hash
stringlengths 32
32
| doc_id
stringlengths 5
12
| section
stringlengths 4
1.47k
| content
stringlengths 0
6.67M
|
|---|---|---|---|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
5.2 Key Issue #2: Security, and Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers
| |
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
5.2.1 Key issue details
|
As studied in TR 23.700-04 [2], training data for AI/ML-based NR air interface operation with UE-side model training may be transferred via the 5G Core (5GC) and then exposed to external OTT servers. The exposure of such UE-related data outside the 3GPP domain introduces security risks that need to be addressed at the exposure interface (e.g., via NEF).
The exposure interface requires mechanisms to:
- Authenticate OTT servers before any data exposure.
- Authorize and apply access control to restrict exposed data to what is necessary for the OTT server.
- Provide confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection of the exposed data during transport.
- Ensure that exposure of UE-related data complies with user consent.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
5.2.2 Security threats
|
Unauthenticated or impersonating OTT servers could obtain sensitive UE-related data.
Without authorization, OTT servers can abuse UE-related data exposure services. .
Leakage, tampering, or replay of UE-related data at the NEF and OTT/AF interface could compromise integrity, confidentiality.
Exposure of UE information without proper consent may violate regulations and create liabilities for the MNO.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
5.2.3 Potential security requirements
|
The 5GS shall support mutual authentication between the NEF and OTT/AF servers handling UE-related data.
The 5GS shall support authorization mechanisms for services related to exposure of UE-related data to the OTT server.
The 5GS shall support confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection for UE-related data during transfer between NEF and OTT/AF.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6 Solutions
|
Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
|
Editor’s Note: This clause captures mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 6.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Key Issues
Solutions
#1
#2
#1
X
#2
X
#3
X
#4
X
#5
X
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.2 Solution #1: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF
| |
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.2.1 Introduction
|
This solution addresses requirements of key issue #1.
For authorization and user consent check between UE and data collection NF, it proposes that the entity who selects UE for data collection is deemed as enforcement point. Especially for user consent check, the existing mechanism can be reused.
For authentication and communication protection, it proposes that 3GPP network sends security parameters (e.g. PSK) to the UE in protected RRC/NAS message and the UE uses the security parameters to establish secure connection (e.g. TLS) with the DCF for UP data transferring.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.2.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.2.2-1: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF
1. Data consumer (e.g. UE model training entity server) requests UE data collection to DCF.
2. DCF retrieves UE subscription data from UDM. The subscription data includes:
a) User consent data: existing user consent parameters can be reused.
b) Authorization profile: whether UE is allowed for exposing specific data to specific data consumer.
The DCF can be enforcement point for authorization and user consent check if it decides that DCF is used for UE selection for data collection.
3. The DCF sends security parameters (e.g. PSK) to the RAN/AMF. The DCF may also send UE subscription data to the RAN/AMF to enforce the authorization and user consent check if it decides that RAN/AMF is used for UE selection for data collection.
4. The RAN/AMF sends security parameters to the UE. The security parameters are protected by RRC/NAS mechanism.
5. The UE establishes a PDU session as depicted in clause 7.1.1 of TR 23.700-04 [2].
6. The UE establishes a secure connection using the security parameters to the DCF, e.g. the UE uses PSK to establish a secure TLS connection with the DCF.
7. The UE reports UP data in the secure connection to the DCF.
8. The DCF reports UP data to the Data consumer.
Editor's note: Aspect related to user consent its application and enforcement in any form for UE data collection is FFS.
Editor's note: Applicability and distribution of related security parameter (i.e. PSK) for the purpose of secure channel establishment or applicability of UE subscription data and its distribution to AMF/RAN in any form for the is FFS.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.2.3 Evaluation
|
TBA
Editor's note: The evaluation is made based on SA2 conclusion.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.3 Solution #2: Security for Data Collection using a DCF
| |
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.3.1 Introduction
|
This solution addresses Key Issue #1.
This solution builds on TR 23.700-04 (for the standardized transfer of standardized data over UP for UE-side data collection) and introduces security enhancements in the 5GS for secure UE connection setup and data transfer with a Data Collection Function (DCF).
