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5.1.2 Security threats
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A misconfigured or compromised NR Femto device with valid credentials and subscription to serve the victim UE can pose various threats including authentication replay attacks, broadcasting CAG IDs that it is not authorized to serve, denial of service attacks, etc.to the connected UEs.
A misconfigured or compromised NR Femto device with valid credentials and subscription to connect to the SeGW can pose various threats including abnormal traffics, abnormal signalling messages, denial of service attacks to the NR Femto MS and the core network.
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5.1.3 Potential security requirements
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The 5G system shall be able to detect misconfigured or compromised femto devices and eliminate associated risks, e.g. preventing the abnormal traffics/signalling threats.
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5.2 Key Issue #2: Security and privacy aspect for local access
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5.2.1 Key issue details
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As defined in TS 23.501 [2] for NR Femto, if a local UPF is deployed close to the location of NR Femto node, the edge computing functionality shall be applied and the deployment options of NR Femto with a locally deployed UPF is also given the annex V. The security and privacy aspect for NR Femto and locally deployed UPF supporting edge computing was not discussed R19.
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5.2.2 Security threats
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The locally deployed UPF is located outside the operator’s security domain, if the 5GS core network topology is not hided towards locally deployed UPF, the core network topology and address information may be exposed outside the operator’s security domain.
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5.2.3 Potential security requirements
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The 5GS should support a mechanism to provide secure local access services for NR Femto.
The 5GS should support a mechanism to hide the 5GS core network topology from the locally deployed UPF.
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5.3 Key Issue #3: Security protection for the NR Femto MS
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5.3.1 Key issue details
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As defined in clause 4.1 of TS 33.545 [3], an NR Femto node connects to NR Femto Management System (NR Femto MS) directly or connects to NR Femto MS via Security Gateway (SeGW) . The NR Femto MS server may be located inside the operator's access or core network (accessible on the MNO Intranet) or outside of it (accessible on the public Internet). When the NR Femto MS server located outside the operator’s network, it will introduce the public internet exposure and related security risk, e.g. DDoS attack, Vulnerability exploitation attack. When the NR Femto MS server located inside the operator’s network, the NR Femto MS topology shall not be directly exposed to the NR Femto which is missed in TS 33.545 [3]. Therefore, the security protection for the NR Femto MS in the 5GS need to be enhance in Release 20.
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5.3.2 Security threats
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The NR Femto MS may be subjected to attacks such as DDoS and Vulnerability exploitation, as it directly connect to a compromised NR Femto and is exposed to public internet when it located outside the operator’s network.
The NR Femto MS topology may be directly exposed to a compromised NR Femto device when it located inside the operator’s network.
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5.3.3 Potential security requirements
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3GPP shall provide deployment recommendations for NR Femto MS in the 5GS from a security perspective.
NOTE: Recommendation or Mandate to deploy the NR Femto MS server inside the operator’s network and connect to the NR Femto device via SeGW can help strengthen the security of NR Femto MS.
The 5GS shall provide a means to support the topology hiding between the NR Femto and the NR Femto MS when the NR Femto MS is located inside the operator’s network.
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5.4 Key Issue #4: Mitigation of QoSA in edge computing
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5.4.1 Key issue details
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Quality of Service (QoS) based Attack (QoSA) exploits UE access to the user plane to cause a DoS attack on the control plane in the core network. It consists of using a set of compromised UEs or UPFs to forge and transmit incorrect QoS measurements to the network to trick core network into considering that a QoS violation occurred. Such QoS violation will be later reported to a target NF such as the SMF. The high number of QoS monitoring reports will cause a DoS on the target NF (e.g., SMF) receiving them.
NR Femto architecture supports edge computing services. In edge computing services, the user plane latency is a key parameter when considering edge relocation. Incorrect QoS measurements will affect the selection of local UPF and the quality of edge computing services.
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5.4.2 Security threats
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A set of compromised UEs or UPFs can forge and transmit incorrect QoS measurements to the core network can cause DoS attack on the NFs receiving the measurements.
Incorrect QoS measurement will affect the selection of local UPF and the quality of edge computing services.
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5.4.3 Potential security requirements
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The 5GS shall provide mechanisms to detect and mitigate QoSA in NR Femto edge computing services.
