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5.1.4.1 General
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From a developer’s perspective, the use case flows describe how an Application Client (AC) interacts with its local Edge Enabler Client (EEC) to request services, discover the right Edge Application Server (EAS), and sustain service continuity when the UE moves between edge zones. The AC is abstracted from all network-level complexity; it only consumes the EDGE-5 APIs provided by the EEC. Behind the scenes, the EEC engages with the EES, ECS, and CAPIF to resolve service endpoints, discover APIs, and coordinate relocation. Each step below outlines the function, rationale, and developer implications.
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5.1.4.2 Step 1: AC Registration & Provisioning
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The first step is for the AC to register with the EEC so that it can start consuming services. The developer must ensure the AC calls the Eeec_ACRegistration API. If the EEC already aware of its serving EES (through provisioning, DNS discovery, or cached state), it registers directly as depicted in Figure 5.1.4.2-1. Otherwise, the EEC bootstraps via the ECS to discover the serving EES as depicted in Figure 5.1.4.2-2. This step establishes the control context needed for subsequent service requests.
Figure 5.1.4.2-1: AC registration in EEC (option 1)
Alternatively, EEC can discover a suitable EES from the ECS.
Figure 5.1.4.2-2: AC registration in EEC (option 2)
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5.1.4.3 Step 2: EAS Discovery
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Once registered, the AC needs to know which EAS can provide the video analytics service. The developer calls Eeec_EASDiscovery, and the EEC queries the EES to find suitable EAS instances in the serving zone. The response includes candidate EAS endpoints, which the EEC returns to the AC via callback. The flow is shown in Figure 5.1.4.3-1.
At this stage, the AC learns where to send its data, but not yet how to use the service API.
Figure 5.1.4.3-1: EAS Discovery
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5.1.4.4 Step 3: CAPIF API Discovery
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The AC now requires the actual API contract to interact with the selected EAS. The developer does not handle CAPIF directly; instead, the EEC calls CAPIF_Discover_Service_API towards the CCF. CAPIF responds with the API base URI, supported operations, and authorization details. The EEC then informs the AC via a response callback. The flow is shown in Figure 5.1.4.4-1.
The developer can now use this endpoint for direct service invocation.
Figure 5.1.4.4-1: CAPIF API Discovery
EEC notifies the API endpoint information obtained from CAPIF.
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5.1.4.5 Step 4: Service Invocation
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With the endpoint and API details, the AC begins sending its video stream directly to the EAS. From the developer’s perspective, this involves implementing the client logic that captures frames and invokes the Video Analytics service API as specified by CAPIF. The EAS processes the video in real time and returns crowd counting results, which the AC can render or act upon. The flow is shown in Figure 5.1.4.5-1.
Figure 5.1.4.5-1: Video Analytics API Consumption
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5.1.4.6 Step 5: Mobility with Application Context Relocation
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The EEC does not detect mobility itself. Mobility/zone-change is determined in the network and conveyed to the EES (e.g., via operator control-plane and exposure functions). The EES then informs the EEC over EDGE-1 using the service continuity/mobility procedures. The EEC translates that into the local EDGE-5 notification the AC can consume. From the developer’s perspective, they only need to:
- ensure the AC has subscribed (e.g., Eeec_Services_Subscribe) to mobility/ACR notifications, and
- handle updateNotificationCallback(mobilityEvent: zoneChange → Zone2) to gracefully pause/buffer and wait for the new endpoint before resuming the stream.
Once the EEC has notified the AC of a mobility event (zone change), the next stage is to relocate the application context. The EES is the anchor for this process. When it detects that the UE should be served by another edge zone, it coordinates with the ECS to identify the target EES/EAS. The EEC can either trigger the ACR procedure explicitly (via Eeec_ACRTrigger) or let the EES manage it automatically.
NOTE: Each edge zone corresponds to an Edge Data Network (EDN) as defined in 3GPP TS 23.558 [4]. An EDN represents the localized network domain that hosts the edge components (EES, EAS, and supporting UPF) providing low-latency application services near the UE. From an application-enablement perspective, the edge zone is the logical area in which an Application Client (AC) is served by a specific EES and its associated EAS instances. When the UE moves to another edge zone, this corresponds to a change of serving EDN at the network level. The EES anchors the control context of each EDN and coordinates the Application Context Relocation (ACR) process to maintain service continuity across edge zones.