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.3.2 Solution details
|
Architecture scope and roles
- DCF in the MNO domain manages Data Collection Profiles (DCPs) and orchestrates UE data collection and transfer,
Security functions
1) Authentication and session protection between UE and DCF
- The UE establishes a secure association with the DCF using shared key derived from network credentials. Transport security (e.g., TLS) is bound to the shared key. Options for shared key derivation are:
- Option #1: AKMA-based keys (TS 33.535 [4x]). DCF acts as a trusted AF, and obtains KAF from the AAnF over SBI.
Editor's note: The role of DCF acting as AF is FFS needs alignment with SA2.
- Option #2: KSEAF or KAMF derived shared key. DCF obtains the shared key from AMF/SEAF over SBI.
Editor's note: How shared key derivation and service operations for exchange of shared key between AMF/SEAF and DCF (option #2) are FFS.
2) UE authorization and policy enforcement
- The DCF authorizes a UE to participate per DCP, using subscription, consent, and operator policy.
Editor's note: Whether and how DCP is applicable is FFS and depends on SA2.
3) Consent enforcement inside the Core Network
- The DCF acts as the consent enforcement point for data collection from the UE, i.e., checks consent from UDM/UDR for permissions, as per TS 33.501 [3z], Annex V.
Editor's note: Whether and how user consent exposure applies will be decided by SA3 based on SA6 progress.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.3.3 Evaluation
|
Editor's note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.4 Solution #3: Security of connection between UE and Data Collection NF
| |
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.4.1 Introduction
|
This solution address KI#1 Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF by reusing the existing TLS based mechanism.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.4.2 Solution details
|
The UE establishes the user plane connection to the Data Collection NF, to protect the interface, the TLS based mechanism is supported.
Editor's note: The detail of the TLS based mechanism is FFS.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.4.3 Evaluation
|
Editor's note: Evaluation is FFS.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.5 Solution #4: New solution for Security of UE connection setup with Data collection NF
| |
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.5.1 Introduction
|
This solution addresses requirements of key issue #1: on "Security of UE connection setup with Data collection NF", particularly by hop-by-hop security. For authorization and user consent check between UE and data collection NF, it proposes detailed authorization checks against UE subscription data and operator policies at the data collection NF (DCF).
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.5.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.5.2-1: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF
1. The UE model training entity/server sends a request to the DCF to collect UE data for UE side model training.
2. The DCF checks subscription data for UE data collection and transfer from the UDM.
3. After successful authorization and user consent check, UE and UPF, DCF sends a request to SMF to establish a secure UP connection.
4. The procedure of secure UP connection shall reuse existing UP security mechanisms from TS 33.501 [3x1] between UE and gNB, reuse exiting NDS/IP specified in TS 33.210 [5x2] between gNB and DCF.
Editor's note: The authentication between UE and data collection NF is FFS.
Editor's note: Aspect related to user consent its application and enforcement in any form for UE data collection is FFS.
Editor's note: How the solution covers all the requirements of KI#1 is FFS.
Editor's note: How the UE perform data collection and its dependency on the solution is subject to SA2 progress.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.5.3 Evaluation
|
TBD
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.6 Solution #5: Secure communication between UE and the data collection function
| |
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.6.1 Introduction
|
This solution addresses part of KI#1, i.e. secure communication.
Secure connection is required between the UE and the data collection function, the connection between the UE and the data collection function can be secured by the TLS or NDS/IP and UP security in this solution.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.6.2 Solution details
|
For connection between UE and the data collection function located in home network, the TLS connection between the UE and the data collection function can be used for protecting the UE data. The TLS can be established based on key shared between the UE and the data collection function.
Editor's note: How the shared key is generated is FFS.
For connection between UE and the data collection function located in home network, the connection between the UE and base station, the connection between base station and the UPF, the connection between the UPF and the data collection function will be secured. Then the following mechanisms can be reused.
- The connection between UE and base station can be secured based on user plane related security algorithms defined in clause 6.6 of TS 33.501[3].
- The connection between base station and UPF can be secured based on existing NDS/IP as specified in clause 9.3 of TS 33.501 [3].
- The connection between UPF and the data collection function can be secured based on existing NDS/IP as specified in clause 9.3 of TS 33.501 [3].
Editor's note: How the solution covers all the requirements of KI#1 is FFS.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
6.6.3 Evaluation
|
In this solution, NDS/IP in TS.33.501 [3] clause 9.3 and user plane security in TS.33.501 [3] clause 6.6 is reused.