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5.5 Key Issue #5: hardware hardening for the NR Femto
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5.5.1 Key issue details
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Some commercial Femto nodes lack essential hardware hardening, e.g., disabling the debug interfaces, thus allowing an attacker to gain direct local access to the Femto nodes and perform further exploitation.
Common debug interfaces include the Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART), which allows serial communication with the device, and the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) interface, which enables low-level hardware debugging and control.
For example, using those debug interfaces, the researchers were able to extract the contents of the flash memory of the femtocell to obtain the firmware image, unpack the firmware file system, and manually identify and extract embedded credentials.
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5.5.2 Security threats
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Without hardware hardening, such as disabling debug interfaces, an attacker could gain direct access to NR Femto nodes to perform further exploitation, such as extracting embedded credentials.
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5.5.3 Potential security requirements
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NR Femto nodes shall harden the hardware platform, including protecting the debug interfaces with strong authentication and authorization, and/or disabling the debug interfaces in commercial deployment.
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential security requirements
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6 Solutions
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6.1 Mapping of solutions to key issues
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Table 6.0-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
KI#4
KI#5
1
X
2
X
3
X
4
X
5
X
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6.2 Solution #1: Security detection of misconfigured 5G NR Femto node
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6.2.1 Introduction
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This solution address the KI #1: Detection of misconfigured/compromised 5G NR Femto node.
It is propose to enhance the 5G NR Femto node to support to report itself configuration information for security detection and monitoring to the security management function which is a part of the 5G NR Femto MS.
It is propose to enhance the 5G NR Femto MS to support the security management function which can receive the configuration information from the 5G NR Femto node and perform the security detection and monitoring based on operator’s policy.
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6.2.2 Solution details
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The security procedure for security detection of 5G NR Femto node are further depicted in Figure 6.2.2.1-1.
Figure 6.2.2.1-1: Security procedure for security detection of 5G NR Femto node
0a. The 5G NR Femto node and Security gateway has established a secure connection of management plane with the Security Management function respectively.
NOTE 1: The Security Management function is apart of the 5G NR Femto node MS.
0b. The 5G NR Femto node has established IPSec tunnels with the Security gateway.
1. The Security Management function configures the 5G NR Femto node for security data collection for detection of the misconfigured 5G NR Femto node according to the operator’s policy.
2. The 5G NR Femto node collect and report itself configuration information for security detection and monitoring to the Security Management function. The transmission of configuration information are protected by the security connection of management plane.
NOTE 2: The collected typical configuration information can be running processes, secure password configurations, open ports and services, user permissions, and so on.
3. The Security Management function perform the security detection and monitoring based on the configuration information collected from the 5G NR Femto node.
NOTE 3: Detail methods of security detection are not specified in this document. Operators can assess the security risks of current Femto node by checking their configuration status, and then implement corresponding security hardening to prevent the potential attacks on Femto node.
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6.2.3 Evaluation
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Editor’s Note: Evaluation is FFS.
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6.3 Solution #2: Security for detection of misconfigured/compromised NR Femto
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6.3.1 Introduction
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A misconfigured or compromised NR Femto device with valid credentials and subscription to connect to the SeGW can pose various threats on the UEs as well as on the operator’s network. NR Femto nodes are expected to comply with location restrictions. Residential or enterprise Femto nodes are allowed to cover a limited geographical region within an area which is known and can be verified by the core network. Attacker in possession of a misconfigured or compromised NR Femto is likely to use it at locations which are different from what the NR Femto node is registered for. If attackers are prohibited from using such compromised NR Femto nodes in any other location, risks against all attacks from compromised NR Femto nodes can be mitigated.
This solution proposes to use location verification methods as described in clause 5.4.1 of TS 33.545 [3] to detect misconfigured location information and there by detection ofcompromised femto devices and eliminate associated risks. Also, this solution proposes to give higher precedence to location verification methods which cannot be controlled or tampered by compromised NR Femtos.
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6.3.2 Solution details
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Following steps are followed:
• Following information about a valid registered NR Femto can be stored in UDM:
◦ NR Femto's geographic location information
◦ NR Femto's neighboring cell IDs, PCI, etc.
◦ NR Femto's neighboring cell locations
• After successful authentication and NAS security context establishment via NR Femtocell, UE can include its location in a NAS message sent to the AMF. Also, NR Femto ID, CAG list received from NR Femto and access mode of the NR Femtocell can be included by the UE in this message.