From the developer’s perspective, the AC does not implement relocation signalling. It only needs to:
- handle the notification callback (from Step 4),
- optionally request relocation via Eeec_ACRTrigger, and
- be ready to consume the new endpoint information once relocation is complete.
The state transfer between EAS 1 and EAS 2, as well as the context push between EESs, is handled by the edge system.
Figure 5.1.4.6-1: Mobility and Application Context Relocation
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5.1.4.7 Step 6: API Update & Resume Streaming
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After relocation, the EEC refreshes API discovery with CAPIF to retrieve the new endpoint for EAS 2. The AC receives this updated endpoint via notification callback. The developer must handle this event by re-establishing the video stream to EAS 2 using the new service API. From the AC’s perspective, this looks like a service update rather than a failure, maintaining continuity of the analytics.
Figure 5.1.4.7-1: API Update & Resume Streaming
At the end of the procedure, the Application Client (AC) has successfully transitioned its session from EAS 1 in Zone 1 to EAS 2 in Zone 2. The Application Context Relocation ensured that service state was preserved across edge zones, while the updated API discovery via CAPIF allowed the AC to obtain the new endpoint seamlessly. From the developer’s perspective, the AC continued to stream video to the analytics service with minimal disruption — first to Zone 1’s EAS and, after mobility and relocation, directly to Zone 2’s EAS. This demonstrates how the EDGEAPP framework hides the complexity of mobility and service continuity, enabling the developer to focus on application logic rather than network details.
5.2 {Use case title}
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5.2.1 Introduction
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5.2.2 Use case Description
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5.2.3 Use case Realisation over Application Enablement Frameworks
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5.2.4 Use case Flows
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6 Developer Guidelines
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6.1 Introduction
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6.2 Cross-Framework Integration
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CAPIF roles definition for EDGEAPP and SEAL entities
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6.3 Example Application Flows
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The following flows will be considered “CAPIF + EDGEAPP”, “CAPIF + SEAL” and “CAPIF + EDGEAPP + SEAL”
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6.4 Multi-CAPIF Considerations
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Relevant information to consider when several CAPIF are deployed
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7 Security Considerations
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Aspects such as identity management across frameworks, secure onboarding and trust models, framework-specific and integrated authorization will be considered
Annex A:
Infrastructure Topology Diagrams Examples
Will show CAPIF+ EDGEAPP, CAPIF+SEAL and CAPIF+EDGEAPP+SEAL
A.1 CAPIF plus +EDGEAPP Topology
Editor’s Note: Further alignment is required between this clause and Annex A.5 of 3GPP TS 23.558 [4].
A.1.1 General
This annex describes a deployment in a single PLMN where the Common API Framework (CAPIF) integrates with the Edge Application Enablement (EDGEAPP) architecture. The scenario illustrates how onboarding, registration, API publication, discovery, authorization, and invocation are carried out with CAPIF security in place.
This sample deployment includes the following entities:
• CAPIF Core Function (CCF): Provides onboarding, registration, API catalogue, authorization, and token issuance.
• Edge Configuration Server (ECS): Provides supporting functions needed for the EEC to connect with an EES.
• Two Edge Enablement Servers (EES): One per Edge location.
• Two Edge Application Servers (EAS): One per Edge location, co-located with each EES.
• Two User Equipment (UEs): Each has an Edge Enabler Client (EEC) and an Application Client (AC) connected to its nearest Edge location.
The Logical Topology is shown in Figure A.1.1-1, where the letters and numbers are independent, for instance AC-A or AC-B could connected to either EAS.
Figure A.1.1-1: CAPIF plus EDGEAPP sample topology
A.1.2 Step 1: ECS Registration into CAPIF
The ECS needs first to be pre-provisioned with the CAPIF Root CA, the CAPIF base URL, and a bootstrap JWT/credentials, see clause 6.1 of 3GPP TS 33.122 [7]. It can then register with the CCF as an API Provider (clause 10.12.2 of 3GPP TS 23.222 [2]), establishing its trusted identity. The flow is depicted in Figure A.1.2-1.