Editor's note: Further evaluation is needed.
Editor's note: How the UE perform data collection and its dependency on the solution is subject to SA2 progress.
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
|
d0df3e4e3bcefeb18133e59bd2cc2a40
|
33.785
|
7 Conclusions
|
Editor’s Note: This clause captures the conclusions of this study.
Annex A:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-253064
S3-252564, S3-252988, S3-252990 for endorsed TR skeleton, overview and new key issue
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253259
Create TR 33.785 based on S3-253064
0.10.01
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253703
S3-253702, S3-253704, S3-253706, S3-253707, S3-253708, S3-253709, S3-253710 for new key issue and new solutions
0.2.0
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
1 Scope
|
The present document has the following objectives:
• Identify and study the authentication and authorization aspects for AIMLE services specified in TS 23.482 [3].
• Study the solutions to address the identified scenarios to support AIMLE service security.
NOTE 1: For the above objectives existing SEAL security aspects [2] need to be taken into account as SEAL architecture is used as baseline for the AIMLE architecture. As the AIMLE phase 2 study progress in SA6 [4], related progress can be taken into account when stable conclusion in SA6 is available if any security aspects need to be considered additionally for this security study.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 33.434, "Security aspects of Service Enabler Architecture Layer (SEAL) for verticals".
[3] 3GPP TS 23.482, "Functional architecture and information flows for AIML Enablement Service".
[4] 3GPP TR 23.700-83, "Study on application layer support for AI/ML services Phase 2".
[5] 3GPP TS 23.434: "Service Enabler Architecture Layer for Verticals (SEAL); Functional architecture and information flows".
…
[x] <doctype> <#>[ ([up to and including]{yyyy[-mm]|V<a[.b[.c]]>}[onwards])]: "<Title>".
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
3.2 Symbols
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
4 Security Assumptions
|
The AIMLE security should use authorization aspects specified in TS 33.434 [2] as baseline.
Editor’s Note: Further details on which server performs the role of an Authorization Server is FFS.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
5 Key Issues
|
Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
5.1 Key Issue #1: Authorization for AIMLE Service Security for AIML members
| |
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
5.1.1 Key issue details
|
3GPP TS 23.482[3] introduces support for AIMLE services, enabling AI/ML operations through interactions between the AIMLE client and AIMLE server(s) over the AIML-UU reference point, and between the VAL servers and AIMLE servers over AIML-S respectively. These services involve distributed AI/ML operations across multiple participants, necessitating robust security mechanisms to ensure that only authorized members participate in the AIMLE workflows. Given the critical role of authorization in securing these workflows, it is important to assess whether the current security specifications are adequate.
Currently, the authorization aspects outlined in TS 33.434 [2] can be limited to address the security requirements of AIMLE services and related aspects specified in TS 23.482 [3] such as related to a) Federated Learning (FL), b) client related handling (registration, discovery, selection, selection subscription, and participation), c) transfers (task transfer, transfer learning, context transfer) d) ML Model (training capability evaluation, monitoring and control), e) Split operations and AIMLE assistance respectively. Therefore, this key issue aims to study whether enhancements to the authorization mechanisms specified in 3GPP TS 33.434 [2] are necessary to support AIMLE service security. The objective is to ensure trusted AIMLE members participation and usage to prevent unauthorized access of AIMLE operations.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
5.1.2 Security threats
|
Unauthorized AIMLE members (e.g., FL members) participating in AIMLE services may gain access to data exchanged between AIMLE clients and servers.
Lack of robust authorization allows unreliable or unauthorized AIMLE members (e.g., FL members) to degrade the quality, efficiency, or availability of AIMLE operations.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
5.1.3 Potential security requirements
|
The 3GPP system shall support authorization mechanisms for AIML members (e.g., FL members) utilising AIMLE services for various AIMLE procedures.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
5.2 Key Issue #2: Secure AIMLE ML Model Access
| |
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
5.2.1 Key Issue details
|
TS 23.482 [3] describes AIMLE services which supports ML Model retrieval, ML model training, ML model management (model information storage and discovery) ML model update, and ML model selection aspects. AIMLE Services uses SEAL as the fundamental architecture and the authorization aspects of SEAL Security in TS 33.434 [2] which allows requested service specific authorization which can be limited and necessary controls can be in place for the different ML access and management work flow authorization for the overall AIMLE based ML access security.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
5.2.2 Security threats
|
Unauthorized AIMLE client(s)/ VAL server using AIMLE services may gain access to ML model data leading to leakage of model.