◦ Alternatively, AMF can obtain UE’s location information from LMF.
• AMF can also request UE to provide neighbour cell measurements to obtain details about neighbouring cells including neighbouring cell IDs, PCI, etc.
• AMF OR AUSF can perform following checks with inputs from NR Femto details stored in the UDM:
◦ Check if UE location is within expected geographical coverage area of NR Femto
◦ Check NR Femto location using neighbouring cells locations
◦ Verify the NR Femto's configured Access Mode and supported CAG list
◦ Perform IP based, SeGW based location verification
• IF any of the checks fail to validate that the NR Femto node is in the same location where it is supposed to be, following steps are performed:
◦ At SeGW, delete any IPSec tunnel existing with the NR Femto node, and revoke the Femto node’s certificate.
◦ Any NG_SETUP_REQUEST from the NR Femto is rejected with cause = un-authorized NR Femto
◦ Instruct neighbouring cells to reject any Handover requests to/from the NR Femtocells hosted by the NR Femto node.
◦ Inform UEs connecting via the NR Femtocells associated with this NR Femto node to remove the cells from cell selection criteria.
Editor’s Note: Further detailed description of solution with figure is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Once detected, how to eliminate the risks associated with compromised/malicious Femto devices and safeguard UEs and 5GS from attacks is FFS.
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6.3.3 Evaluation
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TBD
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6.4 Solution #3: Enhance SeGW to support security protection for N4 interface
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6.4.1 Introduction
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This solution addresses key issue #2. Considering the locally deployed UPF is located outside the operator’s security domain and interact with core network through N4 interface, which leads to the exposure threats to the core network, this solution propose to enhance the Security Gateway as defined in TS 33.545 [3] to prevent core network against the attacks through N4 interface. Locally deployed UPF shall securely communicate with SMF via SeGW in front of 5GC over N4 interface. All N4 related input/output traffic over the trust boundary should be delegated and protected by Security Gateway.
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6.4.2 Solution details
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6.4.2.1 Security architecture
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The security aspect enhancements to system architecture of clause 4.1 in TS 33.545 [3] for security protection for N4 interface are further depicted in Figure 6.4.2.1-1.
Figure 6.4.2.1-1: Enhancement for security architecture of NR Femto
Security protections provided by the Security Gateway for the traffic through N4 interface between locally deployed UPF and SMF deployed in core network over the trust boundary can be categorized in the following way:
- Topology information hiding of the core network;
- Signalling message filtration;
- Security protection between the locally deployed UPF and the Security Gateway;
- Access control etc.
NOTE: It is assume that NR Femto GW is integrated with SeGW in this solution. Whether the above N4 security protection function is provide by NR Femto GW or SeGW is left to implementation.
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6.4.2.2 Topology hiding
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The core network topology shall not be directly exposed to the locally deployed UPF through N4 interface.
The SeGW shall hide the 5GC topology so that the core network entity address information (such as IP addresses of SMF etc.) are not inadvertently exposed to the locally deployed UPF.
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6.4.2.3 Signalling message filtration
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The Security Gateway shall supports to discard malformed signalling messages sent from the locally deployed UPF through N4 interface over the trust boundary according to 3GPP specifications.
The Security Gateway shall supports to block messages with wrong NF types sent from the locally deployed UPF through N4 interface over the trust boundary according to 3GPP specifications.
The Security Gateway supports the rate-limiting functionalities to defend itself and core network NFs against excessive or overload signalling messages of N4 interface.
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6.4.2.4 Security protection
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Security requirements and functions as defined in clause 4.2.1.7 of TS 33.545 [3] can provide the mutual authentication and transport protection between the locally deployed UPF and the Security Gateway.
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6.4.2.5 Access control
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The Security Gateway shall supports the access control mechanism for the locally deployed UPF accessing the SMF deployed in core network, e.g. configure the access control list.
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6.4.3 Evaluation
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Editor’s Note: Evaluation of this solution is FFS.
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6.5 Solution #4: Security of local UPF
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6.5.1 Introduction
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This solution proposes the following:
• Perform additional verification of parameters when UE attempts to setup PDU session or sends service requests to local UPF.
