hash
stringlengths 32
32
| doc_id
stringlengths 5
12
| section
stringlengths 4
1.47k
| content
stringlengths 0
6.67M
|
|---|---|---|---|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.7.9 File/Directory Read Permissions Misuse
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.9 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.7.10 Insecure Network Services
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.10 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.7.11 Unnecessary Services
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.11 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.7.12 Log Disclosure
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.12 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.7.13 Unnecessary Applications
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.13 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.7.14 Eavesdropping
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.14 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.7.15 Security threat caused by lack of GCNP traffic isolation
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.15 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP with the following addition:
- Threat name: Security threat caused by lack of GCNP traffic isolation.
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: Absence or misconfiguration of network traffic isolation within the GCNP (Global Container Network Platform) can lead to unauthorized visibility and access to network communications between containers, pods, or services. Without proper isolation mechanisms - such as Kubernetes Network Policies, namespace segmentation, or service mesh controls - traffic can flow freely across workloads that should be isolated. This exposes sensitive data in transit, increases the risk of eavesdropping, data leakage, and lateral movement by malicious actors who compromise one component of the cluster. Attackers may intercept unencrypted or unauthorized traffic, gain insights into internal service architectures, and exploit this information to escalate attacks or exfiltrate confidential information. Effective traffic isolation is critical to maintaining confidentiality and limiting the blast radius of breaches especially in multi-tenant or complex microservices environments.
- Threatened Asset: inter-pod/network traffic confidentiality
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.7.16 Secrets in Environment Variables
|
- Threat name: Secrets in Environment Variables.
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: Storing secrets such as credentials or tokens in environment variables exposes them to significant security risks. These secrets are easily accessible by anyone with access to the container or node since environment variables can be inspected inside the container, appear in pod specs, and may be exposed in logs or debugging output. This exposure increases the chance of credential leakage, unauthorized access, and lateral movement within the cluster. Additionally, environment variables typically lack encryption at rest and in transit, have poor auditability, and are difficult to rotate once compromised, further exacerbating the risk. Attackers who access these environment variables can use the exposed secrets to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems or data.
- Threatened Asset: container runtime secrets
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.7.17 Secrets in Image Layers
|
- Threat name: Secrets in Image Layers
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: Embedding secrets, such as private keys or credentials, within container image layers exposes them to anyone who can pull or inspect the image. Even if later removed in newer layers, these secrets remain retrievable from image history. Attackers gaining access to these secrets can authenticate to sensitive systems, bypass security controls, and potentially compromise the wider environment. This risk is heightened when images are stored in public or unsecured registries without proper scanning or scrubbing.
- Threatened Asset: embedded image secrets
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.8 Denial of Service
|
The threats in all clauses of clause 5.3.7 for TR 33.926 [2] apply to GCNP.
In addition, the following threats apply to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.8.1 Resource Starvation via Orchestration
|
- Threat name: Resource Starvation via Orchestration
- Threat Category: Denial of Service.
- Threat Description: An attacker who orchestrates pods with excessive CPU and memory requests can deliberately exhaust cluster resources, causing denial of service across workloads. By scheduling malicious pods that consume disproportionate compute or memory resources without proper limits, the attacker starves legitimate applications of critical resources, leading to degraded performance, application crashes, or total service unavailability. This threat is amplified in environments lacking resource quotas, limits, or proper orchestration policies, and can also drive up cloud costs through unnecessary autoscaling. Such attacks impact cluster stability, availability, and reliability, making resource management and enforcement crucial to mitigating risk.
- Threatened Asset: cluster resource availability
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.8.2 Container Spawn Storm
|
- Threat name: Container Spawn Storm
- Threat Category: Denial of Service.
- Threat Description: An attacker who abuses the ability to create large numbers of pods or containers can overwhelm cluster resources, causing performance degradation, service disruption, and denial of service. By rapidly spawning excessive pods without proper controls or limits, the attacker exhausts CPU, memory, network, and orchestration resources, destabilizing the Kubernetes environment. This attack may also increase cloud infrastructure costs due to uncontrolled scaling. The threat is particularly severe in clusters lacking effective resource quotas, rate limiting, or admission controls, enabling the attacker to degrade availability or cause outages across multiple applications and services.
- Threatened Asset: cluster orchestration capacity
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.8.3 DoS via Log Volume
|
- Threat name: DoS via Log Volume
- Threat Category: Denial of Service.
- Threat Description: An attacker generates excessive container logs to fill storage resources, causing denial of service by exhausting disk space or overwhelming log processing systems. This attack can disrupt cluster operations, block legitimate logging and monitoring, and hinder incident detection and response. Without controls like log rate limiting, retention policies, or alerting on unusual log volumes, excessive logging can degrade cluster performance, cause service outages, and increase operational costs. This threat is especially impactful in busy Kubernetes environments where logs are critical for security and operational visibility.
- Threatened Asset: storage and logging subsystems
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.9 Elevation of privilege
|
All threats in clause 5.3.8 for TR 33.926 [2] apply to GCNP.
In addition, the following threats apply to GCNP:
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.9.1 Abuse of Linux Capabilities
|
- Threat name: Abuse of Linux Capabilities
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: An attacker who exploits excessive or unnecessary Linux capabilities (e.g. CAP_SYS_ADMIN) granted to a container can escalate privileges beyond the intended scope. Linux capabilities break down root privileges into fine-grained permissions, and when improperly assigned or not dropped, they enable a compromised container process to perform privileged actions such as modifying system configurations, accessing sensitive kernel interfaces, or escaping container isolation. This abuse can lead to full host compromise, lateral movement within the cluster, or persistent control over the Kubernetes environment. The risk increases when containers run with default or elevated capabilities without careful restriction, lacking security context settings like dropping all unused capabilities or disabling privilege escalation mechanisms. Properly restricting Linux capabilities and using Kubernetes securityContext controls (e.g., allowPrivilegeEscalation: false) is critical to mitigating this threat.
- Threatened Asset: host and container privilege boundaries
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.9.2 Privilege Escalation via Orchestration Misconfiguration
|
- Threat name: Privilege Escalation via Orchestration Misconfiguration
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: An attacker who exploits RBAC misconfiguration in a Kubernetes cluster can create pods with elevated privileges by assigning themselves roles or permissions beyond their intended scope. Misconfigured role-based access control (RBAC) settings may allow an attacker to create or modify roles and role bindings that grant them the ability to launch pods with privileged settings, such as adding capabilities, mounting host filesystems, or running in privileged mode. This can lead to container breakout, host compromise, lateral movement within the cluster, and full cluster takeover. The risk is particularly high when the attacker is allowed the escalate permission on roles or clusterroles, enabling them to escalate privileges beyond their assigned limitations.
- Threatened Asset: RBAC and orchestration policies
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.9.3 Running as Root inside Containers
|
- Threat name: Running as Root inside Containers
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: When containers run with root user privileges by default, attackers who compromise such containers gain powerful capabilities that facilitate exploitation of container breakout vulnerabilities. Root execution inside containers enables attackers to perform privileged operations, bypass container isolation, manipulate kernel interfaces, and potentially escape to the host system. This gives them the ability to gain full root access on the underlying host, escalate privileges within the cluster, and control critical resources. Running containers as root increases the risk surface for attacks leveraging known and unknown kernel or runtime vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code with minimal restrictions and achieve persistent control over the Kubernetes environment.
- Threatened Asset: container isolation enforcement
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.9.4 Use of Privileged Containers
|
- Threat name: Use of Privileged Containers
- Threat Category: Elevation of privilege
- Threat Description: Allowing containers to run in privileged mode grants them nearly unrestricted access to the host system, effectively bypassing key security mechanisms and container isolation. This elevated access enables an attacker who compromises such a container to interact directly with the host kernel, modify system files, and access sensitive data on the host and other workloads. Privileged containers can facilitate container escape, lateral movement, and full host takeover, significantly expanding the attacker’s capabilities. Running containers as privileged violates the principle of least privilege and greatly increases the risk of privilege escalation, cluster compromise, and persistence of malicious activity.
