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4.1 General
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5G roaming charging are specified in middle tier charging specifications. Take data connectivity as an example, the home routed roaming charging, LBO roaming charging with N47 and LBO roaming charging with N107 are specified in 3GPP TS 32.255[2]. The common failure handling includes CTF detected failure, CHF detected failure, CHF as NF Consumer detected failure, Retry handling and Response code handling are specified in clause 5.5 of 3GPP TS 32.290[3]. In order to support more failure handling scenarios in roaming, the enhancement of failure handling will be studied.
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4.2 Home routed Roaming charging
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Figure 4.2-1 illustrates the Home Routed roaming charging architecture depicted in clause 4.2 of 3GPP TS 32.255[2]. The N40 reference point is defined for the interactions between H-SMF and H-CHF and between V-SMF and V-CHF in the reference point representation.
Figure 4.2-1: 5G data connectivity converged charging architecture in roaming Home Routed reference point representation
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4.3 Local Breakout Roaming charging
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Figure 4.3-1 illustrates the Local Breakout roaming charging with N47 architecture, as specified in clause 4.2.6 of 3GPP TS 32.255[2]. The N47 reference point is defined for the interactions between V-SMF and H-CHF.
Figure 4.3-1: 5G data connectivity converged charging architecture in Local Breakout V-SMF to H-CHF scenario reference point representation
Figure 4.3-2 illustrates the Local Breakout roaming charging with N107 architecture, as specified in clause 4.2.6a of 3GPP TS 32.255[2]. The N107 reference point is defined for the interactions between V-CHF and H-CHF.
Figure 4.3-2: 5G data connectivity converged charging architecture in Local Breakout Inter-CHF scenario reference point representation
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5 Scenarios and key issues
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5.1 Topic 1: Local Breakout inter CHFs scenario
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5.1.1 Use cases
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5.1.1.1 Use case #1: Failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
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In the LBO N40+N107 charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, there is a charging session between the V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF, and there is also a charging session between the V-CHF and H-CHF. When a failure detected between V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF, How the charging system handles the failure should be studied.
Figure 5.1.1.1-1: An example of failure detected between V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF
The potential charging requirements for this UC are: REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1.
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5.1.1.2 Use case #2: Failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
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In the LBO N40+N107 architecture, for a specific PDU session, there is a charging session between the V-SMF(CTF) and V-CHF, and there is also a charging session between the V-CHF and H-CHF. When a failure detected between V-CHF and H-CHF, How the charging system handles the failure should be studied.
Figure 5.1.1.2-1: An example of failure detected between V-CHF and H-CHF
The potential charging requirements for this UC are: REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2.
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5.1.2 Potential charging requirements
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REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF.
REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2: charging system shall support failure handling for the Local Breakout charging scenario in which a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF.
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5.1.3 Key issues
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5.1.3.1 Key issue #1: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the CTF and the V-CHF
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This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-1. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the CTF and the V-CHF;
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5.1.3.2 Key issue #2: Failure handling enhancement for failures detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF
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This key issue is for investigating how to support REQ-3GPPCH-LBIC-2. This investigation covers the following:
- Identification of the failure handling enhancement for the scenario in which a failure is detected between the V-CHF and the H-CHF;
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5.1.4 Possible solutions
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5.1.4.1 Solution #1
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5.1.5 Evaluation
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5.1.6 Conclusion
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5.2 Topic 2: Home Routed charging scenario
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5.2.1 Use cases
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5.2.1.1 Use case #1: Failure of one charging session
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In the HR roaming charging architecture, for a specific PDU session, there are two charging sessions simultaneously. When a failure is detected in one of the charging sessions, How the charging system handles the failure should be studied.
Figure 5.2.1.1-1: An example of the failure between H-SMF and H-CHF in HR roaming
The potential charging requirements for this UC are: REQ-3GPPCH-LBHR-01.
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5.2.2 Potential charging requirements
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REQ-3GPPCH-LBHR-01: Charging system shall support failure handling for the Home Routed charging scenario in which a failure is detected in one of the charging sessions.