Lack of robust authorization allows unauthorized AIMLE client(s) or VAL servers to degrade the quality, efficiency, or availability of AIMLE operations.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
5.2.3 Potential security requirements
|
The 3GPP system shall support authorization to secure AIMLE service-based ML Model operations such as retrieval, training, update, selection, and management (i.e., ML model information storage and discovery).
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key Issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
6 Solutions
|
Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
6.1 Solution #1: Authorization for AIMLE based FL
| |
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
6.1.1 Introduction
|
This solution address KI#1.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
6.1.2 Solution details
|
AIMLE authorization related to FL can reuse the authorization procedure specified in TS 33.434 [2] clause 5.2.2 (SEAL service authorization) and clause B.3.3 (SEAL service authorization) as the baseline i.e., SIM-S acts as an authorization server and issues access token to the AIMLE service consumer. The AIMLE service producer provides the requested services to the AIMLE service consumers by verifying the authorization of AIMLE service consumer i.e., on validating the access token claims.
The specific authorization related adaptations to AIMLE based FL related procedures include the following:
1. FL member registration: The candidate FL member (e.g., VAL server, AIMLE Server) can get access token from the authorization server such as SIM-S. The FL member registration services can be restricted based on the authorization issued with access token claims, which includes FL member ID as Subject, AIMLE service-related information as scope, FL member type (as Server or Client), FL member capabilities, Allowed ML Model ID list, FL member location information, Issuer as Authorization Server ID. The AIMLE service producer i.e., ML repository validates the access token and if success process the FL member registration request and provides the FL member registration response as in TS 23.482 [3]. The authorization procedure can be same for the FL member registration update request and response.
2. FL related events subscription: The candidate FL member (e.g., VAL server, AIMLE Server) can get access token from the authorization server such as SIM-S. The FL related event subscription request services can be restricted based on the authorization issued with access token claims, which includes FL member ID as Subject, AIMLE service-related information as scope, FL member Type (Server or Client), FL related Events ID or name, Allowed ML Model ID list/ML Model Information for FL, Allowed notification target address, issuer as authorization server ID. The AIMLE service producer i.e., ML repository validates the access token and if success process the FL related event subscription request and provides the response as in TS 23.482 [3].
3. HFL Training: VAL Server can get access token from the authorization server such as SIM-S. The FL member grouping support request services can be restricted based on the authorization issued with access token claims, which includes Requestor ID as Subject, AIMLE service-related information as scope, AIML Model (e.g., Model ID/Type) and Model parameters, Dataset ID(s), Allowed FL members (Allowed List of member client IDs) to use as AI MLE clients for HFL (or) ML model training, Training Type (HFL/VFL/or both), Allowed AI MLE client selection/filtering criteria, Allowed ML Model ID list/ML Model Information for training, F/ML Model selection filtering criteria, issuer as authorization server ID. The AIMLE service producer i.e., AIMLE Server validates the access token and if success process the FL member grouping request and provides the response as in TS 23.482 [3].
4. VFL Training: VAL Server can get access token from the authorization server such as SIM-S. The ML model training request services can be restricted based on the authorization issued with access token claims, which includes Requestor ID as Subject, AIMLE service-related information as scope, Allowed FL members (Allowed List of member client IDs) to use as AI MLE clients for VFL model training (e.g., per domain), Training Type (HFL/VFL/or both), Allowed AI MLE client selection/filtering criteria, Allowed ML Model ID list/ML Model Information for training, VFL Model selection filtering criteria, issuer as authorization server ID. The AIMLE service producer i.e., AIMLE Server validates the access token and if success process the FL member grouping request and provides the response as in TS 23.482 [3].