- Threatened Asset: host and cluster security controls
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
5.3.2.10 Generic assets and threats for network functions supporting SBA interfaces
|
The assets and threats for containerized network functions supporting SBA interface are the same as the assets and threats specified in clause 6 for TR 33.926 [2].
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
6 Test cases for Container-based Products
| |
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
6.1 Analysis of existing general test cases
|
The following table lists all test cases present in TS 33.117 [4] and states their applicability for GCNP.
All test cases marked with „applicable“ do not need any further work and can be applied for GCNP.
Section Nr
Section Title
Test Name
Applicability for GCNP
4.2.2.2.2
Protection at the transport layer
TC_PROTECT_TRANSPORT_LAYER
applicable
4.2.2.2.3.1
Authorization token verification failure handling within one PLMN
TC_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN_VERIFICATION_FAILURE_ONE_PLMN
applicable
4.2.2.2.3.2
Authorization token verification failure handling in different PLMNs
TC_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN_VERIFICATION_FAILURE_DIFF_PLMN
applicable
4.2.2.2.4.1
Correct handling of client credentials assertion validation failure
TC_CLIENT_CREDENTIALS_ASSERTION_VALIDATION
applicable
4.2.3.2.2
Protecting data and information -- Confidential System Internal Data
TC_CONFIDENTIAL_SYSTEM_INTERNAL_DATA
applicable
4.2.3.2.3
Protecting data and information in storage
TC_PSW_STOR_SUPPORT
applicable
4.2.3.2.4
Protecting data and information in transfer
TC_PROTECT_DATA_INFO_TRANSFER_1
applicable
4.2.3.2.5
Logging access to personal data
TC_LOGGING_ACCESS_TO_PERSONAL_DATA
applicable
4.2.3.3.2
Boot from intended memory devices only
TC_BOOT_INT_MEM_1
N/A
4.2.3.3.3
System handling during excessive overload situations
TC_SYSTEM_HANDLING_OF_OVERLOAD_SITUATIONS
applicable
4.2.3.3.5
Network Product software package integrity
TC_SW_PKG_INTEGRITY_1
Adaptation or new test case needed
Keep the same intent but validate signed OCI images/Helm charts at pull/admission time; ensure only authorized principals can change trust roots/admission policies (e.g., imagePolicyWebhook).
Validate provenance and signature of container base images as well as application layers
4.2.3.4.1.1
Successful authentication and authorization of system functions
TC_SYS_FUN_USAGE
applicable
4.2.3.4.1.2
Unambiguous identification of the user
TC_ACCOUNT_DOCUMENTATION
applicable
4.2.3.4.1.2
Unambiguous identification of the user
TC_ACCOUNT_DEFAULTS
applicable
4.2.3.4.1.2
Unambiguous identification of the user
TC_ACCOUNT_NUMBER
applicable
4.2.3.4.2.1
Account protection by at least one authentication attribute.
TC_ACCOUNT_PROTECTION
applicable
4.2.3.4.2.2
Deletion or disablement of predefined accounts
TC_PREDEFINED_ACCOUNT_DELETION
Adaptation needed
Check for predefined user accounts, service accounts, and default credentials present in container images or orchestration manifests.
Editor’s Note: It is needed to clarify whether certificate is a kind of credentials.
4.2.3.4.2.3
Deletion or disablement of predefined or default authentication attributes.
TC_PREDEFINED_AUTHENTICATION_ATTRIBUTES_DELETION
Adaptation needed
Instead of only checking for default passwords or keys on the network product’s host OS, the tester inspects container images and orchestration configuration for predefined authentication attributes, like e.g. API keys, tokens ...
Any such attributes should either:
• Trigger a forced change/rotation at first use or deployment, or
• Be replaced with dynamically generated secrets at runtime via a secure secret management mechanism.
4.2.3.4.3.1
Password Structure
TC_PASSWORD_STRUCT
applicable
4.2.3.4.3.2
Password changes
TC_PASSWORD_CHANGES
applicable
4.2.3.4.3.3
Protection against brute force and dictionary attacks
TC_PROTECT_AGAINST_BRUTE_FORCE_AND_DICTIONARY_ATTACKS
applicable
4.2.3.4.3.4
Hiding password display
TC_HIDING_PASSWORD_DISPLAY
applicable
4.2.3.4.4.1
Network Product Management and Maintenance interfaces
TC_MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION-ON_NETWORK_PRODUCT_MANAGEMENT_PROTOCOLS
applicable
4.2.3.4.5 a
Policy regarding consecutive failed login attempts
TC_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS a
applicable
4.2.3.4.5 b
Policy regarding consecutive failed login attempts
TC_FAILED_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS b
applicable
4.2.3.4.6.1
Authorization policy
TC_AUTHORIZATION_POLICY
applicable
4.2.3.4.6.2
Role-based access control
TC_RBAC_SUPPORT
applicable
4.2.3.5.1
Protecting sessions -- logout function
TC_PROTECTING_SESSION_LOGOUT
Adaptation or new test case needed
For stateless APIs, test token revocation/expiry and session invalidation on role/secret rotation rather than UI cookie sessions.
4.2.3.5.2
Protecting sessions -- Inactivity timeout
TC_PROTECTING_SESSION_INAC_TIMEOUT
4.2.3.6.1
Security event logging
TC_SECURITY_EVENT_LOGGING
Adaptation needed
Evidence and method should target container logs (stdout/err), audit logs, and orchestrator audit; verify shipping via sidecar/DaemonSet/agent rather than OS syslog alone.
Verify audit logging from Mandatory Access Control systems (AppArmor, SELinux) inside the CNF
4.2.3.6.2
Log transfer to centralized storage
TC_LOG_TRANS_TO_CENTR_STORAGE
4.2.3.6.3
Protection of security event log files
TC_EVENT_LOG
4.2.4.1.1.1
Handling of growing content
TC_HANDLING_OF_GROWING_CONTENT
Adaptation or new test case needed
Clarify to run within the pod’s network/UTS namespace and evaluate the image and pod security context (non-root, read-only FS, dropped caps) instead of host OS
4.2.4.1.1.2
Handling of ICMP
TC_HANDLING_OF_ICMP
4.2.4.1.1.3
Handling of IP options and extensions
TC_HANDLING-IP-OPTIONS-AND-EXTENSIONS
4.2.4.1.2.1
Authenticated Privilege Escalation only
TC_OS_PRIVILEGE
4.2.4.2.2
System account identification
TC_UNIQUE_SYSTEM_ACCOUNT_IDENTIFICATION
4.2.5.1
HTTPS
HTTPS
applicable
4.2.5.2.1
Webserver logging
TC_WEBSERVER_LOGGING
applicable
4.2.5.3
HTTP User sessions
TC_HTTP_USER_SESSIONS
applicable
4.2.6.2.1
Packet filtering
TC_PACKET_FILTERING
applicable
4.2.6.2.3
GTP-C Filtering
TC_GTP-C_FILTERING
applicable
4.2.6.2.4
GTP-U Filtering
TC_GTP-U_FILTERING
applicable
4.3.2.1
No unnecessary or insecure services / protocols
TC_NO_UNNECESSARY_SERVICE
Adaptation needed
Also target containerization/orchestrator APIs (e.g., kube-API, container runtime sockets) reachable from inside workloads.
4.3.2.2
Restricted reachability of services
TC_RESTRICTED_REACHABILITY_OF_SERVICES
Adaptation needed
Enforce via NetworkPolicies / service mesh policy; no wildcard allows
4.3.2.3
No unused software
TC_NO_UNUSED_SOFTWARE
Adaptation or new test case needed
Inspect container images for installed packages, binaries, or libraries not required for the CNF’s documented functionality. Remove or rebuild images without such software to reduce attack surface.
Assess OCI images & SBOMs; strip shells/pkg managers unless justified; ensure supported, patched bases
Use automated container scanning or SBOM tools (e.g., Syft/Grype).
4.3.2.4
No unused functions
TC_NO_UNUSED_FUNCTIONS
Adaptation or new test case needed
Review deployment manifests, Helm charts, and application configs to ensure disabled/undocumented features, debug endpoints, or optional APIs are not present or exposed in running containers.