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6 Conclusions and recommendations
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Annex <A>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA5#163
Initial skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA5#163
S5-254381
S5-254488
S5-254490
S5-254489
S5-254491
S5-254812
S5-254813
S5-254815
Skeleton update
Add definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
Add scope
Add reference
Introduce the background for roaming charging
Introduce the usecase1 on Local Breakout Inter CHFs scenario
Introduce the usecase2 on Local Breakout Inter CHFs scenario
Introduce the usecase on Home Routed scenario
0.1.0
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1 Scope
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The present document … studies management aspects, with emphasis on the NRM definitions, required to provide a unified multi-RAT management interface (netconf/yang) for 4G and 5G.
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2 References
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The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
…
[x] <doctype> <#>[ ([up to and including]{yyyy[-mm]|V<a[.b[.c]]>}[onwards])]: "<Title>".
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3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
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3.2 Symbols
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For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
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4 Concepts and background
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Editor's Note: This clause provides an overview with the background.
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5 Analysis of management model definitions of 4G and 5G Radio Access Technologies
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Editor's Note: This clause provides an analysis and identification of gaps and inconsistencies in the management model definitions of EUTRAN and NR.
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6 Potential solutions to resolve the identified inconsistencies
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Editor's Note: This clause presents one or more solutions to address all the identified gaps and inconsistencies identified in 5.
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7 Conclusions and recommendations
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Editor's Note: This clause captures the conclusions and the recommendations of the study.
Annex X (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA5#163
S5-254377
-
-
-
Initial skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA5#163
S5-254730
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1
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1 Scope
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The present document …contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the NR Femto Security Gateway (SeGW) network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptations of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the SeGW network product class.
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2 References
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The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements"
[3] 3GPP TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes".
[4] 3GPP TS 33.545: "Security aspects of NR Femto".
[5] 3 GPP TS 33.320: "Security of Home Node B (HNB) / Home evolved Node B (HeNB)"
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3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
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3.2 Symbols
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Void.
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
SeGW Security Gateway
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4 SeGW-specific security requirements and related test cases
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4.1 Introduction
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NR Femto SeGW-specific security requirements include both requirements derived from NR Femto SeGW-specific security functional requirements as well as security requirements derived from threats specific to NR Femto SeGW as described in TR 33.926 [3]. Generic security requirements and test cases common to other network product classes have been captured in TS 33.117 [2] and are not repeated in the present document.
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4.2 SeGW-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases
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4.2.1 Introduction
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The present clause contains SeGW-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test cases.
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4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the SeGW deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test cases
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4.2.2.1. Location verification
Requirement Name: TC_LOCATION_VERIFICATION
Requirement Reference: TS 33.545 [4], clause 5.4.1
Requirement Description:
The SeGW can act as the verifying node to perform the location verification for the NR Femto node. The location verification is performed during or after the device authentication process. If the location verification fails, the connection from the NR Femto node to 5GC should be blocked as early as possible.
Threat References: failed location verification
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LOCATION_VERIFICATION
Purpose:
Verify that the SeGW blocks connection after failed location verification.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Conditions:
- Location information and verification policy are configured in the SeGW.
- A SeGW is connected in emulated/real network environment.
- A NR Femto whose location information is not within the permitted range is connected in emulated/real network environment.
Execution Steps
1. The tester triggers the NR Femto to initiate an mutual authentication between the NR Femto and the SeGW.
2. the NR Femto sends its location information in the Notify Payload with a Notification Type of LOCATION_INFO in the IKE_AUTH request .
3. The SeGW processes the Notify payload of the IKE_AUTH request and verify the location of the NR Femto based on the verification policy.
Expected Results:
The SeGW blocks the connection between the NR Femto and the SeGW.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., pcap file or screenshot containing the operational results.
4.2.2.2. Unauthenticated traffic filtering
Requirement Name: Unauthenticated traffic filtering
Requirement Reference: TS 33.320 [5], clause 4.4.3, TS 33.545 [4], clause 4.2.3
Requirement Description:
Any unauthenticated traffic from the H(e)NB is filtered out at the SeGW.
The Security Requirements and Principles defined in clause 4.4 of TS 33.320[1] are reused with the following modifications: H(e)NB replaced with NR Femto etc.