Figure A.1.2-1: ECS Registration flow
A.1.3 Step 2: ECS Publishes APIs
Having obtained a valid certificate, the ECS publishes its service APIs (e.g., EESRegistration, configuration APIs) into CAPIF. The flow is depicted in Figure A.1.3-1.
Figure A.1.3-1: ECS Publish API flow
A.1.4 Step 3: EES Onboarding and Registration into CAPIF
Before onboarding, each EES is provisioned with:
• CAPIF Root CA certificate(s), to validate TLS when connecting to the CCF.
• CAPIF Core Function base URL, the discovery root for onboarding, registration, discovery, and token endpoints.
• Bootstrap JWT and/or credential material, initial credentials used to authenticate to CCF for onboarding (per operator policy).
The EES establishes a secure TLS session to the CCF using the CA root, authenticates with the bootstrap token/credentials, and performs:
• API Invoker onboarding (so it can later discover/consume ECS APIs), and
• API Provider registration (so it can later publish its own EES-facing APIs, e.g., EASRegistration/Discovery).
The EES onboarding as an API Invoker and then registering as an API Provider flows are depicted in Figure A.1.4-1.
Figure A.1.4-1: EES onboarding and registration flow
A.1.5 Step 4: EES Publishes Its APIs
The EES publishes APIs for EASRegistration, EASDiscovery, and UE-related assistance (EEC), as depicted in Figure A.1.5-1.
Figure A.1.5-1: EES publishing flow
A.1.6 Step 5: EES Discovers ECS APIs
Before interacting with ECS, the EES discovers ECS’s published APIs through CAPIF, as depicted in Figure A.1.6-1.
Figure A.1.6-1: EES discovery flow
A.1.7 Step 6: EES Registers with ECS
In order to register in ECS, EES needs to consume the discovered EESRegistration API. For that, the EES establishes a Security Context with the CCF using the client certificate issued/provisioned during API Invoker onboarding (Step 3) selecting the SecurityMethod, in this case, will be OAuth. Then, the EES requests an OAuth2 access token (Client Credentials grant) from the CCF, bound to the established Security Context, with scope for ECS APIs (EESRegistration).
The EES invokes EESRegistration on the ECS (EDGE-6) with the OAuth token in the bearer header. The ECS validates the token and completes EES registration into ECS.
These steps are depicted in Figure A.1.7-1.
Figure A.1.7-1: EES registration flow
A.1.8 Step 7: EAS Onboarding and Registration into CAPIF
Before onboarding, each EAS is provisioned with:
• CAPIF Root CA certificate(s): to validate the CCF’s TLS server certificate.
• CAPIF Core Function base URL(s): the root(s) for CAPIF onboarding, discovery/catalogue, and token endpoints.
• Bootstrap JWT and/or credential material: initial credentials issued by the operator/CCF that authorize the EAS to onboard; may encode roles for API Invoker and API Provider. JWT is be different for API Invoker and API Provider roles.
The EAS establishes a TLS session to the CCF (verifying with the CAPIF Root CA). It authenticates using the bootstrap token/credentials and performs:
• API Invoker onboarding, so it can later discover and consume ECS and EES APIs
• API Provider registration, so it can later publish its own application APIs to CAPIF
The EAS onboarding as an API Invoker and then registering as an API Provider flows are depicted in Figure A.1.8-1.
Figure A.1.8-1: EAS Onboarding and Registration flows
A.1.9 Step 8: EAS Discovers ECS/EES APIs
EAS queries CAPIF to locate both ECS and its serving EES APIs, as depicted in Figure A.1.9-1.
Figure A.1.9-1: EAS discovery flows
A.1.10 Step 9: EAS Registers with EES
The EAS requests a CAPIF-issued token scoped to EASRegistration and registers into its local EES, as depicted in Figure A.1.10-1.