Use automated container scanning or SBOM tools (e.g., Syft/Grype).
4.3.2.5
No unsupported components
TC_NO_UNSUPPORTED_COMPONENTS
Adaptation or new test case needed
Verify base images, libraries, and runtime dependencies in container images are vendor-supported and security-patched; replace unsupported OS layers or packages before deployment.
Use automated container scanning or SBOM tools (e.g., Syft/Grype).
4.3.2.6
Remote login restrictions for privileged users
TC_REMOTE_LOGIN_RESTRICTIONS_PRIVILEGED_USERS
applicable
4.3.2.7
Filesystem Authorization privileges
TC_FILESYSTEM_AUTHORIZATION_PRIVILEGES
applicable
4.3.3.1.1
IP-Source address spoofing mitigation
TC_IP_SPOOFING_MITIGATION
applicable
4.3.3.1.2
Minimized kernel network functions
TC_PROXY_ARP_DISABLING
applicable
4.3.3.1.2
Minimized kernel network functions
TC_DIRECTED_BROAD_DISABLING
applicable
4.3.3.1.2
Minimized kernel network functions
TC_IP_MULTICAST_HANDLING
applicable
4.3.3.1.2
Minimized kernel network functions
TC_GRATUITOUS_ARP_DISABLING
Adaptation or new test case needed
In containers, ARP behaviour is often governed by the node kernel/CNI. Scope the test to the pod namespace (send/observe) or mark N/A if the CNF cannot influence L2
4.3.3.1.2
Minimized kernel network functions
TC_BROADCAST_ICMP_HANDLING
applicable
4.3.3.1.3
No automatic launch from removable media
TC_NO_AUTO_LAUNCH_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA
N/A
4.3.3.1.4
SYN Flood Prevention
TC_SYN_FLOOD_PREVENTION
applicable
4.3.3.1.5
Protection from buffer overflows
TC_PROTECTION_FROM_BUFFER_OVERFLOW
applicable
4.3.3.1.6
External file system mount restrictions
TC_EXTERNAL_FILE_SYSTEM_MOUNT_RESTRICTIONS
applicable
4.3.4.2
No system privileges for web server
TC_NO_SYSTEM_PRIVILEGES_WEB_SERVER
applicable
4.3.4.3
No unused HTTP methods
TC_NO_UNUSED_HTTP_METHODS
applicable
4.3.4.4
No unused add-ons
TC_NO_UNUSED_ADD-ONS
applicable
4.3.4.5
No compiler
TC_NO_COMPILER_FOR_CGI
applicable
4.3.4.6
No CGI or other scripting for uploads
TC_NO_CGI_OR_SCRIPTING_FOR_UPLOADS
applicable
4.3.4.7
No execution of system commands with SSI
TC_NO_EXECUTION_OF_SYSTEM_COMMANDS
applicable
4.3.4.8
Access rights for web server configuration
TC_ACCESS_RIGHTS_WEB_SERVER_FILES
applicable
4.3.4.9
No default content
TC_NO_DEFAULT_CONTENT
applicable
4.3.4.10
No directory listings
TC_NO_DIRECTORY_LISTINGS
applicable
4.3.4.11
Web server information in HTTP headers
TC_NO_WEB_SERVER_HEADER_INFORMATION
applicable
4.3.4.12
Web server information in error pages
TC_NO_WEB_SERVER_ERROR_PAGES_INFORMATION
applicable
4.3.4.13
Minimized file type mappings
TC_NO_WEB_SERVER_FILE_TYPE MAPPINGS
applicable
4.3.4.14
Restricted file access
TC_RESTRICTED_FILE_ACCESS
applicable
4.3.5.1
Traffic Separation
TC_TRAFFIC_SEPARATION
Adaptation or new test case needed
Verify that control plane, user plane, and management/OAM traffic are isolated at the container networking level — e.g., by using separate Kubernetes network policies, CNI configurations, service mesh policy enforcement, namespaces, or dedicated interfaces — so that no pod or container can send or receive traffic outside its assigned plane.
4.3.6.2
No code execution or inclusion of external resources by JSON parsers
TC_JSON_PARSER_CODE_EXEC_INCL
applicable
4.3.6.3
Unique key values in Information Elements (IEs)
TC_UNIQUE_KEY_VALUES
applicable
4.3.6.4
The valid format and range of values for IEs
TC_IE_VALUE_FORMAT
applicable
4.4.2
Port scanning
TC_BVT_PORT_SCANNING
applicable
4.4.3
Vulnerability scanning
TC_BVT_VULNERABILITY_SCANNING
Adaptation needed
Adapt to running vulnerability scans against container images and, where applicable, the running containers to identify known CVEs in OS packages, libraries, or application code, using tools that understand container layers and registries, and ensuring findings are addressed before deployment.
4.4.4
Robustness and fuzz testing
TC_BVT_ROBUSTNESS_AND_FUZZ_TESTING
applicable
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
6.1.1 Security functional requirements deriving from containerization and related test cases
| |
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
6.1.1.1 Security non-functional requirements related to passwords
|
All text from TS 33.117 [1], clause 4.2.3.4.3 applies to containerized elements.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
6.1.1.2 Security requirements related to logging
|
All text from TS 33.117 [1], clauses 4.2.3.6.1, 4.2.3.6.2 and 4.2.3.6.3 apply to containerized elements.
Requirement Name: Logs from containerized functions are available
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall provide sufficient logging mechanisms (e.g., stdout/stderr container logs, audit logs, orchestrator audit, audit log from MAC, like AppArmor or SELinux). Security and Audit logs shall be collected and stored allowing security monitoring, forensic and threat detection. The possibility of forwarding relevant Security and Audit logs to external SIEM system must be in place (e.g., Syslog over TLS, REST API over HTTPS, SFTP).
Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_LOGGING_CAPABILITIES
Purpose:
Ensure that Security and Audit logs are collected and stored allowing security monitoring, forensic and threat detection.
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester reviews the documentation provided by the vendor describing how logs from containerized functions are being handled and verifies that this in line with the requirement description
2. The tester verifies the forwarding to an external SIEM by enabling log forwarding, triggering a security event and verifying at the SIEM, that the event has been forwarded.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots containing the information gathered from documentation.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
6.1.1.3 Using trusted image repositories for container image handling
|
Requirement Name: Securing container function source by using trusted image repositories
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall use trusted/private source image repositories while building the container image.
Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_IMAGE_REPOSITORIES
Purpose:
Ensure that containers are built using trusted image bases. Images coming from untrusted/public source code repositories (e.g., Public-DockerHub) shall not be used due to risk factors.
- HTTPS protocol for accessing internal repositories shall be used.
- Trust level of image content shall be checked to ensure source and integrity of the image.
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester reviews the documentation provided by the vendor describing the container build procedure and listing trusted image repositories.
2. For dynamically built containers the tester reviews the build configuration.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots of the configuration or documentation.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
6.1.1.4 Vulnerability scanning for containerized NF
|
All text from TS 33.117 [1], clause 4.4.3 applies to containerized elements. Because of the nature of containerized applications and their high dependency on 3rd party software specific vulnerability scanning tools need to be used. Therefore, the test case TC_BVT_VULNERABILITY_SCANNING specified in 4.4.3 need to be enhanced with the testcase below.
Requirement Name: Securing container functions by vulnerability scanning
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall not contain any known vulnerabilities.
Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_VULNERABILITY_SCANNING
Purpose:
Ensure that containers are not containing any known vulnerabilities. Trust level of image content shall be checked to ensure security and integrity of the image. Vulnerability scanning of container image shall be performed during development phase, discovering the vulnerabilities, and remediating those vulnerabilities before Developer/SO ships the container image to the Container registries. Vulnerabilities shall be resolved, and validated security patches shall be installed in a timely manner by the vendor.
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester runs suitable vulnerability analysis tool to scan containers for known vulnerabilities.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots of the configuration or documentation, snapshots from vulnerability scanner.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
6.1.1.5 Containerized NF run-time security
|
Requirement Name: Securing container functions by configuration and hardening testing
Requirement Description:
The containerized NF shall not contain any known misconfigurations.