Threat References: Traffic from unauthenticated NR Femtos
Test case:
Test Name: TC_UNAUTHENTICATED_TRAFFIC_FILTERING
Purpose:
Verify that the SeGW filters out traffic from the unauthenticated NR Femto.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Conditions:
- A SeGW is connected in emulated/real network environment.
- A NR Femto is connected in emulated/real network environment.
- Mutual authentication is not performed between the SeGW and the NR Femto.
Execution Steps
1. The tester initiates any message other than the initial authentication message from the NR Femto to the SeGW.
Expected Results:
the SeGW filters out the message.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., pcap file or screenshot containing the operational results.
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4.2.3 Technical Baseline
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4.2.4 Operating systems
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4.2.5 Web servers
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4.2.6 Network devices
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4.3 SeGW-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
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4.3.1 Introduction
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The present clause contains SeGW-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases.
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4.3.2 Technical Baseline
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4.3.3 Operating Systems
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4.3.4 Web Servers
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4.3.5 Network Devices
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4.3.6 Network Functions in service-based architecture
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4.4 SeGW-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases
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Annex <X> (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253632
TS skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253768
S3-253767, S3-253442, S3-253425, S3-253771
0.1.0
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1 Scope
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The present document investigates the following security enhancement for CAPIF:
- New possible security requirements for new functionalities in CAPIF introduced in TR 23.700-43[4];
- Whether and how to address open security issue specified in TS 23.222[2] during Rel-19 and not yet analysed in TS 33.122[3]. Specifically, it covers the following:
- Group ID Authorization limited to a UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources of a group;
- Open Discover Service APIs procedure.
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33.700-23
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2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 23.222: "Functional architecture and information flows to support Common API Framework for 3GPP Northbound APIs; Stage 2".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.122: "Security aspects of Common API Framework (CAPIF) for 3GPP northbound APIs".
[4] 3GPP TR 23.700-43: "Study on CAPIF Phase 4"
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33.700-23
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3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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33.700-23
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
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4e23bd4f77006ce5a3ecbeb78915f06a
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33.700-23
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3.2 Symbols
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
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33.700-23
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3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
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33.700-23
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4 High-level architectures
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TS 33.122[3] provides security architecture for CAPIF based on the architecture specified in TS 23.222[2]. The security architecture in TS 33.122 [3] is the baseline of the present document. The procedures of section 8.34 and 8.38 of TS 23.222[2] are the basis for the solutions of this document.
Editor’s note: New possible security aspects introduced by the new functionalities studied in 23.700-43[4] will be considered in this document.
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5 Key issues
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5.1 Key issue #1: Group Authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group
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5.1.1 Key issue details
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The procedure specified in clause 8.34 of TS 23.222 [2] enable a UE-hosted API invoker accessing network-hosted resources owned by other UEs that belong to the same group. According to clause 8.34.2 of TS 23.222 [2], the security aspect of that procedure is left with the following note:
"NOTE: The security aspects of this procedure are specified in 3GPP TS 33.122 [y]."
To provide security protection for the procedure of UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources of a group, the key issue studies the potential solutions to mitigate potential security threats.
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5.1.2 Threats
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Without proper authorization mechanism, an unauthorized API invoker can claim membership in a privileged group to access resources of UEs within that group, resulting in information leakage and unauthorized modification to the resources of the resource owner.
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5.1.3 Potential security requirements
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The CCF should support authorization of a UE-hosted API invoker accessing resources owned by other UEs that belong to the same group.
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5.2 Key issue #2: Security for open discover service API
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5.2.1 Key issue details
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As specified in TS 23.222[2], the requestor which doesn’t register to the CAPIF can discover service API from CCF. There is a NOTE:
NOTE: The security aspects of this procedure are unspecified in this release of the specification.
The existing security mechanism specified in TS 33.122[3] does not discuss the security aspects of the new feature of open discover service API, which may cause information leakage. This key issue aims to address the security aspects of open discover service API.
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5.2.2 Threats
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Without proper protection mechanism, the API invoker may obtain sensitive service API information beyond its permission.
An attacker impersonating the CCF can send wrong information to the Requestor about the service APIs.