Figure A.1.10-1: EAS registration flow
A.1.11 Step 10: EAS Publishes its Application APIs
The EAS publishes its application APIs (telemetry, AR, gaming, etc.) into CAPIF, as depicted in Figure A.1.11-1.
Figure A.1.11-1: EAS Publishing flow
At this point, EDGEAPP infrastructure is setup and ready. All EDGEAPP entitles are registered in CCF and have published their API endpoints. EES and EAS have also registered in ECS for UEs to discover them using EDEAPP APIs.
A.1.12 Step 11: AC/EEC Access EAS Services
ACs on UEs reach EAS services via EEC and EES. The EEC may leverage CAPIF-discovered info or operator-controlled EES discovery.
The EEC discovers its serving EES either through operator bootstrap configuration (pre-provisioned URL/endpoint), dynamic discovery via DNS or network signalling, or network-assisted redirection at session setup. CAPIF is not usually queried directly by the EEC for EES.
EEC sends an API Discovery request to the CCF to learn what APIs EAS has published (this aligns with Step10 where the EAS published APIs into CAPIF).
The EEC then passes EAS API information to AC. AC invokes the desired EAS API. The EAS processes the request, and responds to the AC.
These steps are depicted in Figure A.1.12-1.
Figure A.1.12-1: AC/EEC API Access flow
A.2 CAPIF+SEAL Topology
A.3 CAPIF+EDGEAPP+SEAL Topology
Annex B:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA6#68
S6-253778
TR Initial Version
0.0.0
2025-08
SA6#68
S6-253670
S6-253778
S6-253727
References
Scope
Introduction
0.1.0
2025-10
SA6#69
S6-254653
S6-254655
S6-254733
S6-254656
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Frameworks intro
Frameworks EDGEAPP
Frameworks CAPIF
Use case: Crowd Counting
Use case: Crowd Counting realisation
Annex CAPIF plus EDGEAPP
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5.1 Use case XCrowd Counting Video Analytics
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5.1.32 Use case Realisation over Application EnablementSA6 Frameworks
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5.1.43 Use case Flows
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1 Scope
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The present document …
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2 References
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The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 28.533: "Management and orchestration; Architecture framework".
[3] 3GPP TS 28.579: "Management services exposure to external consumers through CAPIF".
[4] 3GPP TS 28.319: "Access control for management services".
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3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
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3.2 Symbols
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For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
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4 Concepts and background
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Editor’s note: This clause provides a description of concepts and background.
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4.1 Overview
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The study builds upon the management services exposure scenarios defined in clause 5.6 of TS 28.533 [2], which serves as the primary reference for exposing management services to external consumers. In addition, the Management Exposure framework described in TS 28.579 [3] introduces an optional approach based on CAPIF.
The enhanced exposure concept includes the ability to abstract sensitive internal identifiers, enforce data sharing permissions, and align with industry-standard exposure frameworks.
Key motivations and considerations include:
• Cross-domain integration: As operators increasingly collaborate with external entities, there is a need to expose selected management services in a controlled and standardized manner.
• Security and privacy: Exposure of collected data must comply with security requirements, for the case where these data conveys sensitive data that the operator does not want to expose as-is outside their admin domain.
• Access control enhancement: Improve mechanisms of existing specifications (e.g., TS 28.319 [4]) to provide notification-level access control, which is essential for dynamic service interactions.
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5 Use cases and potential solutions
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5.X Use case #<X>: <use case title>
5.X.1 Description
Editor's note: This clause provides a description of use case.
5.X.2 Potential requirements
Editor's note: This clause provides potential requirements for the corresponding use case.
5.X.3 Potential solutions
Editor's note: This clause provides one or more solutions. Further (sub-)clause(s) may be added to capture details.
5.X.4 Evaluation of potential solutions
Editor's note: This clause provides evaluation of potential solutions.
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6 Conclusions and recommendations
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6.X Use case #<X>: <use case title>
Editor's note: This clause provides conclusions and recommendations for the corresponding use case.
Annex A (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA5 #163
S5-254449
S5-254694
Added the TR structure for enhanced exposure of management services.
Added concepts and background.