Test Name: TC_SECURE_CONTAINER_CONFIGURATION
Purpose:
Ensure proper Security hardening was performed. Apart from vulnerability scan of container image, analysis of container security measures implemented for FN in running state shall be performed. Test should prove that all misconfigurations were resolved, and validated security patches were installed.
Container and orchestrator in a running state shall be hardened in relation to security benchmark (e.g., CIS benchmark or other common auditing tools). Network Access Policies shall be configured for securing containerized functions by default. If network segmentation in applicable, related policies preventing lateral movement across containers should be present. Security polices shall be configured for securing PODs and Containers where applicable. Usage of Privileged container, Default Namespace, Ports, Services, Public IP Address etc. shall be restricted.
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester runs a benchmark analysis tool to scan container for known misconfigurations.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots of the configuration or documentation, snapshots from benchmark tool.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
6.1.1.6 Data protection in containerized NF
|
All text from TS 33.117 [1], clause 4.2.3.2.3 applies to containerized elements. Encryption at-rest, in-transit shall be applied for control plane and data plane. Secrets, credentials, keys shall be securely stored in secure way, and the access rights to those secrets, credential, keys shall be restricted rather than keeping them in configuration file.
Execute the following steps:
1. Review the documentation provided by the vendor describing data handling procedures.
2. Run container vulnerability analysis tool or a configuration check tool capable of analysing the way secrets are stored by the containerized functions.
3. Ensure secrets, keys, credentials are not stored in plain text.
Expected format of evidence:
Snapshots of the configuration or documentation, snapshots from security testing tool.
Editor’s Note: The requirement and threat references will be edited during normative phase.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
6.2 Potential new test cases for GCNP
|
The following table lists potential new test cases for GCNP currently not covered by existing test cases.
Test Name
Purpose
Threat Reference
TC_CNF_NO_EXPOSED_CONTAINERIZATION_API
Ensure kube-API / container runtime sockets aren’t reachable from workloads.
Related to “Exposed Containerization API” threat.
Exposed Containerization API
5.3.2.5.8
TC_CNF_NO_UNUSED_CAPABILITIES
Explicitly check for Linux caps in pod security context (drop all; no CAP_SYS_ADMIN/NET_ADMIN/PTRACE unless justified).
Abuse of Linux Capabilities
5.3.2.9.1
TC_CNF_IMAGE_PROVENANCE_AND_SIGNATURE
Verify signed OCI images/Helm at pull/admission (distinct from classic SW package integrity).
Editor’s Note: Additional description is needed to explain about the aforementioned distinction.
Software Tampering
5.3.2.5.1
TC_CNF_REGISTRY_SECURITY
authN/Z, TLS, signing, and scanning on the image registry to deter Image Registry Tampering
Image Registry Tampering
5.3.2.5.9
TC_CNF_NO_SECRETS_IN_ENV
Forbid or securely use (e.g., encrytped) credentials/tokens in env vars; check manifests/pods/logs
Secrets in Environment Variables
5.3.2.7.16
TC_CNF_NO_SECRETS_IN_IMAGE_LAYERS
Ensure no embedded keys/passwords in layers/history or they are used in a secure way (e.g., encrypted); use SBOM
Secrets in Image Layers
5.3.2.7.17
TC_CNF_POD_SECURITY_ENFORCEMENT
Admission/Pod Security must enforce non-root, read-only FS, no privileged, minimal caps, no hostPath/hostNetwork unless justified (covers Elevation of Privileges threats).
Privilege Escalation via Orchestration Misconfiguration
5.3.2.9.2;
Running as Root inside Containers
5.3.2.9.3;
Use of Privileged Containers
5.3.2.9.4
TC_CNF_RESOURCE_QUOTAS_AND_LIMITS
Quotas/limits/rate-limits to block Resource Starvation and Container Spawn Storm
Resource Starvation via Orchestration
5.3.2.8.1;
Container Spawn Storm
5.3.2.8.2
TC_CNF_LOG_VOLUME_GUARDRAILS
Rate-limit & rotate logs; alert on spikes to mitigate DoS via Log Volume
DoS via Log Volume
5.3.2.8.3
TC_CNF_ORCHESTRATOR_AUDIT_LOGGING
kube-audit enabled, retained, and secured (authZ changes, pod/role/secret ops, pulls, admission). Complements but goes beyond “security event logging.”
Orchestrator Audit Logs Disabled
5.3.2.6.3
TC_CNF_CENTRAL_USER_AUTH
Test CNF’s ability to integrate with external auth (RADIUS, TACACS+, LDAP)
Service Account Token Abuse
5.3.2.4.8
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
|
7 Conclusions
|
Editor's Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
Annex A:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA3#123
TR skeleton
0.0.0
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-253038
Incorporating skeleton (S3-252890) and scope (S3-252710)
0.1.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253722
Incorporating S3‑253147, S3‑253148, S3‑253149, S3‑253719, S3‑253720 and S3‑253721
0.2.0
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] IETF RFC 9700: "Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security".
…
[x] <doctype> <#>[ ([up to and including]{yyyy[-mm]|V<a[.b[.c]]>}[onwards])]: "<Title>".
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
3.2 Symbols
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
4 Overview
|
Editor’s Note: This clause includes the overview of the study.
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
5 Best practices and counter measures analysis
| |
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
5.1 Best practice #1: Protecting redirect-based flows
| |
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
5.1.1 Description
|
This best practice addresses protecting redirect-based flows, as described in clause 2.1 of RFC 9700 [2].
Redirect-based flows are not used in token-based authorization in the context of 5G SBA.
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
5.1.2 Related security mechanisms
|
Security mechanisms related to protecting redirect-based flows are not applicable to 5G SBA.
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
5.1.3 Evaluation
|
Further investigation of security mechanisms related to protecting redirect-based flows is not required.
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
5.2 Best practice #2: Resource owner password credentials grant
| |
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
52.1 Description
|
This best practice addresses resource owner password credentials grant, as described in clause 2.4 of RFC 9700 [2].
Resource owner password credentials grant is not used in token-based authorization in the context of 5G SBA.
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
5.2.2 Related security mechanisms
|
Security mechanisms related to resource owner password credentials grant are not applicable to 5G SBA.
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
5.2.3 Evaluation
|
Further investigation of security mechanisms related to resource owner password credentials grant is not required.
5.X BSP#X: <Title>
5.X.1 Description of best practice
Editor’s Note: This clause identifies and documents the target measure/practice and includes the precise reference from RFC 9700 and RFC 8725. The intention is not to copy content but a condense summary of the exact practice/measure captured from the RFCs.
5.X.2 Usage in 5G SBA
Editor’s Note: This clause discusses for the security related mechanism that are outlined in the RFC 9700 and RFC 8725 whether and how those are being applied in current 3GPP specifications, e.g., token replay, token validation, JWT signature bypass, etc. References to the specification clause in 33.501 will be given.
Reference:
A summary of the TS text reference
Reference:
A summary of the TS text reference
5.X.3 Assessment
Editor’s Note: Short info on whether controls/measures in SBA are optional and mandatory / applied or not applied. reference to the suggestion from RFC on mitigation for controls not applied.
|
a0b113714dcc0ebc7bd5161162acae15
|
33.755
|
6 Conclusions
|
Editor’s Note: This clause provides a conclusion for relevant assessment results. Whether the best practice is relevant in 5G and whether it has been applied? Statement on what to do with relevant best practices that are not applied in 5G?
Editor’s Note: Provide a statement on whether future steps are envisioned.
Annex A (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10-17
SA3#124
S3-253778
Skeleton
0.0.1
2025-10-20
SA3#124
S3-253736
Incorporate pCR’s S3-253498, S3-253499
0.1.0
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31
|
33.768
|
1 Scope
|
The scope of this document is to study the security aspects of the solutions provided in TR 29.867 [2].
NOTE 1: The potential solutions are assumed to not weaken the IMS security.