An attacker between the CCF and the Requestor can access to the information about the service APIs.
An attacker between the CCF and the Requestor can modify the information about the service APIs.
An attacker between the CCF and the Requestor can replay the outdated information about the service APIs.
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5.2.3 Potential security requirements
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CAPIF should support authentication of CCF by the requestor.
CAPIF should support authorization for the requestor not recognized by CAPIF to discover sensitive API information through service API from CCF.
CAPIF should support confidentiality, integrity protection, and replay protection for the secure communication between the CCF and the Requestor.
Editor’s note: The interface between Requestor and CCF is to be clarified and the potential security impacts are FFS.
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5.3 Key issue #3: More granular authorization based on purpose information
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5.3.1 Key issue details
|
The purpose for data processing has been captured in TS 23.222 [2] in authorization, but it has not been addressed in TS 33.122 [3]. With the lack of more granular authorization based on purpose information, it will not be possible for the resource owner to give permission for data sharing only for some specific purposes. This key issue is not aiming to specify different purpose values, but to specify the usage of purpose information in authorization.
|
4e23bd4f77006ce5a3ecbeb78915f06a
|
33.700-23
|
5.3.2 Threats
|
The API Invoker can access to the resources of the resource owner for any purposes. This can lead to a threat of unauthorized access.
|
4e23bd4f77006ce5a3ecbeb78915f06a
|
33.700-23
|
5.3.3 Potential security requirements
|
CAPIF RNAA should support the usage of purpose information in authorization and authorization revocation of the API Invoker to access the resources of the resource owner.
|
4e23bd4f77006ce5a3ecbeb78915f06a
|
33.700-23
|
5.4 Key Issue #4: Study on security aspects of Credentials unavailability
| |
4e23bd4f77006ce5a3ecbeb78915f06a
|
33.700-23
|
5.4.1 Key issue details
|
KI#3 in TR 23.700-43 [4] aims to study how to manage entities which do not have access to their CCF provided certificate.
Due to the nature of the study around security credentials and their management, it is proposed to study such aspect in SA3. In particular, this key issue focuses on the unavailability of the API Invoker to use the certificate due to either the loss or corruption of the certificate itself or due to the loss of the corresponding private key.
Additionally, use cases such as certificate expiration management, or the management of API provider certificates are not in scope of 3GPP.
|
4e23bd4f77006ce5a3ecbeb78915f06a
|
33.700-23
|
5.4.2 Threats
|
Editor’s Note: Security threats are FFS.
|
4e23bd4f77006ce5a3ecbeb78915f06a
|
33.700-23
|
5.4.3 Potential security requirements
|
Editor’s Note: Potential security requirements are FFS.
5.X Key issue #X: <Title>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
|
4e23bd4f77006ce5a3ecbeb78915f06a
|
33.700-23
|
6 Proposed solutions
| |
4e23bd4f77006ce5a3ecbeb78915f06a
|
33.700-23
|
6.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues
|
Table 6.0-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
6.Y Solution #Y: <Title>
6.Y.1 Introduction
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
|
4e23bd4f77006ce5a3ecbeb78915f06a
|
33.700-23
|
7 Conclusions
|
Annex <X>:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253327
Skeleton
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253731
Incorporate pCRs that add S3‑253756, S3‑253757, S3‑253758, S3‑253759, S3‑253761, S3-253760
0.1.0
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
1 Scope
|
Editor’s Note: This clause is going to capture the scope of this study.
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TR 23-700-13: "Study on Architecture Support of Ambient power-enabled Internet of Things".
[3] 3GPP TR 38.848: "Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; Study on Ambient IoT (Internet of Things) in RAN".
[4] 3GPP TR 23700-30: "Study on Architecture support of Ambient power-enabled Internet of Things (AIoT); Phase 2".
[5] 3GPP TR 38.769: "Study on solutions for Ambient IoT (Internet of Things) in NR".
[6] 3GPP TS 22.369: "Service Requirements for ambient power-enabled IoT".
[7] 3GPP TS 23.369: "Architecture support for Ambient power-enabled Internet of Things; Stage 2".