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1 Scope
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The present document studies the charging aspects of 6G system. This includes new charging business models and potential charging metrics, 6G charging architecture and charging mechanism, and the charging aspects of 6G services and frameworks.
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2 References
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The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 32.240: "Charging management; Charging architecture and principles".
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3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
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3.2 Symbols
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For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
ABMF Account Balance Management Function
CDR Charging Data Record
CGF Charging Gateway Function
CHF Charging Function
CTF Charging Trigger Function
ECUR Event Charging with Unit Reservation
IEC Immediate Event Charging
PEC Post Event Charging
RF Rating Function
SCUR Session Charging with Unit Reservation
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4 High-level description
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4.1 Background
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4.1.1 5G Converged Charging System
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The converged charging online and offline charging system is introduced for 5G system, as described in the TS 32.240 [2] clause 4.3.3.2. The following figure 4.1.1-1 specified the converged charging architecture.
Figure 4.1.1-1: Logical ubiquitous converged charging architecture
The Converged charging system includes the CHF (CHarging Function), ABMF (Account Balance Management Function), CGF (Charging Gateway Function) and RF (Rating Function).
The 5G converged charging is to provide a common process for a single, unified charging system, support the utilized online and offline charging information, as well as charging information record generation via CHF.
- Converged online and offline charging, with and without Quota management.
- Service Basde Interfaces Nchf via unified resource for all NF consumers.
- CHF CDR generation: CHF CDR(s) are generated by CHF for both online and offline charging, for all of the 5G services.
- Support "session" and "event" based charging, i.e. SCUR, ECUR, IEC and PEC.
- Charging information collection and reporting: the usage of online charging and offline charging are collected and reported in one charging message.
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4.2 Business Model for 6G Charging
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The 6G network will introduce new and enhanced services that may lead to new charging business models. To enable 6G, it is essential to support new capabilities and services, engage new ecosystem stakeholders, and evaluate the associated business models. Therefore, the following are considered in the 6G business model:
- 6G Services
- Target Customers: Charged party, e.g., individual customers, Industry/Verticals
- Charging Model: Extend charging metrics beyond the volume and time (e.g., AI token, AI task for AI services); new charging scenarios support the customized charging and billing package plan.
- Stakeholders: MVNO, Industry/vertical partners, service/content providers.
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5 Topics
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5.1 Topic 1: Charging Architecture
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5.1.1 General description
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5.1.2 Use cases
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5.1.2.Y Use Case #1.Y: <Use case Title>
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5.1.3 Potential charging requirements
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5.1.4 Key issues
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5.1.5 Solutions
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5.1.5.Y Solution #1.Y: <Solution Title>
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5.1.6 Evaluation
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5.1.7 Conclusion
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5.2 Topic 2: Charging Mechanism
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5.2.1 General Description
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5.2.2 Use cases
|
5.2.2.Y Use Case #2.Y: <Use case Title>
|
aff4dbe4b481faa9d073e85f28942051
|
32.801-02
|
5.2.3 Potential charging requirements
| |
aff4dbe4b481faa9d073e85f28942051
|
32.801-02
|
5.2.4 Key issues
|
5.2.4.Y Key issue #2.Y: <Key issue Title>
5.2.5 Solutions
5.2.5.Y Solution #2.Y: <Solution Title>
5.2.6 Evaluation
5.2.7 Conclusion
|
aff4dbe4b481faa9d073e85f28942051
|
32.801-02
|
6 Conclusions and Recommendations
|
Annex <X> :
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA5#163
S5‑254357
Initial skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA5#163
S5‑254818
S5‑254816
S5‑254817
S5‑254819
S5‑254820
S5‑254821
Update of the skeleton
Update of the Scope
Add background for the 6G Charging
Introduce a topic of new charging business models and charging metrics for 6G
Study structure 6G charging architecture
Add the new topic for the charging mechanism
0.1.0
|
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
1 Scope
|
The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the NR Femto network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases. It also specifies the requirements and test cases unique to the NR Femto network product class.…
|
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".
|
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
|
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
3.2 Symbols
|
Void.
|
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
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33.546
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
Void.