NOTE 2: It is assumed that the same PLMN has control of both the IMS system and 5GC.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31
|
33.768
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TR 29.867: "Study on IMS resiliency".
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31
|
33.768
|
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31
|
33.768
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31
|
33.768
|
3.2 Symbols
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31
|
33.768
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31
|
33.768
|
4 Overview
|
Editor’s Note: This clause includes the overview applicable for the study.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31
|
33.768
|
5 Key issues
|
Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31
|
33.768
|
6 Solutions
|
Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31
|
33.768
|
6.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
|
Editor's Note: This clause contains a table mapping between key issues and solutions.
Table 6.1-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#X
KI#Y
KI#Z
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
|
23ce66f9e0712435a22db29d79f5bf31
|
33.768
|
7 Conclusions
|
Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
Annex <X>: Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253609
Skeleton for TR 33.768
0.0.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253724
S3‑253754
0.1.0
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
1 Scope
|
The present document studies the complexities involved with the introduction of standalone and/or hybrid Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms in existing security protocols used by 5G specifications. These security protocols and their associated algorithms have been listed in TR 33.938 [2] “3GPP Cryptographic Inventory”. Specifically,
• Studies principles and attributes of PQC relevant to use in 3GPP procedures.
- Studies the impact of using hybrid and standalone PQC algorithms in 3GPP procedures
- Impact to 3GPP procedures due to larger length of PQC key, signature, and message compared to the length of those in traditional cryptography.
- Determines security levels (I-V) required to align with existing 3GPP procedures level of assurance.
- Studies the suitability of classes of post-quantum signature algorithms (e.g., lattice-based, hash-based) to 3GPP procedures.
• Identifies the protocols with asymmetric cryptography listed in TR 33.938 [2] that are not expected to be updated by other Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) in a near future to use PQC, e.g., MIKEY-SAKKE and SUCI calculation
• Studies security threats and alternative solutions for the 3GPP procedures if they are not updated to use PQC.
• Documents the expected timeline for when security protocols defined by other SDOs will include PQC algorithms and be available for inclusion into 3GPP procedures. The timeline includes the availability of stable protocols.
• Studies solutions to update 3GPP defined security protocols (for example SUCI calculation) to use the appropriate PQC algorithm, if those protocols are not expected to be updated by other SDOs to use PQC algorithms.
The present document is Generation agnostic.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TR 33.938: "3GPP Cryptographic Inventory".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.180: "Security of the Mission Critical (MC) service".
[4] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G System".
[5] PQUIP draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers: "Post-Quantum Cryptography for Engineers".
[6] IETF RFC 6509: ''MIKEY-SAKKE: Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)''.
[7] IETF RFC 9794: "Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes".
[8] NIST IR 8547: "Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards".
[9] SECG SEC 1: "Recommended Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Version 2.0, 2009. Available at http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf.
[10] SECG SEC 2: "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", Version 2.0, 2010. Available at http://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf.
[11] EU, Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography
https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/eu-reinforces-its-cybersecurity-post-quantum-cryptography
[12] UK NCSC, Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines
[13] NSA, The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 and Quantum Computing FAQ
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/0/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF
[14] ANSSI, Guide des Mécanismes cryptoraphiques
https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2021/03/anssi-guide-mecanismes_crypto-2.04.pdf
[15] ASD, Guidelines for cryptography
https://www.cyber.gov.au/business-government/asds-cyber-security-frameworks/ism/cybersecurity-guidelines/guidelines-for-cryptography
[16] Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, Roadmap for the migration to post-quantum cryptography
https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/roadmap-migration-post-quantum-cryptography-government-canada-itsm40001
[17] Swedish NCSC, Kvantsäker kryptografi
https://www.ncsc.se/sv/aktuellt/kvantsaker-kryptografi/
[18] NSM Cryptographic Recommendations
https://nsm.no/getfile.php/1314334-1742808614/NSM/Filer/Dokumenter/Veiledere/NSM%20Cryptographic%20Recommendations%202025.pdf
[19] AIVD, The PQC Migration Handbook
https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documenten/publications/2024/12/3/the-pqc-migration-handbook/The+PQC+Migration+Handbook+.pdf
[20] 3GPP, Release Timeline
https://www.3gpp.org/specifications-technologies/releases/release-20
[21] NIST FIPS 203: "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard"
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203
[22] NIST FIPS 204: "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard"
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204
[23] NIST FIPS 205: "Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard"
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.205
[24] OpenSSH 10.0 Introduces Default Post-Quantum Key Exchange Algorithm https://quantumcomputingreport.com/openssh-10-0-introduces-default-post-quantum-key-exchange-algorithm
[25] Cloudflare Radar https://radar.cloudflare.com/adoption-and-usage#post-quantum-encryption-adoption
[26] A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/coordinated-implementation-roadmap-transition-post-quantum-cryptography
[27] Next steps in preparing for post-quantum cryptography https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/next-steps-preparing-for-post-quantum-cryptography
[28] PQC Transition in France ANSSI Views https://cyber.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/document/pqc-transition-in-france.pdf
[29] ANSSI plan for post-quantum transition https://pkic.org/events/2023/pqc-conference-amsterdam-nl/pkic-pqcc_jerome-plut_anssi_anssi-plan-for-post-quantum-transition.pdf
[30] ETSI TS 103 744: "Quantum-safe Hybrid Key Establishment". https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103700_103799/103744/01.02.01_60/ts_103744v010201p.pdf
[31] FIPS 202: "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions". https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf
[32] SP 800-185: "~SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash". https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf
[33] GSMA: "Post Quantum Cryptography – Guidelines for Telecom Use Cases - v2.0"
[34] IETF RFC 5869 "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
[35] IETF RFC 7748: "Elliptic Curves for Security".
[36] FN-DSA: Falcon is a cryptographic signature algorithm submitted to NIST, Refer to https://falcon-sign.info/falcon.pdf
[37] NIST: “Submission Requirements and Evaluation Criteria for the Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process “,
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography/documents/call-for-proposals-final-dec-2016.pdf
[38] Bernstein, D.J. (2009): "Introduction to post-quantum cryptography ", 2009. Available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88702-7_1
[39] NIST IR 8545: “Status Report on the Fourth Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process”, 2025. Available at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8545/final
[40] NIST, "Considerations for Achieving Cryptographic Agility: Strategies and Practices," CSWP 39, Jul. 2025. [Online]. Available: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/cswp/39/considerations-for-achieving-cryptographic-agility/2pd
[41] IETF RFC 7696: “Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms”.
[42] IETF: “About RFCs”. Available at https://www.ietf.org/process/rfcs/.
[43] IETF RFC 9242: "Intermediate Exchange in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) "
[44] IETF RFC 9370: "Multiple Key Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) "
[45] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) ", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem/.
[46] IETF RFC 9593: "Announcing Supported Authentication Methods in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"
[47] IETF RFC 8784: "Mixing Preshared Keys in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) for Post-quantum Security"
[48] IETF Draft (Standards Track): " Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) using PQC ", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth/.
[49] IETF RFC 7383: "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Message Fragmentation". https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7383
[50] IETF RFC 9763: "Related Certificates for Use in Multiple Authentications within a Protocol "
[51] IETF RFC 9802: "Use of the HSS and XMSS Hash-Based Signature Algorithms in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure"
[52] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) ", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates/.
[53] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Algorithm Identifiers for SLH-DSA", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-x509-slhdsa/.
[54] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates/.
[55] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "Composite ML-KEM for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem/.
[56] IETF Draft (Standards Track): "A Mechanism for X.509 Certificate Discovery", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-certdiscovery/.
[57] IETF RFC 5246: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"
[58] IETF RFC 8446: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3"
[59] 3GPP TS 33.210: "Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security"
[60] IETF Draft draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-08: "TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze "
[61] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/123/materials/slides-123-tls-wg-status-00
[62] https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/2058/
[63] IETF Draft draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-16: "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3". https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/.
[64] IETF Draft draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-04: "ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3". https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-mlkem/.
[65] IETF Draft draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem-01: "Post-quantum hybrid ECDHE-MLKEM Key Agreement for TLSv1.3". https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem/.