• Use either NATing OR Femto Gateway to hide network topology from local UPF
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6.5.2 Solution details
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When UE attempts PDU session establishment or sends service request to local UPF, following additional steps are followed for additional verification:
• 5GC performs additional verfication for local UPF by:
◦ Verifying that the gNB ID maps to NR Femto node
◦ Verifying that the local UPF ID maps to the NR Femto node
◦ Verify that the UE has required subscription to access the local UPF
• If the above additional verification succeeds:
◦ 5GC provides local UPF related configurations to NR Femto node, including routing and security information to enable local UPF connectivity with SMF (over N4 interface).
◦ Security configuration must ensure that the local UPF connects to 5GC via SeGW and relevant local UPF specific certificates can also be provided. Separate certificates for local UPF can also enable independent security associations being created with the SeGW.
◦ The routing related configuration is made such that either a NATing or an interface via NR Femto Gateway is used by local UPF to hide the topology of 5GC.
• If the additional verification fails, 5GC informs the UE and ensure that UE is not able to use local UPF. Also, 5GC may take any relevant risk mitigation actions depending on the reasons for the additional verification failures.
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6.5.3 Evaluation
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6.6 Solution #5: Security protection for NR Femto MS
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6.6.1 Introduction
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This solution address the KI #3: security protection for NR Femto MS. It is propose to enhance the security architecture and requirements of NR Femto which is defined in clause 4 of TS 33.545 [3] as the follow aspects:
- Provide deployment recommendations for NR Femto MS in the 5GS from a security perspective.
- Enhance the SeGW to support the topology hiding between the NR Femto and the NR Femto MS, when the NR Femto MS is located inside the operator’s network.
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6.6.2 Solution details
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6.6.2.1 Enhancement for security architecture of NR Femto
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The security aspect enhancements to system architecture of NR Femto for security purpose are further depicted in Figure 6.6.2.1-1.
Figure 6.6.2.1-1: Enhancement for security architecture of NR Femto
Consider the NR Femto MS may be subjected to attacks when it located outside the operator’s network, such as DDoS and Vulnerability exploitation, as it directly connect to a compromised NR Femto and is exposed to public internet. It is mandate to deploy the NR Femto MS server inside the operator's network and connect to the NR Femto device via SeGW from a security perspective.
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6.6.2.1 Topology hiding between the NR Femto and the NR Femto MS
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The NR Femto Management System server topology shall not be directly exposed to the NR Femto.
When the NR Femto MS server located inside the operator’s network, the SeGW shall hide the NR Femto Management System server topology so that the NR Femto Management System server address information (such as IP addresses and port etc.) are not inadvertently exposed to the NR Femto.
NOTE: It is assume that NR Femto GW is integrated with SeGW in this solution. Whether the topology hiding function is provide by NR Femto GW or SeGW is left to implementation.
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6.6.3 Evaluation
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This solution addresses the requirements of KI#3 i.e. provide deployment recommendations for NR Femto MS in the 5GS from a security perspective, support the topology hiding between the NR Femto and the NR Femto MS.
This solution proposes to mandate to deploy the NR Femto MS server inside the operator’s network and connect to the NR Femto device via SeGW. The SeGW or NR Femto GW shall hide the NR Femto Management System server topology so that the NR Femto Management System server address information (such as IP addresses and port etc.) are not inadvertently exposed to the NR Femto.
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation is FFS.
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
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7 Conclusions
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Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
Annex <X> :
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-252616
TR skeleton.
0.0.0
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-253007
Incorporated changes from S3-253008, S3-253009 and S3-253010.
0.1.0
2025-10
SA3#124
S3-253738
Incorporated changes from S3-253468, S3-253522, S3-253813, S3-253814, S3-253815, S3-253816, S3-253817, S3-253818 and S3-253819.
0.2.0
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1 Scope
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The present document studies the applicability and adaptation of the GNP threats/assets in TR 33.926 [2], the GVNP threats/assets in TR 33.927 [3] and the existing general SCAS test cases in TS 33.117 [4] to generic 3GPP container-based network products (GCNPs).
It identifies:
- Critical assets and threats relevant to GCNPs, including adaptations of existing threats and new GCNP-specific threats.
- Applicability of existing SCAS test cases to GCNPs.
- New or modified test cases to address GCNP-specific threats and deployment characteristics.
The study focuses on GCNPs where the container orchestration platform (e.g. Kubernetes) and container runtime are part of the evaluated network product boundary.