5. FL member grouping: VAL Server can get access token from the authorization server such as SIM-S. The FL member grouping support request services can be restricted based on the authorization issued with access token claims, which includes Requestor ID as Subject, AIMLE service-related information as scope, VAL service ID, AIML Model ID, ADAE Analytics ID, ML Model Profile Information (e.g., ID for which the FL grouping is to be used), ML Task Information/ID (e.g., FL Training task or FT Inference Task), Allowed FL members (Allowed List of member client IDs) to use as AI MLE clients/server for FL, issuer as authorization server ID. The AIMLE service producer i.e., AIMLE Server validates the access token and if success process the FL member grouping request and provides the response as in TS 23.482 [3].
Editor’s Note: Who performs the role of Authorization Server is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Further details on how the solution address the overall scope of AIMLE procedures related to KI#1 is FFS.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
6.1.3 Evaluation
|
TBD
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
6.2 Solution #2: Authorization of AIMLE clients acting as FL members for access to AIMLE Service Security
| |
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
6.2.1 Introduction
|
This solution proposes the authorization of AIMLE clients in support of federated learning (FL). It ensures that only authorized clients (FL members) are selected, and that secure token-based verification is performed using NEF. Tokens include only the minimum required claims such as ML model ID / Application Data Analytics Enablement (ADAE) analytics ID and ML model interoperability information to maintain security while ensuring interoperability.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
6.2.2 Solution details
| |
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
6.2.2.1 The procedure for AIMLE clients’ authorization
|
Figure 6.2.2.1-1 Authorization’s procedure of AIMLE clients acting as FL members
1. The VAL server sends a FL member grouping support request to the AIMLE server. The request includes the requestor ID, security credentials, and FL grouping criteria (e.g., grouping method, member selection criteria). The initial request is to create the FL member grouping support as described in Step 1 of clause 8.17.2 of TS 23.482 [3].
Editor ’s Note: The purpose, and validation procedure of the security credentials used in Step 1 are FFS.
2. Upon receiving the request, the AIMLE server validates whether the requestor is authorized to make it.
3. If authorized, the AIMLE server performs an FL member registration fetch with the ML repository based on the FL grouping criteria (see Step 3 of clause 8.17.2 in TS 23.482[3]).
4. The AIMLE server monitors AIMLE clients (FL members) to check whether they meet the selection criteria from step 1 as described in Step 4 of clause 8.13.2.2 of TS 23.482 [3]. AIMLE server interacts with NEF and/or SEAL services (including SEALDD) to set up monitoring. For location-based criteria, it uses SEAL-LMS (3GPP TS 23.434 [5] clauses 9.3.11/9.3.12) or 5GC services (e.g., NEF) to detect UEs entering or present in the target area.
5.a. Using monitoring results, the AIMLE server selects clients that meet the criteria and removes those that do not (e.g., due to location changes).
NOTE 1: The frequency at which monitoring results are provided is left to the implementation.
5.b. Each selected AIMLE client requests an access token from the AIMLE Server. The access token request sent to the AIMLE Server includes the following parameters: ML model ID / ADAE analytics ID and ML model interoperability information.
5.c. The AMILE server requests token from NEF on client’s behalf.
5.d. The NEF sends the generated access token to the AMILE server, which then returns the token to the client.
Editor ’s Note: The entity acting as the resource server for access token validation and protected resource access is FFS.
6.a. If AIMLE client obtains the access token, the AIMLE client sends a service request message to AIMLE server, requesting the AIMLE server to join FL group. The message contains the ML model ID / ADAE analytics ID and ML model interoperability information, and access token.
6.b. The AIMLE server triggers token verification with NEF. The NEF obtains the ML model ID / ADAE analytics ID and ML model interoperability information contained in the access token and verifies whether they match the corresponding values in step 5.d.
6.c. In case of successful access token verification, NEF respond to AIMLE server to retain the client.
Editor’s Note: The issue and verification of token by NEF is FFS.
7. The AIMLE server performs the FL member grouping, notifies selected AIMLE clients of their group membership, collects acknowledgements, and returns a FL member grouping support response to the VAL server that includes success/failure status, grouping details, and an optional expiration time for the grouping.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
6.2.3 Evaluation
|
TBD
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
|
99b74656dd921800e6b7e98ab4213547
|
33.786
|
7 Conclusions
|
7.Z Key Issue #Z: <Key Issue Name>
Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions for Key Issue #Z.