[66] IETF Draft draft-ietf-tls-mldsa-01: "Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-mldsa/
[67] IETF Draft draft-ietf-jose-pqc-kem-03: "Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) for JOSE and COSE"
[68] IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-08: "ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE"
[69] IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus-05: "SLH-DSA for JOSE and COSE"
[70] IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-falcon-01: "JOSE and COSE Encoding for Falcon"
[71] IETF Draft (Standards Track): “Use of Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) with JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)”, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-hpke-encrypt/.
[72] IETF Draft (Standards Track): “Use of Hybrid Public-Key Encryption (HPKE) with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)”, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-hpke/.
[73] NIST SP 800-227 Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, url: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/227/ipd
[74] 3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification".
[75] NIST.SP.800-56 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography. url: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
[76] Galois Counter Mode with Strong Secure Tags (GCM-SST). https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mattsson-cfrg-aes-gcm-sst
[77] Ericssons comments on NIST SP 800-227 (Initial Public Draft). https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/sp/800/227/ipd/docs/sp800-227-ipd-public-comments-received.pdf
[78] IETF Draft (Standards Track): " Mixing Preshared Keys in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE and in the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchanges of IKEv2 for Post-quantum Security", https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt/.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
3.1 Terms
|
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
3.2 Symbols
|
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
3.3 Abbreviations
|
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
ANSSI Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
CA Certification Authority
CBOR Concise Binary Object Representation
COSE CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
CRL Certificate Revocation Lists
CRQC Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman key Exchange
ECIES Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
FN-DSA Fast-Fourier Transform over NTRU-Lattice-Based DSA
HBS Hash-Based Signature
HQC Hamming Quasi-Cyclic
HSS Hierarchical Signature System
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
JWE JSON Web Encryption
JWS JSON Web Signature
KEM Key Encapsulation Mechanism
MIKEY-SAKKE Multimedia Internet KEYing – Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption
ML-DSA Module-Lattice-Based DSA
ML-KEM Module Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
NCSC National Cyber Security Centre
NSA National Security Agency
NSM National Security Memorandum
NTRU Nth-degree Truncated Polynomial Ring Units
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PKIX Public Key Infrastructure X.509
PQC Post-Quantum Cryptography
SA Security Association
SDO Standards Development Organizations
SECG Security Engineering & Consulting Group
SLH-DSA Stateless Hash-Based DSA
SUCI Subscription Concealed Identifier
TLS 1.2 Transport Layer Security Version 1.2
TLS 1.3 Transport Layer Security Version 1.3
XMSS eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
4 Overview
|
4.1 Background Information
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
4.1.1 General
|
The security protocols that use symmetric and/or asymmetric cryptography in 3GPP systems are listed in TR 33.938 [2]. Particularly, 3GPP heavily depends on IETF standards for the usages of public-key cryptography. All the security protocols using traditional asymmetric cryptography are vulnerable to attacks using a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC).
Given the wide variation in requirements, specifications, technical capabilities, and implementation maturity across protocols, this study is organized by security protocols. Each major protocol (such as COSE, IKEv2, JWE, JWS, MIKEY-SAKKE, SUCI, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3) is covered in a separate clause.
This study does not focus on any particular generation of mobile networks and analyses various aspects that will be useful for PQC migration.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
4.1.2 Transition Timeline
|
Editor’s Note: More timeline information from other organizations is ffs.
Countries and agencies around the world are generally aligned on the need to migrate to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The common recommendation is to complete migration for high priority systems by around 2030 and for all systems by approximately 2035. Examples of government-issued PQC migration timelines can be found in [8, 11–19]. Whether a system is high priority or not is determined by a variety of factors such as how long the data needs to remain confidentiality protected and what level of risk is the data owner willing to bear. Some parts of telecommunications systems may be assessed by the network operator to be of high priority.
Although the migration of signature-based authentication in protocols such as TLS and IPsec is typically not prioritized for transition until 2035, transitioning Public Key Infrastructures (PKI), which are necessary to support signature-based authentication, often takes a decade or more, making it critical to begin their transition almost immediately.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the above timelines apply to deployments. For full PQC adoption in deployed systems, it is essential that standards are updated, and stable implementations are made available well in advance of those deployment milestones. The timelines for different stakeholders in the ecosystem, such as standards development organizations (SDO), equipment vendors, and operators deploying the systems are inherently different. Standards bodies need to finalize specifications early, vendors need sufficient lead time to implement, test, and certify solutions, and only then can large-scale deployments take place.
3GPP Rel-20 specification is expected to be frozen in the mid-2027 [20]. Rel-21 specification can be expected to be completed in the beginning of 2029 at the earliest. It should be considered that some vendors and operators require to meet the 2030 migration timeline for high priority systems.
4.1.3 PQ and PQT Algorithm Standards
There are three principal alternatives to traditional asymmetric cryptographic algorithms which have progressed furthest in relevant standards bodies. These are ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key encapsulation, and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for digital signature [21–23]. These are standards designed by cryptographers from all over the world, and they form the basis for recommendations from a number of agencies. These recommendations vary between organisations and include both standalone and hybrid transition paths.
Most governments require use of standardized PQC algorithms, such as the already standardized ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) [21–23]. With the publication of ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has quickly moved from research to implementation and deployment. Some agencies recommend standalone ML-KEM and ML-DSA [13, 27], while others recommend that lattice-based algorithms (ML-KEM and ML-DSA) be hybridized [26, 28] with, for example, elliptic curve-based algorithms (ECDHE and ECDSA). The hash-based algorithm (SLH-DSA) doesn’t need to be hybridized as hash algorithms are better understood by the cryptographic research community and have also been cryptanalyzed far longer than lattices, and governments currently do not recommend SLH-DSA to be hybridized [28, 29].
ML-KEM is an algorithm for key encapsulation. It is a replacement for ECDH(E) key exchanges (note that RSA key encipherment has largely been deprecated). Both standalone and hybrid versions have relatively mature implementations available (e.g. OpenSSL 3.5 LTS) and are progressing through other SDOs (e.g. the TLS WG in IETF), with the hybrid version receiving more attention. In TLS, X25519MLKEM has already seen massive implementation support. It has been reported [25] that over 40% of all HTTPS client requests use PQC. OpenSSL 3.5 LTS supports ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA. OpenSSH is now using mlkem768x25519-sha256 as the default key exchange [24]. Many IKEv2 implementations support ML-KEM. See clause 6 for further details broken down by protocol.
ML-DSA is an algorithm for digital signature. While the IETF and real-world deployments have embraced hybrid KEMs, hybrid signatures have not seen similar adoption. SLH-DSA is a special purpose digital signature algorithm, owing to its significantly large key sizes and slow operation times — making it unsuitable for general use cases like short-lived certificates or high-throughput applications, but excellent for specific tasks such as firmware signing and code signing where long signing times and large signature sizes are not prohibitive. Implementations of standalone versions of both ML-DSA and SLH-DSA are also available (e.g. OpenSSL 3.5 LTS). There is more progress to date integrating standalone ML-DSA into protocols than either hybrid ML-DSA or standalone SLH-DSA. See clause 6 for further details broken down by protocol.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
4.2 General Assumptions
|
In the present document, PQC is referred to as cryptographic algorithms that are deemed to be secure against attacks from both classical and quantum computing.
All traditional public key cryptographic algorithms used in 3GPP systems need to be migrated to PQC algorithms. If suitable PQC options are not available, then an alternative path needs to be provided and justified, e.g., deprecation, mitigation, and re-architecting.
The PQC options are to be drawn from well-studied standardised primitives and protocols.
Both hybrid and standalone KEM are in the scope of this study. Standalone and hybrid signatures are also in the scope of this study.
Editor’s Note: Further general assumptions are FFS.