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2 References
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The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TR 33.926: „Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes“
[3] 3GPP TR 33.927: „Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); threats and critical assets in 3GPP virtualized network product classes“
[4] 3GPP TS 33.117: „Catalogue of general security assurance requirements“
[5] ETSI GS NFV-IFA 011: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 3; Management and Orchestration; VNF Descriptor and Packaging Specification".
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3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
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3.2 Symbols
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For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
CISM Container Infrastructure Service Management
CNF Containerized Network Function
CNI Container Network Interface
GCNP Generic Containerized Network Product
GNP Generic Network Product
GVNP Generic Virtualized Network Product
VNF Virtualized Network Function
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4 Assumptions
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A Generic Container-based Network Product (GCNP) constitutes a minimal container product consisting of:
- Container image(s) containing the network function implementation and dependencies
- Image registry reference with associated metadata (tags, manifests)
- Basic configuration parameters (environment variables, command arguments)
- Minimal deployment descriptors (orchestration manifests)
Beyond the minimal container product, GCNP vendor offerings may represent different product packaging classes of increasing sophistication:
- Templated Package Product: Vendor-supplied templated deployment packages (e.g., Helm charts, Kustomize overlays) with comprehensive configuration management and standardized packaging for simplified customer deployment
- Enhanced Container Product: Vendor-provided Custom Resource Definitions (CRDs), installation scripts, and comprehensive deployment automation, enabling platform-agnostic deployment with advanced lifecycle capabilities
- Platform-ready Product: Complete vendor-delivered solution including monitoring components, observability integration, backup/restore procedures, and comprehensive documentation for enterprise platform integration
NOTE: Operator-based automation and platform-specific integrations are typically implemented by system integrators or customer platform teams rather than delivered directly by network function vendors.
The GCNP operates within a container orchestration environment that is either:
- included within the network product boundary, or
- assumed to have undergone equivalent security assurance evaluation if residing outside the product boundary
The GCNP may consist of multiple containers (pods) forming the network function.
The Vendor defines the product boundaries in accordance with SECAM principles as established in TR 33.916, clause 4.2.
The minimal GCNP (Container images, orchestration manifests, and runtime configuration) is under the vendor's control, within the scope of security evaluation.
Networking between GCNP components utilizes a Container Network Interface (CNI) plugin; security controls at the orchestration level fall within scope if contained within the product boundary.
Host OS and underlying hardware platform security remain out of scope unless explicitly included in the vendor-defined product boundary.
The security assurance methodology follows the principles established in TR 33.916, clause 5, with environmental assumptions requiring validation during deployment by the network operator.
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5 Assets and threats for Container-based Products
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5.1 Introduction
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The present clause contains assets and threats that are believed to apply to more than one container-based network product (GCNP).
The format follows TR 33.926 [2] and TR 33.927 [3] to allow alignment with existing SCAS threat catalogues, with adaptations for containerized deployments.
Container-based network products may consist of multiple container images orchestrated by a container orchestration platform (e.g. Kubernetes), either included in the product boundary or assumed to have undergone equivalent evaluation. The threats below cover both intra-GCNP interactions and interfaces between the GCNP and external entities (e.g. OAM systems, service-based interfaces).
5.2 Critical Assets
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5.2.1 Mapping of existing Critical Assets from GNP
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Mapping of critical assets of GNP (see TR 33.926 [2], clause 5.2) to GCNP.
Critical Asset for GNP
Applicablity for GCNP
User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords)
applicable for GCNP
Log data
applicable for GCNP
Configuration data, e.g. GNP's IP address, ports, VPN ID, Management Objects (e.g. user group, command group) etc.
applicable for GCNP with adaptations
Operating System (OS), i.e. the files that make up the OS and its processes (code and data)
applicable for GCNP with adaptations
GNP Application
applicable for GCNP with adaptations
Sufficient processing capacity: that processing powers are not consumed close to limits
not applicable
Hardware, e.g. mainframe, board, power supply unit etc.
not applicable
Console interface, for local access
applicable for GCNP
OAM interface, for remote access
applicable for GCNP
GNP Software: binary code or executable code
applicable for GCNP
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.2.2 Mapping of existing Critical Assets from GVNP
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Mapping of critical assets of GVNP (see TR 33.927 [3], clause 5.2.1) to GCNP.
