stage's optimization. The regularizer ensures that the model's harmful loss reduction before/after simulated harmful perturbation is attenuated, thereby mitigating the subsequent fine-tuning risk. Empirical results show that Booster can effectively reduce the harmful score of the fine-tuned models while maintaining the performance of downstream tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Booster.

Artificial intelligence (AI) developers are increasingly building language models with warm and empathetic personas that millions of people now use for advice, therapy, and companionship. Here, we show how this creates a significant trade-off: optimizing language models for warmth undermines their reliability, especially when users express vulnerability. We conducted controlled experiments on five language models of varying sizes and architectures, training them to produce warmer, more empathetic responses, then evaluating them on safety-critical tasks. Warm models showed substantially higher error rates (+10 to +30 percentage points) than their original counterparts, promoting conspiracy theories, providing incorrect factual information, and offering problematic medical advice. They were also significantly more likely to validate incorrect user beliefs, particularly when user messages expressed sadness. Importantly, these effects were consistent across different model architectures, and occurred despite preserved performance on standard benchmarks, revealing systematic risks that current evaluation practices may fail to detect. As human-like AI systems are deployed at an unprecedented scale, our findings indicate a need to rethink how we develop and oversee these systems that are reshaping human relationships and social interaction.

Large-scale pre-trained language models have achieved tremendous success across a wide range of natural language understanding (NLU) tasks, even surpassing human performance. However, recent studies reveal that the robustness of these models can be challenged by carefully crafted textual adversarial examples. While several individual datasets have been proposed to evaluate model robustness, a principled and comprehensive benchmark is still missing. In this paper, we present Adversarial GLUE (AdvGLUE), a new multi-task benchmark to quantitatively and thoroughly explore and evaluate the vulnerabilities of modern large-scale language models under various types of adversarial attacks. In particular, we systematically apply 14 textual adversarial attack methods to GLUE tasks to construct AdvGLUE, which is further validated by humans for reliable annotations. Our findings are summarized as follows. (i) Most existing adversarial attack algorithms are prone to generating invalid or ambiguous adversarial examples, with around 90% of them either changing the original semantic meanings or misleading human annotators as well. Therefore, we perform a careful filtering process to curate a high-quality benchmark. (ii) All the language models and robust training methods we tested perform poorly on AdvGLUE, with scores lagging far behind the benign accuracy. We hope our work will motivate the development of new adversarial attacks that are more stealthy and semantic-preserving, as well as new robust language models against sophisticated adversarial attacks. AdvGLUE is available at https://adversarialglue.github.io.

We study the problem of adversarial language games, in which multiple agents with conflicting goals compete with each other via natural language interactions. While adversarial language games are ubiquitous in human activities, little attention has been devoted to this field in natural language processing. In this work, we propose a challenging adversarial language game called Adversarial Taboo as an example, in which an attacker and a defender compete around a target word. The attacker is tasked with inducing the defender to utter the target word invisible to the defender, while the defender is tasked with detecting the target word before being induced by the attacker. In Adversarial Taboo, a successful attacker must hide its intention and subtly induce the defender, while a competitive defender must be cautious with its utterances and infer the intention of the attacker. Such language abilities can facilitate many important downstream NLP tasks. To instantiate the game, we create a game environment and a competition platform. Comprehensive experiments and empirical studies on several baseline attack and defense strategies show promising and interesting results. Based on the analysis on the game and experiments, we discuss multiple promising directions for future research.

The proliferation of online toxic speech is a pertinent problem posing threats to demographic groups. While explicit toxic speech contains offensive lexical signals, implicit one consists of coded or indirect language. Therefore, it is crucial for models not only to detect implicit toxic speech but also to explain its toxicity. This draws a unique need for unified frameworks that can effectively detect and explain implicit toxic speech. Prior works mainly formulated the task of toxic speech detection and explanation as a text generation problem. Nonetheless, models trained using this strategy can be prone to suffer from the consequent error propagation problem. Moreover, our experiments reveal that the detection results of such models are much lower than those that focus only on the detection task. To bridge these gaps, we introduce ToXCL, a unified framework for the detection and explanation of implicit toxic speech. Our model consists of three modules: a (i) Target Group Generator to generate the targeted demographic group(s) of a given post; an (ii) Encoder-Decoder Model in which the encoder focuses on detecting implicit toxic speech and is boosted by a (iii) Teacher Classifier via knowledge distillation, and the decoder generates the necessary explanation. ToXCL achieves new state-of-the-art effectiveness, and outperforms baselines significantly.