5 Principles and attributes of PQC to use in 3GPP procedures
Editor’s Note: This clause contains impact of using hybrid and standalone PQC algorithms in 3GPP procedures, impact to 3GPP procedures due to larger length of PQC key, signature, and message compared to the length of those in traditional cryptography, security levels (I-V) required to align with existing 3GPP procedures level of assurance, suitability of classes of post-quantum signature algorithms (e.g., lattice-based, hash-based) to 3GPP procedures.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
5.1 PQC security level
|
The NIST use the concept of security levels/security strength categories to group algorithms, keys, and protocols related to PQC [37]. Security is defined as a function of resources comparable to or greater than those required to break AES and SHA2/SHA3 algorithms, i.e., key search on block cipher for AES and collision search on a 256-bit hash function for SHA2/SHA3. The security strength is broadly grouped into the following 5 levels [8] and to each of the PQ security levels, the corresponding traditional and post-quantum algorithm can be mapped:
Level 1: At least as hard as breaking AES-128 (key search on block cipher) , PQC-Algorithm: ML-KEM-512 [21], FN-DSA-512 [36], SLH-DSA-SHA2/SHAKE-128f/s [23]
Level 2: At least as hard as breaking SHA-256/SHA3-256 (collision search on a 256-bit hash function), PQC-Algorithm: ML-DSA-44 [22]
Level 3: At least as hard as breaking AES-192 (key search on block cipher), PQC-Algorithm: ML-KEM-768 [21], ML-DSA-65 [22], SLH-DSA-SHA2/SHAKE-192f/s [23]
Level 4: At least as hard as breaking SHA-384/SHA3-384 (collision search on a 256-bit hash function), PQC-Algorithm: No algorithm tested at this level
Level 5: At least as hard as breaking AES-256 (key search on block cipher), PQC-Algorithm: ML-KEM-1024 [21], FN-DSA-1024 [36], ML-DSA-87 [22], SLH-DSA-SHA2/SHAKE-256f/s [23]
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
5.2 Hybrid and standalone schemes
|
Post-Quantum Traditional (PQT) hybrid scheme as defined in RFC 9794 [7] is a multi-algorithm scheme where at least one component algorithm is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional algorithm. Both the PQT hybrid scheme and the standalone PQC scheme are considered in the present document.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
5.3 Cryptographic agility
|
Cryptographic agility [40, 41] refers to the capabilities needed to replace and adapt cryptographic algorithms while preserving security and ongoing operations. The 3GPP systems need to consider cryptographic agility.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
5.4 PQC algorithm types and cryptographic diversity
|
PQC algorithms can be categorized based on different mathematical foundations. The following are a few typical types of PQC algorithms [38, 5]: Lattice-based cryptography, Hash-based cryptography, Multivariate cryptography, Code-based cryptography, and Isogeny-based cryptography.
NOTE: The types for NIST selected algorithms are as follows: ML-KEM for key encapsulation, ML-DSA for digital signature, and FN-DSA for digital signature are all Lattice-based algorithms; SLH-DSA for digital signature is a Hash-based algorithm; and HQC is a Code-based algorithm for digital signature.
Cryptographic diversity is the practice of having different types of PQC algorithms available. This provides resilience against future attacks in case that a weakness or vulnerability is discovered in one type of algorithm, when other types of algorithms will remain unaffected. For example, NIST has chosen SLH-DSA as a backup algorithm for ML-DSA and HQC algorithm as a backup for ML-KEM [39]. A key enabler for this is cryptographic agility so that if an algorithm is broken it can be removed and replaced with an alternative without undue disruption.
6 Protocols expected to be updated for PQC by other SDOs
Editor’s Note: This clause contains the expected timeline for when security protocols defined by other SDOs will include PQC algorithms and be available for inclusion into 3GPP procedures. The timeline includes the availability of stable protocols.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.1 General
|
According to the inventory in TR 33.938 [2], many security protocols and algorithms used in 3GPP (e.g. (D)TLS, IKEv2, JWE, JWS, etc.) are specified in other standard organizations (e.g. IETF). They are expected to be updated using PQC in the corresponding organizations.
In this clause, the progress of the post-quantum migration of these protocols are reported. Mature specifications developed by related SDOs will be given priority consideration. In addition, whether the relevant solutions can be directly applied to specific 3GPP scenarios will be evaluated.
The present document discusses several IETF documents that are at different levels of maturity in the overall IETF standardization process [42], and categorizes them as follows:
• IETF Individual Draft: A document that has been submitted to IETF and has not been adopted by one of the working groups in IETF. On the IETF Datatracker website, such documents have type “Active Internet-Draft (individual)”.
• IETF WG Draft: A document that has been reviewed and adopted by one of the working groups in IETF. On the IETF Datatracker website, such documents have type “Active Internet-Draft (xyz WG)”, where xyz is the name of the working group that adopted the document, e.g., tls.
• IETF RFC: A document that has gone through the whole IETF standardization process.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.2 COSE
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.2.1 General
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.2.2 Current Work in IETF
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.2.2.1 IETF RFCs
|
No RFCs for the usage of PQC algorithms in COSE are published yet.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.2.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
|
The IETF is developing support for PQC algorithms in COSE. The following drafts are relevant:
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-jose-pqc-kem-03, "Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) for JOSE and COSE" [67], describes the conventions for using Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ-KEMs) within JOSE and COSE.
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-08, "ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE" [68], describes JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) serializations for Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA).
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus-05: "SLH-DSA for JOSE and COSE" [69], describes JOSE and COSE serializations for SLH-DSA.
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-falcon-01, "JOSE and COSE Encoding for Falcon" [70], describes JSON and CBOR serializations.
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-hpke-16, "Use of Hybrid Public-Key Encryption (HPKE) with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)" [72] defines a Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) for use with JOSE utilizing an asymmetric Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), a Key Derivation Function (KDF), and an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm.
However, no IETF work on hybrid signature schemes for COSE has been adopted.
6.2.3 3GPP Considerations
Editor’s Note: This clause does not include any conclusions.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.3 IKEv2
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.3.1 General
|
The IETF IPSECME group has introduced multiple RFCs and Drafts to enable a smooth PQC transition for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) protocol. They cover both key exchange and authentication.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.3.2 Current Work in IETF
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.3.2.1 IETF RFCs
|
6.3.2.1.1 Key Exchange
KEM-based Key Exchange
• IETF RFC 9242 [43] introduces a new exchange, called "Intermediate Exchange" for IKEv2 to avoid IP fragmentation of large IKE messages and enable transferring large amounts of data during Security Association (SA) establishment expected for some PQC key exchanges.
• IETF RFC 9370 [44] describes a method to perform multiple successive key exchanges in IKEv2. It allows integration of PQC in IKEv2 and the negotiation of one or more PQC algorithms, in addition to the existing (EC)DH key exchange data that provides backward compatibility.
• IETF RFC 7383, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Message Fragmentation" [49] describes a way to avoid IP fragmentation of large Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) messages, which is necessary when using ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA, or SLH-DSA.
PSK-based Key Exchange
- IETF RFC 8784 [47] describes an extension of IKEv2 resistant to quantum computers using pre-shared keys.
6.3.2.1.2 Authentication and Signature
- IETF RFC 9593 [46] defines a mechanism that allows implementations of IKEv2 to indicate the list of supported authentication methods to their peers while establishing IKEv2 SAs. This mechanism improves interoperability when IKEv2 partners are configured with multiple credentials of different types (for example, ECC-based certificate and PQC-based certificate) for authenticating each other.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.3.2.2 IETF WG Drafts
|
6.3.2.2.1 Key Exchange
KEM-based Key Exchange
• IETF Draft draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-03, "Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)" [45] proposes to use the ML-KEM [21] as an additional key exchange in IKEv2 along with traditional key exchanges.
• IETF Draft draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-04, "Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) using PQC" [69], specifies a generic mechanism for integrating post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) digital signature algorithms into the IKEv2 protocol.
PSK-based Key Exchange
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-qr-alt-10, "Mixing Preshared Keys in the IKE_INTERMEDIATE and in the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchanges of IKEv2 for Post-quantum Security" [78] defines an alternative way to provide protection against quantum computers, which is similar to the solution defined in RFC 8784 [47], but also protects the initial IKEv2 SA.
6.3.2.2.2 Authentication and Signatures
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-04, "Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) using PQC" [48] outlines how Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signatures (ML-DSA) [22] and Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signatures (SLH-DSA) [23], can be employed as authentication methods within the IKEv2.