Annex <A>: <Informative annex title for a Technical Report>
Annex <X>: Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-252919
AIMLE Service Security TR Skeleton
0.0.0
2025-09
SA3#123
S3-253004
Included Contributions: S3-253003, S3-253005 S3-253006
0.1.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253701
Included Contributions: S3-253134, S3-253697, S3-253698, S3-253699, S3-253700
0.2.0
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
1 Scope
|
This document studies potential security and privacy architecture and procedures for 6G mobile networks for improvement of existing services and support of new services, to meet the 6G system requirements and architecture.
One goal of this document is to study how to create lean and streamlined standards for 6G, e.g. by dimensioning an appropriate set of functionalities, minimizing the adoption of multiple options for the same functionality, avoiding excessive configurations, etc.
The document covers the following aspects:
• Security and privacy for overall 6G system architecture
• Security and privacy of 6G RAN architecture.
• Security and privacy of 6G UE to core network interactions.
• Enhancements to Core Network security including endpoint security at transport and application layers, internal and external interfaces as well as end to end roaming security taking roaming intermediary into account.
The document covers possible security enhancements of the procedures from previous generations and new security aspects.
The complete or partial conclusions of this study are used as basis for the normative work.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TR 38.914: “Study on 6G Scenarios and requirements”.
[3] 3GPP TR 38.760-2: “Study on 6G Radio RAN2 aspects”.
[4] 3GPP TR 23.801-01: “Study on Architecture for 6G System”.
[5] 3GPP TR 33.771: “Study on supporting AEAD algorithms”.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
3.2 Symbols
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
4 Security areas and high level security requirements
| |
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
4.1 Security areas
|
Editor's Note: This clause further clarifies the scope of the study by listing the security areas that SA3 is working on.
This document includes the following security areas:
1. UE to Core Network Security deals with the UE to Core Network communication security. e.g., management of UE and network NAS security contexts, the associated key hierarchy, key derivation and key usage in the 6G System.
2. RAN security deals with the security aspects of 3GPP access network, e.g., RAN architecture, protocol stack, interfaces, procedures, interaction with UEs.
3. Subscription Authentication and Authorization deals with different aspects of access-agnostic authentication, authorization and related privacy aspects (i.e. subscriber identifier privacy) for UEs accessing 6G network
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
4.2 Potential high level security requirements
|
Editor's Note: This clause will document high-level requirements that guide the study.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5 Key issues
| |
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.1 Security area #1: UE to Core Network Security
| |
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.1.1 Introduction
|
This security area studies how to establish and manage secure communication(s) between the UE and the Core Network. This includes the following aspects:
Editor's Note: work is to be aligned and in coordination with TR 23.801-01 [4] based on SA2 progress.
Editor's Note: Any potential NAS impact due to the use of AEAD will be based on the conclusions in TR 33.771 [5].
- Security of NAS protocol, architecture and procedures
- NAS Security context management, including mobility
- Interworking between 6GS and 5GS
NOTE: Mobility aspects that are excluded in the RAN security area (i.e., mobility aspects that affect the core network security context) are included here.
Editor’s Note: Other aspects are FFS.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.1.2 Security assumptions
|
Editor's Note: This clause will document security assumptions related to each security area.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.1.3 Key issues
|
Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
5.1.3.y Key issue #1.y: <key issue name>
Editor's Note: Key issues within the security area are not in any particular order but they are added incrementally (y = 1, 2, 3…) when new key issue is identified. 'x' refers to the security area.
5.1.3.y.1 Key issue details
5.1.3.y.2 Security threats
5.1.3.y.3 Potential security requirements
5.1.3.y.4 Interim agreements
Editor's note: This clause will include the principles that are agreed as work progresses for the specific KI#x.y. This may be populated directly or e.g. also when a topic in Area #x gets resolved and a principle is agreed. Where there is consensus, interim agreements pertaining to this key issue (e.g. solution principles descriptions, not specific solutions) should be documented in this clause as soon as possible during the study.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.2 Security area #2: RAN security
| |
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.2.1 Introduction
|
Purpose is to study potential attack vectors, vulnerabilities, security and privacy risks, impact and mitigations. This includes the following aspects:
Editor’s Note: To be aligned with TR 38.914 [1] and TR 38.760-2 [2] as 6G RAN study progresses in RAN WGs.
- Radio protocol stack, architecture and procedures
Editor’s Note: Lower layer security is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Examples are FFS.