Language changes over time, including in the hate speech domain, which evolves quickly following social dynamics and cultural shifts. While NLP research has investigated the impact of language evolution on model training and has proposed several solutions for it, its impact on model benchmarking remains under-explored. Yet, hate speech benchmarks play a crucial role to ensure model safety. In this paper, we empirically evaluate the robustness of 20 language models across two evolving hate speech experiments, and we show the temporal misalignment between static and time-sensitive evaluations. Our findings call for time-sensitive linguistic benchmarks in order to correctly and reliably evaluate language models in the hate speech domain.

Large-scale language models, like ChatGPT, have garnered significant media attention and stunned the public with their remarkable capacity for generating coherent text from short natural language prompts. In this paper, we aim to conduct a systematic inspection of ChatGPT's performance in two controllable generation tasks, with respect to ChatGPT's ability to adapt its output to different target audiences (expert vs. layman) and writing styles (formal vs. informal). Additionally, we evaluate the faithfulness of the generated text, and compare the model's performance with human-authored texts. Our findings indicate that the stylistic variations produced by humans are considerably larger than those demonstrated by ChatGPT, and the generated texts diverge from human samples in several characteristics, such as the distribution of word types. Moreover, we observe that ChatGPT sometimes incorporates factual errors or hallucinations when adapting the text to suit a specific style.

Large language models (LLMs) often generate responses that deviate from user input or training data, a phenomenon known as "hallucination." These hallucinations undermine user trust and hinder the adoption of generative AI systems. Addressing hallucinations is essential for the advancement of LLMs. This paper introduces a comprehensive hallucination benchmark, incorporating both new extrinsic and existing intrinsic evaluation tasks, built upon clear taxonomy of hallucination. A major challenge in benchmarking hallucinations is the lack of a unified framework due to inconsistent definitions and categorizations. We disentangle LLM hallucination from "factuality," proposing a clear taxonomy that distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic hallucinations, to promote consistency and facilitate research. Extrinsic hallucinations, where the generated content is not consistent with the training data, are increasingly important as LLMs evolve. Our benchmark includes dynamic test set generation to mitigate data leakage and ensure robustness against such leakage. We also analyze existing benchmarks, highlighting their limitations and saturation. The work aims to: (1) establish a clear taxonomy of hallucinations, (2) introduce new extrinsic hallucination tasks, with data that can be dynamically regenerated to prevent saturation by leakage, (3) provide a comprehensive analysis of existing benchmarks, distinguishing them from factuality evaluations.

We study suffix-based jailbreaksx2013a powerful family of attacks against large language models (LLMs) that optimize adversarial suffixes to circumvent safety alignment. Focusing on the widely used foundational GCG attack (Zou et al., 2023), we observe that suffixes vary in efficacy: some markedly more universalx2013generalizing to many unseen harmful instructionsx2013than others. We first show that GCG's effectiveness is driven by a shallow, critical mechanism, built on the information flow from the adversarial suffix to the final chat template tokens before generation. Quantifying the dominance of this mechanism during generation, we find GCG irregularly and aggressively hijacks the contextualization process. Crucially, we tie hijacking to the universality phenomenon, with more universal suffixes being stronger hijackers. Subsequently, we show that these insights have practical implications: GCG universality can be efficiently enhanced (up to times5 in some cases) at no additional computational cost, and can also be surgically mitigated, at least halving attack success with minimal utility loss. We release our code and data at http://github.com/matanbt/interp-jailbreak.

Model compression techniques are receiving increasing attention; however, the effect of compression on model fairness is still under explored. This is the first paper to examine the effect of distillation and pruning on the toxicity and bias of generative language models. We test Knowledge Distillation and Pruning methods on the GPT2 model and found a consistent pattern of toxicity and bias reduction after model distillation; this result can be potentially interpreted by existing line of research which describes model compression as a regularization technique; our work not only serves as a reference for safe deployment of compressed models, but also extends the discussion of "compression as regularization" into the setting of neural LMs, and hints at the possibility of using compression to develop fairer models.