Critical Asset for GVNP
Applicablity for GCNP
User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords, private key)
applicable for GCNP
Log data
applicable for GCNP
Configuration data, e.g. GVNP's IP address, ports, VPN ID, Management Objects (e.g. user group, command group) etc.
applicable for GCNP with adaptations
Guest Operating System, i.e. the files that make up the guest OS and its processes (code and data)
applicable for GCNP with adaptations
GVNP Application
applicable for GCNP with adaptations
Sufficient processing capacity: that processing powers are not consumed close to limits
not applicable
OAM interface, for remote access: interface between GVNP and OAM system
applicable for GCNP with adaptations
Interface between virtualised network function (VNF) and VNFM
applicable for GCNP with adaptations
Interface between VNF and virtualisation layer, for providing the execution environment to run VNF
applicable for GCNP with adaptations
GVNP Software package (binary code or executable code) which includes:
- VNFD;
- VNF image and image description file;
- Configuration data (e.g. manifest file as defined in [5])
applicable for GCNP with adaptations
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33.730
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5.2.3 Critical Assets for GCNP
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List of new, copied and derived critical assets for GCNP.
Critical Asset for GCNP
Origin
User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords, private key, API tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens)
copied from GNP and GVNP
Log data (container logs, orchestrator audit logs, security event logs)
copied from GNP and GVNP
Configuration data - including CNF’s network configuration (IP addresses, ports, VPN IDs), orchestration manifests, Helm charts, Kubernetes RBAC policies, and CNI network policies
copied from GNP and GVNP
Container images - including base images, application layers, manifests, and associated image signatures
derived from GNP and GVNP
The GCNP shares the hosts kernel and a base image is provided containing the minimal userland from another OS.
Guest operating system layers inside containers - including files and processes of the container image OS layer
derived from GNP and GVNP
Container orchestration configuration - e.g. Deployment/StatefulSet specs, PodSecurity settings, NetworkPolicies
new for GNP
GCNP Application - the software components implementing 3GPP-defined NF functionality
derived from GNP and GVNP
Sufficient processing capacity: that processing powers are not consumed close to limits
derived from GNP and GVNP
Sufficient storage capacity: limited or exhausted storage capacity should not hinder the functionality
new for GNP
Service interfaces defined in relevant 3GPP specifications
copied from GNP and NF-specific sections
Service interfaces not defined by 3GPP but exposed by the CNF, container orchestration API
new for GCNP
OAM interface, for remote access: interface between GCNP and OAM system
derived from GNP and GVNP
Interface between GCNP workloads and the orchestration control plane (e.g. Kubernetes API) - In the container SCAS context, the VNFM role is effectively handled by the Container Infrastructure Service Management (CISM),
new for GCNP
Interface between GCNP workloads and containerization layer, for providing the execution environment to run CNF; CNI - Execution environment interface between container runtime and orchestration platform
new for GCNP
5.3 Threats
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.1 Generic threats format
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Threats are described using the following format:
- Threat Name:
- Threat Category:
- Threat Description:
- Threatened Asset:
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33.730
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5.3.2 Generic threats for GCNP
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.1 Introduction
|
The common STRIDE threat categories used in TR 33.926 [2], clause 5.3.1 also apply to GCNP. Many generic threats from TR 33.926 clause 5.3 are applicable with adaptation for container contexts. In addition, GCNP have unique threats due to container runtime, orchestration APIs, and image distribution.
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.2 Threats related to 3GPP-defined interfaces
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GCNP inherit all the threats related to 3GPP-defined interfaces in TR 33.926 [2], clause 5.3.2, without any changes. It means that there is no need repeat the threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces which are covered in 3GPP security specifications. If threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces are found to be not sufficiently covered in existing 3GPP security specifications, they need to be addressed in the SCAS for containerized network products.
As in TR 33.927. clause 5.3.2.2, threats for 3GPP-defined interfaces are as per TR 33.926, clause 5.3.2 unless GCNP-specific considerations arise (e.g. exposure of SBA endpoints through orchestration misconfiguration). If existing protections are absent or misconfigured, these interfaces remain in scope for container SCAS.
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.3 Threats related to interfaces introduced in container environments
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Two interfaces unique to GCNP are identified as critical assets:
- Interface between GCNP workloads and the orchestration control plane (e.g. Kubernetes API).
- Interface between GCNP workloads and the container runtime API (e.g. Docker socket, containerd API).