- Mobility and state transitions within 6G radio
- Mobility between 5G NR and 6G Radio
NOTE: Mobility aspects that affect the core network security context are included in other security areas.
- Interfaces within RAN and between RAN and core network
Editor’s Note: Other aspects are FFS.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.2.2 Security assumptions
|
Editor's Note: This clause will document security assumptions related to each security area.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.2.3 Key issues
|
Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
5.2.3.y Key issue #2.y: <key issue name>
Editor's Note: Key issues within the security area are not in any particular order but they are added incrementally (y = 1, 2, 3…) when new key issue is identified. 'x' refers to the security area.
5.2.3.y.1 Key issue details
5.2.3.y.2 Security threats
5.2.3.y.3 Potential security requirements
5.2.3.y.4 Interim agreements
Editor's note: This clause will include the principles that are agreed as work progresses for the specific KI#x.y. This may be populated directly or e.g. also when a topic in Area #x gets resolved and a principle is agreed. Where there is consensus, interim agreements pertaining to this key issue (e.g. solution principles descriptions, not specific solutions) should be documented in this clause as soon as possible during the study.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.3 Security area #3: Subscription Authentication and Authorization
| |
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.3.1 Introduction
|
This security area includes the following security aspects related to access-agnostic authentication and authorization between the UE and the 6GS:
-Authentication, key agreement and authorization between the UE and the 6GS.
Editor’s Note: Examples are FFS
Editor’s Note: Other types of authentication is FFS
-Re-authentication between the UE and the 6GS in different conditions of mobility.
-Subscriber identifier privacy.
-Long term credentials storage and processing
Editor’s Note: Other aspects are FFS
Editor’s Note: clarification of authorization aspects are FFS
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.3.2 Security assumptions
|
Editor's Note: This clause will document security assumptions related to each security area.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
5.3.3 Key issues
|
Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
5.3.3.y Key issue #3.y: <key issue name>
Editor's Note: Key issues within the security area are not in any particular order but they are added incrementally (y = 1, 2, 3…) when new key issue is identified. 'x' refers to the security area.
5.3.3.y.1 Key issue details
5.3.3.y.2 Security threats
5.3.3.y.3 Potential security requirements
5.3.3.y.4 Interim agreements
Editor's note: This clause will include the principles that are agreed as work progresses for the specific KI#x.y. This may be populated directly or e.g. also when a topic in Area #x gets resolved and a principle is agreed. Where there is consensus, interim agreements pertaining to this key issue (e.g. solution principles descriptions, not specific solutions) should be documented in this clause as soon as possible during the study.
5.x Security area #x: <security area name>
Editor's Note: The study is expected to be divided into several security areas which all have their own key issues and solutions. Security areas are not in any particular order but they are added incrementally (x = 1, 2, 3…) when new area is identified.
5.x.1 Introduction
Editor's Note: Detailed description of the security area
5.x.2 Security assumptions
Editor's Note: This clause will document security assumptions related to each security area.
5.x.3 Key issues
Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
5.x.3.y Key issue #x.y: <key issue name>
Editor's Note: Key issues within the security area are not in any particular order but they are added incrementally (y = 1, 2, 3…) when new key issue is identified. 'x' refers to the security area.
5.x.3.y.1 Key issue details
5.x.3.y.2 Security threats
5.x.3.y.3 Potential security requirements
5.x.3.y.4 Interim agreements
Editor's note: This clause will include the principles that are agreed as work progresses for the specific KI#x.y. This may be populated directly or e.g. also when a topic in Area #x gets resolved and a principle is agreed. Where there is consensus, interim agreements pertaining to this key issue (e.g. solution principles descriptions, not specific solutions) should be documented in this clause as soon as possible during the study.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
6 Solutions
|
6.x Solutions to Security Area #x <security area name>
6.x.y Solutions to Key Issue #x.y <key issue name>
6.x.y.z Solution #x.y.z: <solution name>
Editor's Note: Solutions are added incrementally (z = 1, 2, 3…) when new solution is identified. 'x' refers to the security area, y to the key issue.