|
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4 NR Femto-specific security requirements and related test cases
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.1 Introduction
|
NR Femto-specific security requirements include both requirements derived from NR Femto-specific security functional requirements as well as security requirements derived from threats specific to NR Femto as described in TR 33.926 [2]. Generic security requirements and test cases common to other network product classes have been captured in TS 33.117 [3] and are not repeated in the present document.
|
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.2 NR Femto-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.2.1 Introduction
|
The present clause contains NR Femto-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test cases.
|
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the NR Femto deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.2.3 Technical Baseline
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.2.4 Operating systems
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.2.5 Web servers
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.2.6 Network devices
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
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33.546
|
4.3 NR Femto-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.3.1 Introduction
|
The present clause contains NR Femto-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
|
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.3.2 Technical Baseline
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.3.3 Operating Systems
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.3.4 Web Servers
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.3.5 Network Devices
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.3.6 Network Functions in service-based architecture
| |
c6e335cd268c6c038cc3112e422fc031
|
33.546
|
4.4 NR Femto-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases
|
Annex <X> (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
TS skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253766
Incorporated accepted contributions: S3-253765, S3-253440
0.1.0
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
1 Scope
|
The present document…
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
3.2 Symbols
|
Void.
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
4 Overview of Security related Events handling
|
Editor’s Note: This clause addresses the architectural view of the feature
The Service Based Architecture (SBA) is the dominant method for control plane as well as the Service Based Management Architecture (SBMA) is for management communications. In addition to the many benefits of using SBA, e.g. agility to increase and decrease the number of service instances in coordination with demand, potential attacks may still appear for network, service and/or APIs.
The 5G system includes heterogeneous and varied Network Functions (NF) deployments, where each and every Network Function has a specified behaviour according to 3GPP specifications. If any NF runs into errors, e.g. a violation of the normal behaviour, or abnormal access or unauthorised request, then the NF needs to be evaluated from security perspective. Collection of data related to abnormal events needs to be performed for the evaluation of the NF behaviour, with related data being transmitted towards a security entity that will execute the evaluation.
The following figure shows an example of trust domains in the overall architecture for the collection and transmission of the Security related Events detected by NFs.
Figure 4-1 Example of trust domains in the Security related Events Handling architecture
Editor’s Note: this figure is for information purposes to illustrate the requirement work. It will be revisited further once the requirements get agreed.
NOTE 1: The definition of the trust domains is to be established by the PLMN-operator.
NOTE 2: The Security related Events Collecting entity is under operator control (e.g. through business agreements, policy, managed service, directly managed, etc) and it is out of the scope of 3GPP.
NOTE 3: Whether the security collecting entity is the same as the management entity is an operator decision.
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
5 Security related events requirements
|
Editor’s Note: This clause addresses the general requirements to secure the procedures to configure, collect and deliver security related events.
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
5.1 General Requirements
|
The NFs in the 5G system shall support the generation of security related events.
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
5.2 Requirements on events storage
|
Security related events data shall be securely stored with confidentiality and integrity protection.
Access to security related events data shall be authorized.
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
5.3 Requirements on configuration for security related events
|
The capability to configure the NFs shall be supported.
Editor’s Note: The detailed set of information elements and reporting type to include for configuration is for further discussion.
The 5G system shall support mutual authentication between the 5GC NF (for configuration/activation of the functionality) and the Management Entity in charge of the configuration/activation of the events.
Authorization to the Management Entity in charge of the configuration/activation of the events shall be supported.
The 5G system shall support integrity protection, replay protection and confidentiality protection for communication between the 5GC NF and the Management Entity in charge of the configuration/activation of the events.
Editor’s Note: Separation of the configuration for security related events from other management related configurations is for further discussion.
Editor’s Note: These requirements and whether additional requirements are needed is FFS.
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
5.4 Requirements on delivery of security related events
|
The delivery of security related events shall be protected against unauthorized parties. Mutual authentication shall be supported between the end entities of such a delivery.
The delivery of security related events shall be confidentiality, integrity and replay protected.
The delivery of the security related events should be separate from other 5G system traffic.