If unprotected, these interfaces can be exploited for privilege escalation, container escape, or manipulation of other workloads.
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.4 Spoofing identity
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.4.1 Default Accounts
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The threat in clause 5.3.3.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
The difference is that VNF is accessed through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface, an attacker can use a default account to access a CNF via VNC.
Default accounts can be present in container images.
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.4.2 Weak Password Policies
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The threat in clause 5.3.3.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
However, the attacker using the weak password accesses GCNP through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.4.3 Password peek
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The threat in clause 5.3.3.3 of TR 33.926 applies to GCNP.
However, the attacker using the peeked password accesses GCNP through VNC (Virtual Network Console) rather than through the physical console interface.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.4.4 Direct Root Access
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The threat in clause 5.3.3.4 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.4.5 IP Spoofing
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The threat in clause 5.3.3.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
However, the objective of unauthorized access is a VNF, not a computer.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.4.6 Malware
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The threat in clause 5.3.3.6 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.4.7 Eavesdropping
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The threat in clause 5.3.3.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.4.8 Service Account Token Abuse
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- Threat Name: Service Account Token Abuse
- Threat Category: Spoofing identity
- Threat Description: An attacker could steal a Kubernetes service account token from a pod and use it to impersonate the GCNP, resulting in the attacker being able to interact with the container API, enumerate resources, privilege escalation, lateral movement, data exfiltration and abuse of resources resulting in denial of service.
- Threatened Asset: Kubernetes API credentials
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.4.9 API Endpoint Impersonation
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An attacker could spoof an orchestration API or SBA endpoint to mislead GCNP components.
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33.730
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5.3.2.5 Tampering
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.5.1 Software Tampering
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The threat in clause 5.3.4.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
Different from traditional physical network products, the entire GCNP is instantiated from the container image(s) and other information (e.g. configuration data, software environmental parameters, license terms information, script, manifest file, checksum, etc.).
- Threat Name: Software Tampering
- Threat Category: Tampering
- Threat Description: Compared with GNP software, GCNP software has additional attack surfaces, e.g. in the process of CNF package onboarding, during which the software package of a GCNP can be tampered/altered if not protected. An attacker, for example, can inject malicious code or tamper the information inside the unprotected package during on boarding. Then after the instantiation of the GCNP, the tampered code can be executed to conduct several attacks (e.g. DoS, Information Stealing, Frauds and so on).
- Threatened Asset: all critical assets of GCNP as listed in clause 5.2.1.
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.5.2 Ownership File Misuse
|
The threat in clause 5.3.4.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.5.3 Boot tampering
|
This threat is not applicable for GCNP since GCNP do not have a boot process in the traditional sense.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.5.4 Log Tampering
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The threat in clause 5.3.4.4 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.5.5 OAM traffic Tampering
|
The threat in clause 5.3.4.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.5.6 File Write Permissions Abuse
|
The threat in clause 5.3.4.6 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.5.7 User Session Tampering
|
The threat in clause 5.3.4.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.5.8 Exposed Containerization API
|
- Threat Name: Exposed Containerization API
- Threat Category: Tampering
- Threat Description: An attacker who gains access to this API can exploit it to escalate their privileges within the system, potentially gaining unauthorized access to sensitive container configurations, network settings, and runtime data. This elevated access allows them to manipulate container security contexts, modify resource allocations, and potentially compromise both the containerized applications and the underlying host system's security boundaries.
- Threatened Asset: orchestrator and runtime APIs
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.5.9 Image Registry Tampering
|
- Threat Name: Image Registry Tampering
- Threat Category: Tampering
- Threat Description: An attacker who gains unauthorized access to a container image registry can insert malicious layers or replace trusted images with backdoored versions. This allows the attacker to embed malware, backdoors, or exploit code within images that are later pulled and run by production environments. When a compromised image is deployed, the attacker can gain initial access to target systems, escalate privileges, or persist undetected within the cluster. The threat is particularly severe if production systems automatically pull images from registries without rigorous validation or scanning, potentially enabling widespread compromise across multiple services or environments.