6.3.3 3GPP Considerations
Editor’s Note: This clause does not include any conclusions.
6.4 JOSE
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.4.1 General
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.4.2 Current Work in IETF
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.4.2.1 IETF RFCs
|
No RFCs for the usage of PQC algorithms in JWE or JWS are published yet.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.4.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
|
The IETF is developing support for PQC algorithms in JOSE. The following drafts are relevant:
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-jose-pqc-kem-03, "Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ KEMs) for JOSE and COSE" [67], describes the conventions for using Post-Quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (PQ-KEMs) within JOSE and COSE.
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-08, "ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE" [68], describes JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) serializations for Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA).
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus-05: "SLH-DSA for JOSE and COSE" [69], describes JOSE and COSE serializations for SLH-DSA.
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-cose-falcon-01, "JOSE and COSE Encoding for Falcon" [70], describes JSON and CBOR serializations.
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-jose-hpke-encrypt-12, "Use of Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) with JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)" [71] defines a Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) for use with JOSE utilizing an asymmetric Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), a Key Derivation Function (KDF), and an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm.
However, no IETF work on hybrid signature schemes for JOSE has been adopted.
6.4.3 3GPP Considerations
Editor’s Note: This clause does not include any conclusions.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.5 PKI certificate
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.5.1 General
|
The IETF LAMPS group has introduced multiple Drafts to enable a smooth transition to PQC in PKIX to provide quantum-resistant security for PKIX.
6.5.2 Current Work in IETF
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.5.2.1 IETF RFCs
|
• IETF RFC 9802 [51] has specified algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding format for several stateful Hash-Based Signature (HBS) schemes: Hierarchical Signature System (HSS), eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), and a multi-tree variant of XMSS, XMSS^MT. These schemes are applicable to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) when digital signatures are used to sign certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs).
- IETF RFC 9763 [50] defines a method for requesting and issuing two X.509 end-entity certificates for the same entity, in order to perform two authentications using the two certificates where each certificate corresponds to a distinct digital signature.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.5.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
|
• IETF Draft draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-11 "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)" [52] specifies the conventions for using the ML-KEM [21] in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure.
• IETF Draft draft-ietf-lamps-x509-slhdsa-09, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Algorithm Identifiers for SLH-DSA" [53] specifies to the conventions for using the SLH-DSA [23] in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure.
• IETF Draft draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-13, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)" [54] specifies the conventions for using the ML-DSA [22] in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure.
• IETF Draft draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem-08 "Composite ML-KEM for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure" [55] defines a specific instantiation of the PQT Hybrid paradigm called "composite" where multiple cryptographic algorithms (i.e. ML-KEM [21] in hybrid with traditional algorithms RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, and X448) are combined to form a single key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) presenting a single public key and ciphertext such that it can be treated as a single atomic algorithm at the protocol level.
- IETF Draft draft-ietf-lamps-certdiscovery-01, "A Mechanism for X.509 Certificate Discovery" [56] specifies a method to discover a secondary X.509 certificate associated with an X.509 certificate to enable efficient multi-certificate handling in protocols.
6.5.3 3GPP Considerations
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.6 TLS 1.2
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.6.1 General
|
The TLS 1.2 handshake in IETF RFC 5246 [57] is used in TLS 1.2, DTLS 1.2, and EAP-TLS 1.2. The DTLS handshake is also applied in DTLS over SCTP and can be used in DTLS-SRTP.
The 3GPP TLS profile is defined in clause 6.2 of 3GPP TS 33.210 [59]. Since Release 15, TLS 1.3 has been mandatory for all 3GPP core network nodes, and from Release 16 onward, it is mandatory for all nodes. Because TLS always negotiates the highest mutually supported version, any use of TLS 1.2 in a 3GPP system from Rel-16 onward implies that at least one node is non-compliant with 3GPP specifications.
While a fully updated TLS 1.2 implementation could theoretically provide strong security against classical adversaries in scenarios where identity protection is not required, in practice, TLS 1.2 is only negotiated by outdated implementations. These often suffer from one or more known vulnerabilities.
Therefore, TLS 1.2 is expected to already have been fully phased out in 5G systems.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.6.2 Current Work in IETF
|
TLS 1.2 has been obsoleted since 2018, as superseded by TLS 1.3 in IETF RFC 8446 [58]. The IETF will no longer approve any additions or updates to TLS 1.2, including PQC support (IETF draft-ietf-tls-tls12-frozen-08 [60]).
6.6.3 3GPP Considerations
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.7 TLS 1.3
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.7.1 General
|
The TLS 1.3 handshake protocol as defined in clause 4 of IETF RFC 8446 [58] is used in TLS 1.3, EAP-TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.3, and QUIC, and it can also be used in DTLS-SRTP. Since Release 15, TLS 1.3 has been mandatory to implement for the core network (cf. Annex E in TS 33.310 v15.0.0), and starting in Release 16, it has been mandatory to implement also for the ME (cf. Annex E in TS 33.310 v16.0.0).
IETF is in general recommending hybridization of KEMs and the hybrid KEM X25519MLKEM768 [65] has already received widespread implementation support and is the default in OpenSSL, Firefox, Chrome, Edge, Go, and other major platforms. According to Cloudflare, nearly 40% of all HTTPS client requests now use X25519MLKEM768. Standalone ML-KEM [64], ML-DSA [66] have seen more limited implementation but are supported in OpenSSL 3.5 LTS.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.7.2 Current Work in IETF
|
The IETF has prioritized post-quantum migration in TLS based on maturity [61]:
• Now (Hybrid + Pure ML-KEM)
• Later (signatures)
• Much later (dual certificates/composite signatures)
Hybrid signatures are significantly less mature and the TLS working group has explicitly decided not to adopt work on hybrid signatures until "much later" [61], making them out of scope for this study.
The IETF TLS Working Group has introduced multiple drafts to enable a smooth transition to PQC in TLS 1.3. These proposals address both key exchange and authentication. These mechanisms collectively aim to maintain interoperability, minimize latency, and provide quantum-resistant security during and after the PQC transition.
In an LS to GSMA, TLS WG stated that they believe [65] is stable enough to be used as normative reference, and that referencing an adopted draft normatively is a practice that other organizations follow as well and that the TLS WG concur with that practice, particularly in this case [62].
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.7.2.1 IETF RFCs
|
No RFCs for the usage of PQC algorithms in TLS 1.3 are published yet.
Editor's Note: several of the adopted drafts are in the final stages and may be published before this document is finalised.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
6.7.2.2 IETF Adopted Drafts
|
- draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-16, "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3" [63], specifies combining multiple key exchange algorithms (e.g., classical ECDHE with a PQ KEM) so that session security holds if at least one component remains secure.
- draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-04, "ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3" [64], proposes to use the NIST specified ML-KEM [21] in TLS 1.3.
- draft-ietf-tls-mldsa-00, "Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3" [66], proposes to use the NIST specified ML-DSA [22] in TLS 1.3.
- draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem-00, "Post-quantum hybrid ECDHE-MLKEM Key Agreement for TLSv1.3" [65], defines three hybrid key agreements for TLS 1.3: X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768, and SecP384r1MLKEM1024.
6.7.3 3GPP Considerations
Editor’s Note: This clause does not include any conclusions.
7 Protocols expected to be updated for PQC by 3GPP
Editor’s Note: This clause contains identification of the protocols with asymmetric cryptography listed in TR 33.938 that are not expected to be updated by other SDOs in a near future to use PQC, e.g., MIKEY-SAKKE and SUCI calculation, security threats and alternative solutions for the 3GPP procedures if they are not updated to use PQC.
|
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
7.1 Threats
| |
6b0cfa87724d0cec8e1fdedaf906ef6b
|
33.703
|
7.1.1 General
|
Most of security protocols used in 3GPP systems are specified in other standards development organizations (SDOs). In case that these protocols are not updated to use PQC in other SDOs, the 3GPP system may be vulnerable to attacks based on quantum computation. The clause 7.2 contains all of these protocols identified and potential solutions to address the issues.
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.