The widespread presence of hateful languages on social media has resulted in adverse effects on societal well-being. As a result, addressing this issue with high priority has become very important. Hate speech or offensive languages exist in both explicit and implicit forms, with the latter being more challenging to detect. Current research in this domain encounters several challenges. Firstly, the existing datasets primarily rely on the collection of texts containing explicit offensive keywords, making it challenging to capture implicitly offensive contents that are devoid of these keywords. Secondly, common methodologies tend to focus solely on textual analysis, neglecting the valuable insights that community information can provide. In this research paper, we introduce a novel dataset OffensiveLang, a community based implicit offensive language dataset generated by ChatGPT 3.5 containing data for 38 different target groups. Despite limitations in generating offensive texts using ChatGPT due to ethical constraints, we present a prompt-based approach that effectively generates implicit offensive languages. To ensure data quality, we evaluate the dataset with human. Additionally, we employ a prompt-based zero-shot method with ChatGPT and compare the detection results between human annotation and ChatGPT annotation. We utilize existing state-of-the-art models to see how effective they are in detecting such languages. The dataset is available here: https://github.com/AmitDasRup123/OffensiveLang

Unwanted and often harmful social biases are becoming ever more salient in NLP research, affecting both models and datasets. In this work, we ask whether training on demographically perturbed data leads to fairer language models. We collect a large dataset of human annotated text perturbations and train a neural perturbation model, which we show outperforms heuristic alternatives. We find that (i) language models (LMs) pre-trained on demographically perturbed corpora are typically more fair, and (ii) LMs finetuned on perturbed GLUE datasets exhibit less demographic bias on downstream tasks, and (iii) fairness improvements do not come at the expense of performance on downstream tasks. Lastly, we discuss outstanding questions about how best to evaluate the (un)fairness of large language models. We hope that this exploration of neural demographic perturbation will help drive more improvement towards fairer NLP.

Hallucinations in generative AI, particularly in Large Language Models (LLMs), pose a significant challenge to the reliability of multilingual applications. Existing benchmarks for hallucination detection focus primarily on English and a few widely spoken languages, lacking the breadth to assess inconsistencies in model performance across diverse linguistic contexts. To address this gap, we introduce Poly-FEVER, a large-scale multilingual fact verification benchmark specifically designed for evaluating hallucination detection in LLMs. Poly-FEVER comprises 77,973 labeled factual claims spanning 11 languages, sourced from FEVER, Climate-FEVER, and SciFact. It provides the first large-scale dataset tailored for analyzing hallucination patterns across languages, enabling systematic evaluation of LLMs such as ChatGPT and the LLaMA series. Our analysis reveals how topic distribution and web resource availability influence hallucination frequency, uncovering language-specific biases that impact model accuracy. By offering a multilingual benchmark for fact verification, Poly-FEVER facilitates cross-linguistic comparisons of hallucination detection and contributes to the development of more reliable, language-inclusive AI systems. The dataset is publicly available to advance research in responsible AI, fact-checking methodologies, and multilingual NLP, promoting greater transparency and robustness in LLM performance. The proposed Poly-FEVER is available at: https://huggingface.co/datasets/HanzhiZhang/Poly-FEVER.

One of the challenges of developing a summarization model arises from the difficulty in measuring the factual inconsistency of the generated text. In this study, we reinterpret the decoder overconfidence-regularizing objective suggested in (Miao et al., 2021) as a hallucination risk measurement to better estimate the quality of generated summaries. We propose a reference-free metric, HaRiM+, which only requires an off-the-shelf summarization model to compute the hallucination risk based on token likelihoods. Deploying it requires no additional training of models or ad-hoc modules, which usually need alignment to human judgments. For summary-quality estimation, HaRiM+ records state-of-the-art correlation to human judgment on three summary-quality annotation sets: FRANK, QAGS, and SummEval. We hope that our work, which merits the use of summarization models, facilitates the progress of both automated evaluation and generation of summary.