- Threatened Asset: container image integrity
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.5.10 Pod Spec/Manifest Modification
|
- Threat Name: Pod Spec/Manifest Modification
- Threat Category: Tampering
- Threat Description: An attacker who alters deployment manifests or pod specifications can modify pod configurations to add elevated capabilities, host mounts, or enable privileged mode. This manipulation enables the attacker to bypass container isolation, gain root-level access on the host, and access sensitive files or resources outside the container. By exploiting these changes, the attacker can escalate privileges, compromise cluster security, persist undetected, and move laterally within the Kubernetes environment. Such unauthorized modifications increase the risk of data theft, operational disruption, and full cluster compromise, especially if security controls such as least privilege or Pod Security Standards are not enforced.
- Threatened Asset: deployment/manifest configurations
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.5.11 File Tampering inside Containers
|
- Threat Name: File Tampering inside Containers
- Threat Category: Tampering
- Threat Description: An attacker who gains access to a container with writable filesystem layers can modify container files if read-only enforcement is not applied. Such tampering allows insertion or alteration of binaries, scripts, or configuration files within the container environment. This can lead to persistence of malicious code, privilege escalation, disruption of application behaviour, data theft, or lateral movement within the cluster. The risk increases significantly when containers are configured without strict immutability policies or security contexts that enforce read-only root filesystems. File tampering may also undermine the integrity and trustworthiness of container images and deployed workloads, potentially causing widespread impact across the environment.
- Threatened Asset: in-container filesystem integrity
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.6 Repudiation
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.6.1 Lack of User Activity Trace
|
The threat in clause 5.3.5.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.6.2 Lack of Container-Level Audit Logging
|
- Threat Name: Lack of Container-Level Audit Logging
- Threat Category: Repudiation
- Threat Description: Absence of comprehensive audit logs for container-related events - such as container start/stop, image pulls, and capability assignments - creates a blind spot in monitoring and security. Without these logs, it becomes difficult or impossible to track user actions, detect unauthorized changes, or investigate suspicious activity within the container environment. This lack of traceability undermines accountability, making it easier for attackers or malicious insiders to repudiate their actions and evade detection or forensic analysis. The absence of container-level audit logging also hinders compliance with regulatory requirements and weakens the overall security posture by masking operational anomalies and potential attacks.
- Threatened Asset: container event traceability
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.6.3 Orchestrator Audit Logs Disabled
|
- Threat Name: Orchestrator Audit Logs Disabled
- Threat Category: Repudiation
- Threat Description: When Kubernetes orchestrator audit logs are disabled or not properly configured, it becomes impossible to prove or track actions taken via kubectl commands or API requests. This lack of audit trail severely undermines accountability and traceability within the cluster, enabling attackers or malicious insiders to perform unauthorized activities without leaving evidence. Without these logs, organizations lose critical visibility into who accessed or modified cluster resources, hindering detection of malicious behaviour, incident investigation, forensic analysis, and compliance with security policies or regulatory requirements. This gap increases the risk of undetected privilege escalation, unauthorized configuration changes, data tampering, or service disruptions, ultimately weakening the security posture and trustworthiness of the Kubernetes environment.
- Threatened Asset: orchestration control operations
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
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5.3.2.7 Information disclosure
| |
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
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5.3.2.7.1 Poor key generation
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.1 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
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5.3.2.7.2 Poor key management
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.2 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
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5.3.2.7.3 Weak cryptographic algorithms
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.3 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
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5.3.2.7.4 Insecure Data Storage
|
- Threat name: Insecure Data Storage
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure
- Threat Description: The GCNP remotely stores sensitive data (e.g. passwords, private keys) on the logical volume that the orchestrator allocates to the GCNP. An attacker can retrieve these data if they have been stored in an insecure way (e.g. clear text, unsalted hashes).
- Threatened Asset: any sensitive data stored on the logical volume of the GCNP
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
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5.3.2.7.5 System Fingerprinting
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.5 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
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5.3.2.7.6 Malware
|
- Threat name: Malware.
- Threat Category: Information Disclosure.
- Threat Description: A malware installed on the logical volume that the orchestrator allocates to the GCNP can access to the stored sensitive data (e.g. subscription data, logs).
- Threatened Asset: any sensitive data stored on the logical volume of the GCNP
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9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
|
33.730
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5.3.2.7.7 Personal Identification Information Violation
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.7 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
|
9d9514499aa7fba2cf30787bc1dd4cc4
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33.730
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5.3.2.7.8 Insecure Default Configuration
|
The threat in clause 5.3.6.8 of TR 33.926 [2] applies to GCNP.
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