NOTE: How this separation is done is left to implementation.
Editor’s Note: How to deliver the security events is to be defined by SA5 and/or CT groups.
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
6 Security related Events
|
Editor’s Note: This clause addresses the list and description of the events as well as naming convention for the events.
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
6.1 General
|
The security related event consists of two parts: common information elements, and specific information elements. The common information elements are specified in section 6.2, and specific information elements are specified in separated clauses.
6.2 Common information elements
The common information elements for all security related events shall consist of the following:
• Event number: A number identifying the event;
• Event name: The name of the event in a human-readable; e.g., "malformed message"
• Event code: A machine-readable name for the event
Editor’s Note: Whether a machine-readable code is needed is FFS.
Editor’s Note: The semantics of Event number, Event name, Event code are FFS
• Event Source: Identifier of the NF generating the event, e.g. NF instance ID;
• Event timestamp.
6.3 Security events related to malformed messages
The NF collects information on the SBA layer about malformed messages it receives that deviate from the 3GPP specified messages or are considered invalid according to the protocol specification and network state.
In addition to the information elements of clause 6.2, this type of events shall include the following:
• Message: The malformed message which triggers event.
• Message type: The type of message represents service operation.
• NF Consumer: Identifier for the NF where such malformed message originated, e.g., NF instance ID.
Editor’s Note: Message type, NF Consumer and any other IEs are FFS.
6.4 Security events related to Authorization Failure
The NF collects information about failed authorization attempts from inbound connections on the SBA layer.
In addition to the information elements of clause 6.2, this type of events shall include the following:
• Message: Full message which fails to pass authorization.
• NF Consumer: Identifier of the NF where the unauthorized message originated, e.g., NF Instance ID.
Editor's Note: NF consumer and any other IEs are FFS.
|
f1ed6ab5405f86d40086eabcf8d910d2
|
33.502
|
7 Protection of Security related events
|
Editor’s Note: This clause addresses the protection for the configuration, collection and delivery of events.
Annex <A> (normative):
<Normative annex for a Technical Specification>
Annex <B> (informative):
<Informative annex for a Technical Specification>
Annex <C> (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
08/2025
SA3#123
S3-252547
Initial draft
0.0.1
08/2025
SA3#123
S3-252991
Includes agreed tdocs S3-252547, S3-252992, S3-252993, S3-252994 and S3-252995
0.1.0
10/2025
SA3#124
S3-253792
Includes agreed tdocs S3-253790, S3-253791, S3-253793, S3-253794, S3-253795
0.2.0
|
eec80117d93ff3c3b720b217c6184aff
|
32.872
|
1 Scope
|
The present document focuses on the roaming charging aspects related to the reliability and recoverability enhancement of roaming charging interactions, including Local Breakout roaming and Home Routed roaming.
The following items are studied:
- Identify the roaming charging reliability enhancement scenarios and requirements.
- Investigate the potential solutions to support the scenarios and requirements.
|
eec80117d93ff3c3b720b217c6184aff
|
32.872
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 32.255: "5G data connectivity domain charging stage 2".
[3] 3GPP TS 32.290: "5G system; Services, operations and procedures of charging using Service Based Interface (SBI)".
|
eec80117d93ff3c3b720b217c6184aff
|
32.872
|
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
eec80117d93ff3c3b720b217c6184aff
|
32.872
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
|
eec80117d93ff3c3b720b217c6184aff
|
32.872
|
3.2 Symbols
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
N40 Reference point between SMF and the CHF.
N16 Reference point between two SMFs.
N47 Reference point between V-SMF and H-CHF.
N107 Reference point between V-CHF and H-CHF.
N42 Reference point between AMF and the CHF in the same PLMN.
N41 Reference point between AMF and the -CHF in different PLMNs.
|
eec80117d93ff3c3b720b217c6184aff
|
32.872
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
AMF Access and Mobility Management Function
CHF Charging Function
CTF Charging Trigger Function
NF Network Function
SMF Session Management Function
URLLC Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communication
|
eec80117d93ff3c3b720b217c6184aff
|
32.872
|
4 Background
|
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