[8] 3GPP TS 33.369: "Security aspects of Ambient Internet of Things (AIoT) services for isolated private networks".
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
3.2 Symbols
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4 Key issues
|
Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.1 Key Issue #1: Authorization of intermediate UE for 5G Ambient IoT services
| |
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.1.1 Key issue details
|
In TR 23.700-13 [2], Key Issues #1 and #3 describe the issues on the system architecture and procedure to support 5G Ambient IoT services, furthermore TR 23.700-30 [4], KI#1 describes the issues on the support AIoT services under the RRC-based option for UE Reader connectivity.
The architecture for topology 2 is defined in TR 23.700-13 [2] clause 8.1.3 which forms the baseline for the release 20.
In the Topology 2 as defined in TR 38.848 [3], the UE is acting as the intermediate node responsible for transferring the information between AIoT device and 5GS. If the authorization and authentication of the intermediate node is not supported, the attacker can play the role of an intermediate node and arbitrarily deny 5G AIoT service to the AIoT device.
Therefore, it is necessary to study how to authorize a UE for acting as the intermediate node i.e an AIoT reader.
NOTE: According to TR 38.769 [5], the intermediate UE for Device 1, 2b and C are all in the scope of this issue.
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.1.2 Security threats
|
Editor’s Note: Threats are FFS.
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.1.3 Potential security requirements
|
Editor’s Note: Requirements are FFS.
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.2 Key Issue #2: Authentication for AIoT devices
| |
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.2.1 Key issue details
|
DO-A capable AIOT devices can inform the network of their presence and send data to the AIOTF autonomously. The TR 23.700-30 [4] studies the architecture framework and procedure for DO-A capable AIoT devices, including the device initiated registration-like procedure and data transfer procedure.
With the capability of providing information autonomously, the existing security mechanisms (e.g. authentication procedure) specified for DT capable AIoT devices need be enhanced to accommodate DO-A use cases. The authentication between the DO-A capable AIoT device and the network is required upon device-initiated communication to validate each other’s identities. Otherwise, the attacker may impersonate the victim device and send fake identification to the network side.
In addition, the security aspects of AIoT Device 1 for public networks, e.g., authentication, should be studied to ensure the security of AIoT systems.
Therefore, it is necessary to study how to perform authentication between the AIoT device and network, addressing risks such as impersonation.
NOTE 1: For AIoT device credentials storage and processing in public networks, the AIoT device credentials storage will use UICC. The exact form factor of UICC, i.e. whether it is removable, non-removable or integrated is out of scope of 3GPP.
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.2.2 Security threats
|
Editor’s Note: Security threats are FFS.
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.2.3 Potential security requirements
|
Editor’s Note: Security requirements are FFS.
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.3 Key Issue #3: Protection of information to support DO-A Capable AIoT Devices during AIoT service communication
| |
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.3.1 Key issue details
|
As per TS 22.369 [6], Ambient power-enabled IoT (AIoT) services aim to support various use cases, including inventory taking, sensor data collection, asset tracking, and actuator control. These services intended to operate with lower power consumption and complexity than the existing IoT technologies such as eMTC, NB-IoT, and RedCap. To fulfil these requirements, AIoT devices require a communication capability.
From a security perspective, security mechanisms to protect the information transmitted during AIoT service communication need to be supported. Failure to provide such security mechanisms will lead to various attacks such as eavesdropping, manipulation and/or unauthorized transmission of the information during AIoT service communication.
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.3.2 Security threats
|
In addition to the command operation (e.g., write, read) as specified in TS 23.369 [7], DO-A Capable AIoT Device can send data to the AIOTF autonomously. The following threats are still applicable:
An attacker may acquire data transmitted to/from AIoT devices by eavesdropping messages if the communication of AIoT service is not confidentiality protected.
An attacker may manipulate information during communication of AIoT service if the communication of AIoT service is not integrity protected.
An attacker may replay a message if replay protection is not activated.
|
8ead7ee022fb2d871885d14e20dd07e7
|
33.714
|
4.3.3 Potential security requirements
|
The 5G system shall support a means to ensure confidentiality, integrity and/or replay protection of information transmitted between DO-A Capable AIoT Device and the network.
|
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