6.x.y.z.1 Introduction
6.x.y.z.2 Solution details
6.x.y.z.3 Evaluation
Editor’s note: Evaluation needs to explain how the solution fulfils each requirement of the key issue.
|
fcf5b2eceb7d6417269cd5478032490d
|
33.801-01
|
7 Conclusions
|
Editor’s note: This clause will contain the overall conclusions made by SA3. The structure of this clause is FFS
Annex A:
Attacker Model
Y.1 General
Editor's Note: This clause includes an introduction to the attacker model.
Y.2 Architecture overview
Editor's Note: This will need to be updated as work progresses in other work groups.
Y.3 Attacker Description
Editor's Note: This clause includes an attacker model description.
Annex B:
Mapping of solutions to key issues
Editor’s note: Structure is FFS
Annex <F>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
Initial version
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253773
Adding Scope to the draft TR
0.1.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253772
Proposal for an Attacker model Annex in the 6G TR 33.801-01
0.1.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253811
Annex mapping of solutions to key issues
0.1.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253812
Adding EN to interim agreements
0.1.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253664
New Security Area on UE to Core Network Security
0.1.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253774
New Security Area on 6G RAN Security
0.1.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253776
Pseudo-CR on Security area Authentication and Authorization
0.1.0
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
1 Scope
|
The present document provides the description and investigation of new AI/ML based use cases, i.e., Multi-hop UE trajectory, AI/ML based intra-CU LTM, and other handover enhancements. Network Slicing and Coverage and Capacity Optimization, and its corresponding solutions, and initial analysis of Rel-18 leftovers.
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 38.300: " NR; NR and NG-RAN Overall Description".
[3] 3GPP TS 38.401: "NG-RAN; Architecture description".
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
3.2 Symbols
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
4 Use cases and Solutions
| |
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
4.1 Multiple-hop UE trajectory
| |
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
4.1.1 Use case description
|
Editor’s Note: Capture the description of use case
In Rel-18, the cell-based UE trajectory prediction is limited to the first-hop target NG-RAN node.
Multi-hop predicted UE trajectory across gNBs consists of a list of cells belonging to gNBs where the UE is expected to connect and these cells are listed in chronological order.
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
4.1.2 Solutions and standard impacts
|
Editor’s Note: Capture the solutions for the use case, including potential standard impacts on existing Nodes, functions, and interfaces
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
4.1.2.1 Locations for AI/ML Model Training and AI/ML Model Inference
|
For CU-DU split architecture, the following solutions are possible:
- AI/ML Model Training is located in the OAM and AI/ML Model Inference is located in the gNB-CU.
- AI/ML Model Training and Model Inference are both located in the gNB-CU.
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
4.2 AI/ML assisted Intra-CU LTM
| |
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
4.2.1 Use case description
|
Editor’s Note: Capture the description of use case
L1/L2 Triggered Mobility (LTM) is specified in TS 38.300 [2].
Intra-CU LTM is specified in TS38.401[3].
AI/ML can be used to optimise Intra-CU LTM procedures, e.g., to enhance Network and UE performance, optimize resource allocation and reduce mobility failures.
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
4.2.2 Solutions and standard impacts
|
Editor’s Note: Capture the solutions for the use case, including potential standard impacts on existing Nodes, functions, and interfaces
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
4.1.2.2 Input data of AI/ML based Intra-CU LTM
|
Editor’s Note: To be updated
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
4.1.2.3 Output data of AI/ML based Intra-CU LTM
|
For AI/ML optimization of Intra-CU LTM the following information can be considered as output data:
- Candidate cell and beam for LTM HO Preparation
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
4.3 Other handover enhancements
|
Editor’s Note: Identify other handover enhancements via AI/ML, e.g., inter-CU LTM
|
d887e2eb3e49a88d12c83289bd463d14
|
38.745
|
5 Conclusion
|
Annex <A> (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
RAN3#129-bis
R3-257331
0.1.0
2025-11
RAN3#130
R3-258086
0.1.1
|
4a21e104e9ac01766cb54297bc56539a
|
38.765
|
1 Scope
|
Editor’s note: This section is to describe the scope of the study, including RAN guideline of gNB-based mono-static sensing for UAV use case.
|
4a21e104e9ac01766cb54297bc56539a
|
38.765
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP RP-252819: "Revised SID: Study on Integrated Sensing And Communication (ISAC) for NR".
|
4a21e104e9ac01766cb54297bc56539a
|
38.765
|
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
4a21e104e9ac01766cb54297bc56539a
|
38.765
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.